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ABSTRACT
The ever-increasing growth of wireless systems has made them an essential part of our
daily life. People rely heavily on wireless networks for communications and to conduct
critical transactions from their mobile devices, including financial transactions, access
to health records, etc. The proliferation of wireless communication devices opens the
door for many security breaches, ranging from eavesdropping to jamming attacks. Such a
disadvantage stems from the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions, which creates an
exposed environment.
In this dissertation, we focus on eavesdropping attacks. While cryptographic tech-
niques can be used to thwart eavesdropping attacks and enable secure wireless commu-
nications, they are not sufficient to protect the lower-layer headers of a packet (i.e., PHY
and MAC headers). Hence, even though the secret message is encrypted, these unen-
crypted headers can be exploited by an adversary to extract invaluable information and
initiate malicious attacks (e.g., traffic classification). Physical-layer (PHY-layer) security
has been introduced as a promising candidate to prevent attacks that exploit unencrypted
lower layer headers.
PHY-layer security techniques typically rely on injecting an intentional interference
into the medium so as to confuse nearby eavesdroppers (Eve). Specifically, a legitimate
transmit-receive (Alice-Bob) pair generates a bogus signal, namely friendly jamming (FJ),
along with the information signal, to increase interference at Eve(s) but without affecting
the legitimate receiver (Bob). Depending on which end of a legitimate link is responsible
13
for generating the FJ signal, two types of FJ techniques exist: transmitter-based (TxFJ)
and receiver-based (RxFJ).
In this dissertation, we propose to advance the state-of-art in PHY-layer security
by considering multi-link scenarios, including multi-user multiple-input multiple-output
(MU-MIMO) and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. Specifically, we consider a scenario
where one or more external Eve(s) attempt to snoop on communications of various links.
In such networks, transmission of one link may be interfered with neighboring links’
transmissions. Thus, special care must be dedicated to handling interference.
In our first contribution in this dissertation, we consider a P2P network tapped by
external Eve(s) in which each Alice-Bob pair conceals its communications using TxFJ.
TxFJ is realized at Alice side using MIMO precoding. The goal is to design the precoders
for both information and TxFJ signals at all Alices so as to maximize a given utility
(e.g., sum of communication rates) while preventing eavesdropping elsewhere. Because
legitimate links do not cooperate with each other and there is no centralized authority
to perform optimization, every link selfishly aims at maximizing its secrecy rate. Using
non-cooperative game theory, we design a distributed method for maximizing the sum of
secrecy rates. Under the exact knowledge of eavesdropping channels, we show that our
distributed method has a comparable secrecy sum-rate to a centralized approach.
In our next contribution, we focus on employing practical precoders in our design for
a P2P network. Specifically, we employed a zero-forcing-based (ZF-based) precoder for
the TxFJ of each Alice-Bob pair in a P2P network. We also assume that each link has a
certain rate demand to be satisfied. In such a scenario, even though the non-cooperative
game designed for this P2P network is shown to be convergent to its unique Nash Equi-
librium (NE), there is still no guarantee that the resulting NE is Pareto-optimal. Hence,
we propose a modified price-based game, in which each link is penalized for generating
14
interference on other legitimate links. We show that the price-based game converges to
the Pareto-optimal point of secrecy rate region. We then leverage mixed-strategy games to
provide solutions that are robust to uncertainties in knowledge of eavesdropping channels.
The proposed ZF-based design of precoders is also implemented on software-defined ra-
dios to assess its performance on a single link in real-world scenarios.
In another contribution of this dissertation, we consider to further enhance the secrecy
of each link in a P2P network by equipping each receiver with RxFJ. Hence, in addition
to the power allocation between TxFJ and information signals, we optimize RxFJ power
as well. We show that by using RxFJ at each Bob, we could leverage the well-established
concept of concave games, which compared to non-convex games enjoy more simplified
game-theoretic analysis. We derive sufficient conditions under which the game admits a
unique NE. We also propose another version of our power control algorithm that can be
implemented asynchronously, making it robust to transmission delays in the network.
In our last contribution, we consider the downlink of a MU-MIMO network in the
presence of an external Eve. No knowledge of Eve’s location is assumed at the access
point. The network is studied in underloaded and overloaded conditions. In an under-
loaded (overloaded) network, the number of antennas at the access point is larger (smaller)
than the total number of downlink users’ antennas. In the overloaded setting, traditional
methods of creating TxFJ, such as ZF-based methods, are infeasible. We propose a linear
precoding scheme that relaxes such infeasibility in overloaded MU-MIMO networks. In
the worst-case scenario where Eve has knowledge of the channels between access point
and downlink users, we show that our method imposes the most stringent condition on the
number of antennas required at Eve to cancel out TxFJ signals. We also show that choos-
ing the number of independent streams to be sent to downlink users has an important role





The traffic generated by users who access the Internet via Wi-Fi and mobile devices will
soon account for 71 percent of traffic volume over the Internet [1]. This trend has been
largely fueled by recent advances in wireless communications and the integration of wire-
less transceivers into many applications, such as smart home appliances, health monitor-
ing and implantable devices, smart infrastructure and utility management grids (power,
water, sewage), etc. Stemming from such proliferation of wireless systems, we are con-
stantly challenged with serious threats related to privacy and data confidentiality. Many
of these threats come from the broadcast nature of the wireless medium which makes
communications vulnerable to passive and active attacks.
Adversaries with moderate hardware can easily eavesdrop on wireless signals and an-
alyze them to extract information about a user, including his online activities (e.g., brows-
ing habits [2]), his location and movement [3], or his health status (eavesdropping on
wireless medical telemetry devices [4]). Other than eavesdropping, an attack may be de-
signed to jam specific wireless communication protocols. Identifying devices that operate
under a certain protocol can be a fairly easy task, as the attacker only needs to search the
wireless channel for protocol-specific transmission fingerprints that are communicated in
open air. Recent examples of such threats include attacks on cellular and wireless local
area networks [5, 6] and implantable cardiac defibrillators [4].
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Of the various malicious activities that threaten a wireless network, the main focus
of this dissertation is on eavesdropping attacks. While cryptographic techniques have
been exploited to thwart eavesdropping attacks on upper layers of communication pro-
tocols, they are not sufficient to safeguard lower-layer headers and control packets (e.g.,
preamble, and modulation scheme fields). Such packets –which are also referred to as
side-channel information (SCI)– must be transmitted in the clear for correct protocol op-
eration. Therefore, even when the payload is encrypted, an eavesdropper can exploit SCI
to perform several malicious attacks, such as traffic analysis and selective jamming [7].
One example for exploiting SCI could target the medium access control (MAC) layer
of 802.11 networks. Specifically, in the virtual carrier sensing phase of such networks, a
transmitting node sends a “duration” field in the MAC header, so that other devices in the
vicinity of the transmitting node update their network allocation vectors (NAVs) [7]. The
duration filed is unencrypted, which makes it possible for an eavesdropper to easily find
out about the packet duration of the transmitting node. Encrypting this field is also not
a good solution because the overhearing devices may have never communicated with the
transmitting node but need to have established a key with the transmitting node to decrypt
the duration field.
Another example of exploiting SCI was shown in [8], where an eavesdropper could
target the unsecured paging protocol of 4G and 5G networks to identify the globally-
unique International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) of a cellular phone. IMSI can
then be exploited to extract location information of the victim. In this attack, eavesdropper
only needs to know the phone number of the victim. By calling the victim a few times, the
subsequent activity in the paging channel can be associated to the outgoing call and then
the IMSI of the victim. Specifically, the base station notifies the cellphone user of the
incoming call by sending beacons in certain occasions which are also known as paging
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occasions. The paging occasions for each cellphone user is directly related to the IMSI
of that user. Hence, at the time of calling the victim, eavesdropper observes the increased
activity in certain paging occasions, which lead her to inferring the IMSI of the victim.
Randomizing the paging occasions (via cryptography or other methods) requires base
station to have established long-term sessions with the mobile user, which can increase
the overhead in protocol. In fact, the mobile user may leave the cell area and thus not be
served by that base station anymore.
Many other examples of SCI-based attacks (see e.g., [7]) suggest that cryptography
may not be the answer to all security issues in modern wireless networks, signifying
that newer directions should be explored in scenarios where cryptography falls short.
Recently, researchers have started to recognize the significance of physical-layer (PHY-
layer) security techniques that exploit the properties wireless channels/environments for
encryption, authentication and device fingerprinting [9]. The interest in PHY-layer se-
curity is mainly due to its potential for enabling keyless confidential communications
and its ability to obfuscate lower-layer headers. Such attributes of PHY-layer security
can enable designers to complement cryptography-based schemes and add security fea-
tures to the PHY-layer via novel transmission strategies. In this dissertation, we focus on
information-theoretic PHY-layer security whose main emphasis is on preventing eaves-
dropping attacks.
1.2 A Primer on Information-Theoretic PHY-Layer Security
PHY-layer security in its information theoretic sense was introduced by Shannon in
[10]. The secrecy problem that Shannon considered states that a message from a sending






Figure 1.1: Eavesdropping in a single-link wireless communication scenario.
(Eve). Shannon assumed that both the main channel (i.e., Alice-Bob channel) and the
eavesdropping channel (i.e., Alice-Eve channel) are noiseless and that Alice and Bob
share a secret key. Shannon considered the communication to be perfecty secure if and
only if the entropy of the secret message given Eve’s observation is the same as the entropy
of the secret message itself, i.e., Eve’s observation does not contain any information about
the secret message. Moreover, Shannon proved that perfectly secure communication is
possible if the entropy of the secret key is at least equal to that of the secret message.
Following Shannon’s theory, Wyner in [11] formulated the secrecy problem with the
assumption that both Bob and Eve receive noisy versions of the secret message and that
the sequence of Alice’s message, Bob’s received message, and Eve’s wiretapped message,
construct a Markov chain. Wyner also had a different (relaxing) definition of secrecy
which was later termed as weak secrecy [12]. He claimed that for large block lengths per-
fect secrecy is achievable if information leakage to the eavesdropper normalized by block
length goes to zero. Such definition of secrecy is not as strict as Shannon’s. In fact, Shan-
non considered the communication to be completely untraceable at Eve, while Wyner
states the leakage over a large block length is negligible. The result of Wyner’s work is
now referenced as the fundamental definition of secrecy rate. Secrecy rate is the differ-
ence of mutual information between Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels. Wyner’s result
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shows that a secure rate is achievable even if there is no key shared between legitimate
nodes.
After Wyner’s work, Csizar and Korner in [13] extended the wiretap model to the
case that is closer to the settings in wireless communication environments. Specifically,
in this model, Alice broadcasts the same secret message to both Bob and Eve. In other
words, Wyner’s assumption of having a Markov chain between Bob’s received message
and Eve’s wiretapped message was removed. Moreover, Bob and Eve’s received messages
are corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). The secrecy rate was again
shown to be computable by subtracting the leaked rate at Eve from the main channel’s
achievable rate. Intuitively, this subtraction indicates that the information rate that is not
decodable by Eve(s) is the rate that can be securely communicated. Since then, most of
the research in PHY-layer security has been based on this study.
The definition of secrecy rate was later extended to channels where Alice, Bob and/or
Eve are equipped with multiple antennas (see [14–17]). For instance, the authors in [14]
characterized the secrecy rate when the legitimate link is a multiple-input-single-output
(MISO) channel and Eve has a single antenna. This result was then extended to a 2 × 2
multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) channel with a single-antenna Eve [15]. Later
on, in [16] the secrecy rate was characterized for a MISO channel with multiple antennas
at Eve (MISOME channel); the same authors derived the secrecy rate of the MIMOME
channel [17], and showed that Gaussian codebook achieves this secure rate.
Secrecy rate is the most commonmeasure for PHY-layer secrecy. However, a complete
characterization of secrecy rate may be prohibitive in some scenarios. For example. in the
case of block-fading channels, some works have considered secrecy outage probability as
their main metric (see [9, 12] and references therein). This measure of secrecy is weaker
than secrecy rate, as security cannot be guaranteed for the entire transmission duration.
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The works mentioned so far mostly rely on Gaussian codebooks and infinite block
length coding. Both of these assumptions are far from being practical. To relax these as-
sumptions and achieve practicality, there have been active research on PHY-layer security
with finite block length coding and finite alphabet codebooks [12, 18, 19]. The notion of
secrecy rate derived in Wyner’s work assumes that probability of error can be arbitrarily
decreased by increasing the block length of the underlying coding scheme. However, in
finite block length regime, a certain probability of error must be considered. In addition,
the notion of secrecy in Wyner’s work can no longer be used, as the leakage is non-zero
for finite block length regime.
Despite these differences, the secrecy definition in Wyner’s work can still be used to
obtain an upper bound on the secrecy rate of a channel. For example the bit-error-rate
(BER) performance of M-QAM modulation scheme is directly related to the value ofM .
Such a relation has shown to be closely related to the information rate that is achieved
using a Gaussian codebook when there is no finite-block-length assumption [20]. Specif-
ically, the achievableM for a given BER is a function of signal-to-noise ration (SNR); this
function can be approximated as the information rate of a transmission using the Gaus-
sian codebook with the addition of certain term known as capacity gap. This capacity
gap determines the BER that the resulting M-QAM modulation attains at a given SNR.
Therefore, both the main channel and eavesdropping channel can be studied under such
approximation, so that while the assumption of finite block length coding can be relaxed,
the analysis for Gaussian codebooks can be leveraged for finite-alphabet codebooks as
well. Obviously, under such an approximation, the leakage will not be zero, and parts of
the (encoded) bitstream can still be received at Eve. However, by creating dependencies
in the bitstream (using e.g., convolutional coding of moderate length), decoding the secret
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message becomes more difficult for Eve.
1.2.1 Friendly Jamming for a Single Link
A widely used method to provide PHY-layer secrecy is to utilize interference as a means
to degrade Eve’s reception. Specifically, the transmission of a secret message can be
accompanied by an artificial noise (AN) that is designed to degrade the SNR at Eve but
not affect Bob’s reception [21]. Such a PHY-layer security technique is often referred to
as friendly jamming (FJ). A wide variety of methods for generating FJ signals have been
proposed in the literature. Many of them focus on generating the FJ signal at Alice (the
information sender), thus the name transmit-based FJ (TxFJ) (see [21]).
When used with single-antenna devices, TxFJ techniques cannot guarantee positive
secrecy rate for all types of channels, thus not guaranteeing PHY-layer security. In such
situations, it has been suggested to use dedicated FJ nodes [22]. Such a method is usu-
ally referred to as cooperative jamming (CJ). Despite guaranteeing positive secrecy rate,
CJ approaches face several implementation challenges related to mobility and trustwor-
thiness. Specifically, if a legitimate receiver is mobile it may be out of the reach of a
stationary CJ, or if the CJ node is a malicious node itself, it does not prevent its jamming
signal to be nullified at Bob, thus compromising the legitimate transmission.
Another class of FJ schemes use multiple antennas to generate a FJ signal, which by
design is nullified at Bob’s location [22]. Specifically, multiple antennas prevent FJ from
decreasing the SNR at Bob, as FJ can be designed to fall in the null space of the Alice-
Bob channel. It has been shown that by generating FJ using multiple antennas and by
having sufficient transmit power, a legitimate link can achieve positive secrecy rate even
when Eve has much better conditions than Bob [22–24]. Figure 1.2 shows an example of








Figure 1.2: Generation of TxFJ in a single-link scenario.
The interest in applying TxFJ to a single legitimate link is driven by pragmatic consid-
erations, and not necessarily due to its optimality. In fact, it was shown in [17] that in the
case of a single eavesdropper, the optimal approach for securing a link, given knowledge
of Eve’s location, is not to use TxFJ. Specifically, designing MIMO precoders towards
minimum leakage at Eve was shown to be the optimal approach. A practical advantage in
MIMO-based FJ is that it can be used in scenarios where no knowledge on Eve’s location
is available [12]. Complementing the classical TxFJ approach in [22], which relies on
transmitting the FJ signal in the null-space of the legitimate channel, it was shown in [25]
that adding TxFJ to both the legitimate channel and its null-space can further improve the
secrecy rate of a link. In the case of multiple eavesdroppers, it was shown in [26] that the
use of TxFJ can significantly improve the secrecy rate compared to the case when TxFJ
is not used.
Another group of FJ-based techniques exploit in-band full-duplex (FD) devices to
generate FJ at the receiver (Bob) side of a legitimate link. These techniques are referred
to as receiver-based FJ (RxFJ) methods. The main interest in using RxFJ is due to some
practicality issues of TxFJ. Specifically, in a real-world wireless channel, a vulnerability
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region exists which encompasses several wavelengths around Bob. The channels between
Alice and any point inside this vulnerability region are highly correlated to each other.
Hence, the TxFJ that was set to be nullified only at Bob will be nullified in the whole
vulnerability region. If Eve exists in the vulnerability region, she will receive the secret
message interference-free, thus making TxFJ ineffective [7].
To address the issue of vulnerability region, Bob can be equipped with in-band FD
capability to generate RxFJ [27,28]. FD is one of the recent advances in wireless commu-
nication devices [29] that allows a device to simultaneously transmit and receive over the
same frequency channel. Many implementations have been proposed over the last decade
to enable in-band FD [29–33]. Each of these schemes demonstrated that the transmit-
ted signal of a device (i.e., the device’s self-interference) can be sufficiently suppressed
at its receive chain. Depending on the underlying suppression scheme, different self-
interference suppression gains have been achieved.
In RxFJ techniques Bob generates the FJ signal while receiving the information signal
from Alice. Bob’s FD capabilities allow it to prevent its transmitted FJ interfering with its
reception of Alice’s information signal. By using RxFJ, it is ensured that the vulnerability
region is eliminated. Figure 1.3 shows a basic setting where RxFJ can help a legitimate
pair to cover the vulnerability region. Other works also considered PHY-layer security
when FD capability is adopted at both Alice and Bob for bidirectional communications,
i.e., Bob transmits information signals to Alice rather than generating RxFJ (see [34] and
its references).
1.2.2 Friendly Jamming in Multi-Link Scenarios
Secrecy analysis for multi-link settings introduces new challenges not present in the










Figure 1.3: Generation of RxFJ in a single-link scenario.
as follows: 1) peer-to-peer (P2P) network which is a network model used to study multi-
ple transmit-receive pairs coexisting in each other’s vicinity, and 2) a broadcast network
where a transmitter and multiple receivers exist in an area and the transmitter sends each
receiver a separate signal. Illustrations of these networks are shown in Figure 1.4.
The definition of secrecy in these multi-link settings depends on the eavesdropping
behavior that causes security threat. For instance, devices in the same network may be
curious about the transmissions of their neighboring devices. Thus, the design must en-
sure that a given link’s transmission is secured from other links. Such a network is re-
ferred to asmulti-link channel with confidential messages (MCCM). Another possibility is
when external Eves exist in the network and the transmissions of legitimate links must be
kept secure from these Eves. Such a network is referred to as multi-link wiretap channel
(MWC). In this dissertation, we study PHY-layer security in MWCs.
For the case of P2P networks, several senders (Alices) convey their messages simul-
taneously to their respective Bobs. Hence, the FJ signal of each Alice must not interfere
with other unintended Bobs. A key challenge here is to ensure that the null space of any












Figure 1.4: General model of a (a) P2P (b) broadcast network.
include potential eavesdropping locations. This can be quite difficult to achieve when only
limited or no coordination is possible between links. Therefore, the need for interference
management is crucial to guarantee a secure yet interference-limited communications.
Interference management roots back to power control problems in wireless networks,
which have been extensively investigated (see for example [35–39]). The main challenge
there is to manage the interference at all receivers so as to maximize a certain network
utility function (e.g., sum of individual rates). In an analogous manner, in a multi-link
wiretap channel, the unwanted interference from one Alice degrades the received signal
at unintended Bobs, reducing the throughput in the network. However, the possibility
of also degrading Eve’s reception makes the unwanted interference potentially useful in
terms of improving the security of communications. In the following, we briefly mention
a few of recently-proposed networking frameworks in which interference exploitation can
be conducted to provide PHY-layer security.
1.2.3 Review of Existing FJ Schemes in Multi-link Scenarios
One of the first observations about the usefulness of interference for secret communi-
cations was made in [40], where it was shown that interference caused by information
signals can be exploited to confuse nearby Eves. A similar result was observed in a sce-
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nario where the secrecy of a number of links was enhanced by other active links in the
network [41]. In [42] the authors considered a two-link SISO WIC with one eavesdrop-
per. By jointly optimizing the transmission powers of the two links, the authors attempted
to maximize the secrecy rate for one link while maintaining a given throughput for the
second link. Other instances of exploiting interference for secure communications can be
found in [43–46].
To provide secrecy for all links in the network, the authors in [47] studied two Alice-
Bob-Eve triplets (i.e., each link is being eavesdropped on by a separate Eve) and proposed
a cooperative beamforming approach to achieve the maximum secure degree of freedom
for both links. Generalizations of interference alignment for PHY-layer secrecy were ac-
complished in [48]. An MWC model was considered in [49] where dedicated cooperative
jammers assist legitimate links by generating FJ signals. Then, a distributed power con-
trol scheme was proposed to maximize the sum of secrecy rates (i.e., secrecy sum-rate)
subject to a power budget for cooperative jammers.
For an MCCM model with MIMO links, game theory was used in [50] to study the
trade-off between the network performance and fairness. Furthermore, the work in [51]
considered the secrecy-rate region of the interference channel when users transmit FJ
along with their information signals. They showed that by using FJ, the secrecy-rate
region will be larger than when FJ is not employed. Regarding FD capability, there
have been several efforts to analyze PHY-layer security when FD capability is used at
both Alice and Bob for bi-directional communications, i.e., Bob is not used for gener-
ating RxFJ because he also communicates information with Alice [52–55]. The authors
of [56] exploited full-duplex capability at the base station of a broadcast/multiple-access
wiretap channel to secure multiple half-duplex downlink and uplink users by generating
RxFJ/TxFJ for uplink/downlink communications. They proposed a multi-objective opti-
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mization framework to find the best tradeoff in minimizing downlink and uplink powers,
subject to certain constraints on information and secrecy rates of downlink and uplink
users.
1.2.4 Applications of FJ in Machine-Type Communications
Many future wireless devices will be used for machine-type communications (MTC). Ex-
amples include health monitoring and implantable devices, smart home appliances, etc.
MTC devices are characterized by machine-to-machine data generation/exchange with
no or little human intervention. The massive deployment of MTC devices will impose
an unprecedented challenge to wireless networks. New network architectures have been
designed to cope with MTC. For example, cellular MTC (cMTC) and multi-tier heteroge-
nous networks (HetNets) directly focus on improving current structures to enable massive
connectivity [57,58]; other methods propose innovative solutions to lighten up the traffic,
such as device-to-device (D2D) communications [59, 60]. Since their introduction, each
of the aforementioned network architectures have put significant effort in handling inter-
ference. Before diving into the applications of PHY-layer security in such networks, we
give a brief description of them.
cMTC
As its name suggests, cMTC enables coverage for a (large) group of MTC devices using
cellular networks. This network architecture mainly focuses on extending current broad-
cast networks such as cellular networks to achieve massive interconnections. Because
of their prevalent deployment and support for mobility, cellular networks have been en-
visioned to carry a large portion of MTC-related applications with reduced installation
cost [57]. However, to accommodate massive amounts of MTC devices, access points
28
(AP) require to employ scalable scheduling, multiple access and signal processing tech-
niques.
HetNets
In HetNets, small cells are added to conventional macro-cell-based networks to increase
frequency reuse for more connectivity and better quality of service [58]. There have been
two well-known spectrum sharing mechanisms in the literature of HetNets: 1) overlay and
2) underlay. In overlay spectrum sharing (OSS) the macro-cell users (MUs) and small-
cell users (SUs) with their respective APs –i.e., macro-AP (MAP) and small-AP (SAP)–
access the shared spectrum sequentially. On the other hand, in underlay spectrum shar-
ing (USS), both tiers can simultaneously have their communications on the condition that
interference is well-handled. In OSS, both tiers are in fact independent of each other.
Hence, an MAP/SAP together with its associated users form a broadcast network. A dis-
tinctive assumption in HetNets is that all APs are connected together via the backhaul of
the network. Thus, coordination between APs to jointly optimize transmission attributes
(e.g., power allocation, transmit beamformers, etc.) is possible.
D2D
D2D allows devices to communicate directly without any communication infrastructure,
thus basically creating an infrastructure-less P2P network instead of having uplink and
downlink communications with AP. Doing so, a portion of traffic from the infrastruc-
tured network is offloaded to a P2P network. The D2D links form a D2D cluster. D2D
communication can be carried out in the same band as the uplink/downlink communi-
cations; alternatively, the links of a D2D cluster can switch to a different channel. In







Figure 1.5: General architecture of HetNet in the presence of eavesdropper(s).
another. Such a network formed throughout the D2D cluster can be studied using the
well-known P2P networks. The P2P links are not aware of each other’s presence. Thus,
in contrast to HetNets where coordination between APs is possible (due to the presence
of backhaul), in D2D coordination among the pairs is minimal.
In the case of HetNets, interference may be generated through dense deployment of
small cells. In the case of cMTC, limited feedback resources that an AP provides to MTC
devices may cause erroneous acquisition of channel state information at the transmit side
(CSIT), thus leading to inter-user interference. The existence of interference in D2D
mainly stems from either the lack of coordination between the nodes or the absence of a
central entity to perform interference attenuation/cancellation. With such an inherent ex-
istence of interference in these networks, it is possible to optimize transmission attributes
of links in a way to drive away interference from legitimate links to Eves. In other words,






Figure 1.6: General architecture of D2D network in the presence of eavesdropper(s).
to jam potential eavesdroppers at the PHY layer and thus provide secrecy throughout these
networks.
The work in [61], is one of the earliest studies in the PHY-layer security for the down-
link of multi-antenna HetNets. In this work, the authors assume that APs coordinate with
each other to design their transmit beamformer to maximize the secrecy rate of one MU
that is being eavesdropped, subject to some rate constraints for the rest of MUs/SUs. An
interesting result of this work is that the use of FJ can be redundant, as interference gen-
erated from APs already acts as FJ. The work in [62] considers the same HetNet system
model with multi-antenna nodes where there is one Eve that is interested in the com-
munications of one MU. Due to the coordination between APs, the author proposes to
design an FJ-like signal at MAP to be transmitted along with the secret message, such
that the interference coming from SAP is cancelled at the MU. This technique is shown
to effectively decrease Eve’s SINR. The Eve’s CSI (E-CSI) is assumed to be partially
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available as well. The author then analyzes the secrecy outage probability of the proposed
scheme and shows that exploiting and mitigating the interference that is coming from
SAP is more beneficial than managing it via power control. Regarding the existing work
in D2D networks, because of close similarities between the structure of a P2P network
and a D2D cluster, the results of secrecy analysis in P2P networks that were mentioned
earlier (e.g., [42, 43, 55]) can be leveraged for D2D as well.
The authors in [63] studied a cMTC network for when the limited capacity of feedback
channel –that is shared among many MTC devices– results in erroneous CSIT feedback
at AP, which makes interference-free transmission more difficult. In such a situation,
other than inter-user interference, the FJ signal(s) designed by AP –that were supposed to
be nullified on legitimate users and confuse nearby Eves– interfere with secret messages
as well. Given such settings, the authors formulate an optimization problem in which
the sum of secrecy rates of several users is maximized with respect to the number of
feedback bits, power allocation between the secret message and FJ, and the number of
transmit antennas. This optimization is constrained by total number of feedback bits and
maximum secrecy outage for each user. It is shown that as the total number of feedback
bits decreases, the number of antennas required to achieve the given secrecy constraints
increase to establish sufficiently good beamformers for FJ and secret messages. This
result suggests that designing APs with massive number of antennas can be beneficial for
cMTC networks.
1.3 Main Contributions
This dissertation focuses on designing and evaluating FJ-based secure communication
methods in some multi-user networks. Novel PHY-layer obfuscation techniques that care-
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fully control intentional interference from Alices and/or Bobs are designed. We will focus
on a single collision domain, e.g., a wireless LAN or an ad hoc network where multiple
authorized but potentially interfering flows are transported wirelessly (one hop) in the
presence of several Eves (i.e., MWC model). Different degrees of uncertainty regarding
the locations or CSI of Eves will be considered, ranging from no information to complete
information. Our study will be conducted under various eavesdropping capabilities, e.g.,
size of antenna array at Eve, Eve’s receive-based beamforming capabilities (if any), the
possibility of collusion among multiple Eves, etc. From a system architecture standpoint,
two networking scenarios will be considered in this dissertation: Multi-user MIMO (MU-
MIMO) and P2P. In what follows, we detail our contributions in each of these networks.
1.3.1 Game-Theoretic Precoder Design for FJ-Aided Transmissions
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, we consider a P2P network tapped by external Eve(s) in
which each Alice-Bob pair conceals its communications using TxFJ. TxFJ is realized at
Alice side using MIMO precoding. Figure 1.7 shows the general model of this network
where Q Alice-Bob pairs exist in the neighborhood of K Eves. The goal is to design the
precoders for both information and TxFJ signals at allQ Alices so as to maximize a given
utility (e.g., sum-rate of information signals) while preventing eavesdropping elsewhere
[64, 65].
Because legitimate links do not cooperate with each other and there is no centralized
authority to perform optimization, every link selfishly aims at maximizing its secrecy rate.
Hence, we leverage non-cooperative game theory to study the behavior of the network. In
this game, the players are legitimate links, each player’s strategy is the set of all TxFJ and
information signal covariance matrices that satisfy a certain power constraint. Finally, the
utility of each player is its secrecy rate.
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Figure 1.7: System model of our work in Chapter 3 [64, 65].
Despite coming up with a suitable game-theoretic model, the non-convexity of
each link’s optimization problem (i.e., best response) makes conventional convex (non-
cooperative) games inapplicable to study such a network, even to find whether a Nash
Equilibrium (NE) exists. To tackle this issue, we analyze the proposed game using a re-
laxed equilibrium concept, called quasi-Nash equilibrium (QNE). We show that under a
constraint qualification condition for each player’s problem, the set of QNEs includes the
NE of the proposed game. We also derive the conditions for the existence and uniqueness
of the resulting QNE.
It turns out that the uniqueness conditions derived for the QNE of the proposed game
are too restrictive, and do not always hold in typical network scenarios. Thus, the pro-
posed game often has multiple QNEs, and the convergence to a QNE is not always guar-
anteed. To overcome these issues, we modify the utility functions of players by adding
several specific terms to each utility function. The modified game is shown to converge
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to a QNE even when multiple QNEs exist. Furthermore, we show that such modifica-
tions enable players to select a desired QNE that optimizes a given social objective (e.g.,
sum-rate or secrecy sum-rate). To be more specific, we propose three different QNE se-
lection methods. Each of these methods require different signaling overheads and provide
different levels of improvement on the efficiency of the proposed non-convex game.
In our first QNE selection, we suggest to select the QNE that maximize the sum of
secrecy rates. The second QNE selection advises to select the QNE that maximizes the
sum-rate of the network. In the last QNE selection method, we propose to select the
QNE that minimizes the total leaked rate to Eves. Using simulations, we show that not
only we are able to guarantee the convergence to a QNE, but also due to the QNE selec-
tion mechanism, we can achieve a significant improvement in terms of secrecy sum-rate
and power efficiency, especially in dense networks. However, a not-so-suitable QNE se-
lection method can force the links to exhaust all their resources and yet have a dismal
performance.
1.3.2 Achieving PHY-Layer Secrecy via Power Control and Practical Precoder Design
The design of precoders in Chapter 3 is based on covariance matrix optimization. On
one hand the non-convexity of secrecy rate maximization in Chapter 3 forces us to settle
with a sub-optimal solution. On the other hand, the resulting covariance matrices from
these sub-optimal methods are not guaranteed to be rank-1, which makes it difficult to
extract practical precoders from these solutions. Therefore, in Chapter 4, we focus on
exploiting practical precoders in our design. Specifically, we design a zero-forcing-based
(ZF-based) precoder so that TxFJ falls in the null space of the channel between Alice
and her corresponding Bob, thus not affecting her corresponding Bob’s reception. Such
a design relaxes the complexities that resulted from optimization of covariance matrices
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and makes our game-theoretic framework more practical. After designing the precoders
of TxFJ and information signals, the strategy profile of each link would be to control
the amount of TxFJ it generates subject to a given information-rate constraint and a power
budget [66,67]. The proposed ZF-based precoder design is also implemented on software-
defined radios (SDRs) to assess its performance on a single link in real-world scenarios.
Even-though the QNE selection techniques that we design in Chapter 3 can improve
the performance of purely non-cooperative games, there is still no guarantee that the re-
sulting convergence points are (Pareto-)optimal. Hence, in the remainder of Chapter 4
we propose a modified price-based game, in which each link is penalized for generating
interference on other legitimate links. Under the exact knowledge of E-CSI, we show that
the price-based game converges to the Pareto-optimal point of secrecy rate region and has
a comparable secrecy sum-rate to a centralized approach. We then relax the assumption of
knowledge of E-CSI and leverage mixed-strategy games to provide alternative solutions
to the distributed secrecy sum-rate maximization problem that are robust to uncertainties
in E-CSI knowledge.
1.3.3 Friendly Jamming with Full-Duplex Radios in a MIMO Wiretap Channel
In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, we consider to further enhance the secrecy of each link
in interference networks by equipping each Bob with RxFJ [68,69]. An illustration of the
systemmodel under study in Chapter 5 is given in Figure 1.8 for a two-link network. It can
be seen that the interference components at each Bob include his self-interference signal
as well as information, TxFJ, and RxFJ signals of the other link. Eve also receives all
information, TxFJ, and RxFJ signals. We assume that the TxFJ of each Alice falls in the
null space of the channel between herself and her corresponding Bob, thus not affecting
her corresponding Bob’s reception. In other words, same as Chapter 4, we aim at using
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practical precoders (i.e., ZF-based precoders) to create TxFJ at each link.
We show that by using RxFJ at each Bob, we can model a non-cooperative game which
can leverage the well-established concept of concave (non-cooperative) games. Hence,
compared to non-convex games in Chapter 3, this new game offers a much simpler analy-
sis, enabling us to derive sufficient conditions under which the game admits a unique NE
(instead of a QNE in Chapter 3) with guaranteed convergence conditions. We also design
a framework in which a careful power assignment between the information signal and
TxFJ at the Alice side of each link is done such that the corresponding Bob is able decide
on using RxFJ independent of any multi-user interference (MUI) factors. This ability sets
Bobs free from having to measure MUI at eavesdropper(s), thus making our design robust
to uncertainties in E-CSI knowledge. Our results indicate that the framework that is ro-
bust to uncertainties in E-CSI knowledge performs close to when E-CSI is fully known to
legitimate links. Moreover, empirically it is shown that the secrecy sum-rate scales with
the power budget of transmitters.
1.3.4 PHY-Layer Security and Linear Precoding in Overloaded MU-MIMO Networks
In Chapter 6 we study precoding in the downlink of MU-MIMOwiretap networks [70]. In
general, when secrecy is desired, the precoders designed for MU-MIMO networks aim to
cancel out two sources of interference on Bobs. First, the MUI which occurs when signals
intended for different Bobs interfere with each other1. The second source of interference
that secure MU-MIMO designs have to minimize/mitigate is the one coming from FJ
signals. Eve must also combat with these two sources of interference to wiretap ongoing
communications.
We are primarily interested in linear precoding design approaches, as non-linear de-















Figure 1.8: System model of our work in Chapter 5 [68, 69].
signs are not suitable for practical implementation. A fundamental condition on the ca-
pacity of MU-MIMO networks in downlink/uplink that utilize linear precoders suggests
that in order to cancel out the MUI on all Bobs, the number of antennas at Alice must be
greater than or equal to the total number of antennas at Bobs, i.e., the network must be
underloaded. In overloaded scenarios where this condition does not hold, zero-forcing
MUI and FJ signals is infeasible.
Motivated by such a challenge, we propose a new linear precoding scheme for the
downlink of MU-MIMO networks which still uses FJ for preserving the secrecy but aims
to extend the functionality of FJ to overloaded scenarios. In particular, we aim to minimize
interference leakage of the downlink signals, which consequently minimizes the MUI.
Next, we design for each Bob an exclusive FJ signal to protect the information signal that
is intended for that Bob. The interference coming from this FJ signal is also minimized
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as a consequence of minimization of MUI. Specifically, the FJ signal created for a Bob is
similar to the information signal intended for that Bob, except that the FJ signal employs
an extra precoder such that it does not affect its associated Bob’s reception.
In the worst-case scenario where Eve has knowledge of the channels between Alice
and Bobs, we show that our method imposes the most stringent condition on the number of
antennas required at Eve to cancel out FJ signals. We verify our analyses with simulations,
and it turns out that choosing the number of independent streams to be sent to Bobs has
an important role in achieving a trade-off between security, reliability and the achievable
rate of the Bobs.
1.4 Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we go over mathe-
matical formulation of FJ in single-link and MU-MIMO settings. We then review game
theory concepts with an emphasis on its application in wireless networks, as it is one of
the key tools in most of our analyses throughout this dissertation. In Chapter 3 we fo-
cus on secure precoding design for MIMO wiretap interference networks, and introduce
equilibrium selection to improve PHY-layer security of the network [64, 65]. Chapter 4
discusses power control with practical precoders for FJ and information signal. We also
introduce pricing methods to approach Pareto-optimal solutions of the secrecy rate region
of MIMO wiretap interference networks [66, 67]. We also discuss our SDR implementa-
tion for our proposed practical precoder design. In Chapter 5, we extend power control
in MIMO wiretap interference network to the case where receivers use FD capability to
transmit RxFJ. Handling the harmful interference [resulting from RxFJ] in distributed
fashion and with partial knowledge of E-CSI is the main focus of this chapter [68, 69]. In
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Chapter 6 we propose novel precoding design for MU-MIMO wiretap networks to extend
the functionality of FJ techniques to overloaded networks [70]. Lastly, in Chapter 7, the





In this chapter we go over the design fundamentals of TxFJ techniques. The details of
design in single-link and MU-MIMO scenarios are given. We then give a primer on the
concepts of game theory and its applications in wireless networks.
Notation
Boldface uppercase/lowercase letters denote matrices/vectors. a ≥ b denotes element-
wise inequality between vectors a and b. A(:,a:b) denotes a matrix that is comprised of
columns a to b of A. A(a:b,:) denotes a matrix that is comprised of rows a to b of A. I and
0 denote the identity matrix and the zero matrix (i.e., matrix with zero entries) of appro-
priate sizes. E[•], •†, Tr(•) and det(•) are, respectively, the expected value, conjugate
transpose, trace, and determinant operators. The sets of real and complex numbers are
indicated by R and C, respectively.
2.1 Mathematical Formulation of MIMO-Based Friendly Jamming
2.1.1 Single-Link Scenario
In this scenario, two nodes, Alice and Bob communicate with each other in the presence
of an eavesdropping node Eve. Alice has N transmit antennas, and Bob hasM antennas.
Eve is a passive node with L antennas that exists in the range of communications between
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Alice and Bob. The received signal at Bob is:
y = H˜u + n (2.1)
where H˜ ∈ CM×N , is the M -by-N complex channel matrix between Alice and Bob,
u ∈ CN is the transmitted signal from Alice, and n ∈ CM is the complex additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) whose covariance matrix is E[nn†] = N0I with N0 ∈ R+.
We assume H˜ = H¯d−η/2, where H¯ ∈ CM×N represents the small-scale fading, d is the
distance between Alice and Bob in meters, and η is the path-loss exponent.
The received signal at Eve is
z = G˜u + e (2.2)
where G˜ ∈ CL×N , denotes, the complex channel matrix between Alice and Eve. Let
G˜ = G¯d−η/2e , where G¯ ∈ CL×N and de is the distance between Alice and Eve. Finally, e
has the same statistical characteristics as n. The transmitted signal from Alice u = s + w
consists of the information signal s and TxFJ w. We set s , Tx, where T ∈ CN×K is the
precoder and x ∈ CK is the K-stream information signal.
Assume that a Gaussian codebook is used for x, i.e., the elements of x are distributed
as a zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables (ZMCSCG-
RVs) with E[xx†] = φP
K
I, where P is the total transmit power of Alice and 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 is
the fraction of transmit power allocated to the information signal. For the TxFJ, we write
w , Zv, where Z ∈ CN×(N−K) is the precoder for the TxFJ signal and v ∈ C(N−K) is the
TxFJ signal with i.i.d. ZMCSCG entries and E[vv†] = σI. The scalar value σ = (1−φ)P
N−K
denotes the TxFJ power1. Let H˜ = UΣV† denote the singular value decomposition (SVD)
1Notice that the TxFJ power is distributed uniformly between various dimensions of v. In the case
of full knowledge of E-CSI, such power division is not optimal. However, when no knowledge of E-CSI
is available, it can be shown that uniform distribution of TxFJ power among different dimensions of v is
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of H˜ where Σ is the diagonal matrix of singular values in descending order, and U and
V are left and right matrices of singular vectors, respectively. We set Z = V(2) where
V(2) denotes the matrix of N −K rightmost columns of V corresponding to the smallest
singular values [22]. We assume that Alice knows H˜2. The information signal precoder
T is set to T = V(1), where V(1)q is the first K columns of V corresponding the largest
singular values. Let H , H˜V(1), Hj , H˜V(2), G , G˜V(1), and Gj , G˜V(2). The terms
G and Gj, ∀q ∈ Q, denote the E-CSI components. Hence, (2.1) and (2.2) can be written
as
y = Hx + Hjv + n
z = Gx + Gjv + e. (2.3a)
After receiving y at Bob, a linear receiver/combiner D ∈ CM×K is applied. Assuming






Eve also applies a linear combiner R ∈ CL×K while eavesdropping on Alice’s signal to
obtain the following estimate of x
zˆ = R†
(
Gx + Gjv + e
)
. (2.5)
We set D = U(1), where U(1) is the first column of U (recall that H˜ = UΣV†). Using
optimal (see [22, 71]).
2Acquiring channel state information (CSI) between Alice and Bob is assumed to be done securely. For
example, a two-phase channel estimation can be performed, where in the first/second time-slot, Alice/Bob
sends the pilot signals to Bob/Alice. This way, we avoid having to send explicit CSI feedback from one
communication end to another, thus lowering the probability of eavesdropping on channel estimates.
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this linear combiner, the TxFJ signal of Alice will be nullified at Bob. In other words,
D†Hjv = 0. However, such a nullification does not occur on Eve’s side. Hence, the TxFJ
appears to Eve as interference.
2.1.2 MU-MIMO Networks
Consider a network where Alice with M antennas communicates with Q Bobs, Q ≥ 2.
Let Q = {1, 2, . . . , Q}. Bobq has Nq < M antennas, q ∈ Q. Without loss of generality,
assume that all Bobs have the same number of antennas, i.e., Nq = N < M, ∀q ∈ Q.
An external Eve with L antennas also exists in the range of communications3. The setting
whereM = NQ is referred to as the fully-loaded scenario. WhenM < NQ the network
is overloaded, and whenM > NQ the network is underloaded.
Bobq, q ∈ Q, receives Kq independent streams from Alice where Kq ≤ N . Without
loss of generality, assume that Kq = K, ∀q ∈ Q. The number of streams determines
how the antennas at Alice and Bobs are exploited. For example, K = N indicates that
the signals intended for Bobs have the maximum number of streams, thus the antennas
are used to exploit spatial multiplexing feature of the MU-MIMO network. In contrast,
K = 1 signifies that the combining features of Bobs are used to increase the diversity
(thus reliability) of transmissions.
We now focus on the long-established ZF method to design the required precoding
matrices. The received signal at Bobq, q ∈ Q, can be expressed as
yq = Hq(u + f) + n (2.6)
where yq ∈ CN , Hq ∈ CN×M is the complex channel between Alice and Bobq, u ∈ CM
3Note that a single Eve with L antennas can also represent mutiple multi-antenna colluding Eves. How-
ever, for the sake of simplicity, we consider Eve as a single entity.
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is the signal containing information from Alice, f ∈ CM is the TxFJ signal, and n ∈ CN
is the AWGN whose power N0/N in each dimension, i.e., E[nn†] = N0/NI. The signal








where uq ∈ CM is the signal intended for Bobq. Tq is the precoder that is responsible for
cancelling the MUI generated from uq. sq ∈ CK is the information signal intended for
Bobq.
Assume that a Gaussian codebook is used for sq, i.e., sq has i.i.d. entries that are
ZMCSCG-RVs with E[sqs†q] = φPq/KI where Pq is the power of Alice allocated to
Bobq’s signal, and φ is the portion of Alice’s total power allocated to all information
signals. Let P ,
∑Q
q=1 Pq where P is the total power of Alice. Alice allocates φP of her
total power to all information signals. The rest of the power (i.e., (1 − φ)P ) goes to the
TxFJ signal.
We assume that Alice knows allHi, ∀i ∈ Q, and Bobq only knowsHq. In the channel
estimation phase, Alice sends pilot signals to Bobs, so that Bobq can estimate Hq and
feed it back to Alice. Applying (2.7) in (2.6), the effective channel that Bobq sees from
Alice would be HqTq. After cancelling MUI via Tq (to be explained later), Alice can
apply another precoder for each Bob to optimize her transmissions. Specifically, Alice







Bobq also applies a linear combiner to estimate the transmitted information signal. In
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particular, Bobq applies Dq ∈ CK×N to have the following estimate from sq:










Let HqTq = UqΣqV†q be the singular-value decomposition (SVD) of HqTq where Uq and
Vq are the unitary matrices of left and right singular vectors, and Σq is the matrix of





optimal precoder/combiner duo to receive K streams of information signals at Bobq can
be established [72, Chapter 3].
Overall, the ZF method is based on nullifying both the TxFJ signal and MUI on Bobs,
i.e., the design of Tq and f must satisfy the following:
HrTq = 0, r 6= q, ∀r, q ∈ Q (2.10a)
Hqf = 0, ∀q ∈ Q (2.10b)
Therefore, the precoder Tq can be determined as follows. Define H˜q ,




q+1, . . . ,H
†
Q]
† ∈ CN(Q−1)×M , and let H˜q = LqJqRq be the SVD of H˜q
where Lq and Rq denote the matrices of left and right singular vectors, and Jq denotes
the matrix of singular values. Provided that M > N(Q − 1), H˜q has a non-trivial null-
space which can be exploited to meet condition (2.10a). Specifically, ifM > N(Q − 1)
Alice sets Tq = R(:,N(Q−1)+1:M)q ∈ CM×M−N(Q−1) to satisfy (2.10a) for all q ∈ Q. The
condition
M > N(Q− 1) (2.11)
constitutes the information rate rank constraint (IRRC) in the downlink of the ZF method.
The TxFJ signal mentioned in (2.6) has the following structure in the ZF method.
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Define H˜ , [H†1, . . . ,H†Q]† ∈ CNQ×M . Let H˜ = LJR be the SVD of H˜ where L and R
denote the matrices of left and right singular vectors and J denotes the matrix of singular
values. To satisfy (2.10b), H˜must have a non-trivial null-space, which requiresM > NQ.
Hence, the inequality
M > NQ (2.12)
is the secrecy rank constraint (SRC) in the ZF method which satisfies the condition in
(2.10b). Hence, the FJ signal can be expressed as
f = Zv (2.13)
where Z = R(:,NQ+1:M). v ∈ CB with B = M −NQ is the vector of artificial noise that
has the same characteristics of AWGN except that E[vv†] = (1− φ)P/BI.
2.2 A Review of Game Theory for Wireless Communication Networks
In this section, we introduce the fundamentals of game theory which has become
visible in the last 20 years as a valuable framework for solving different problems in
communication networks and signal processing. Many ongoing engineering problems in
communication networks stem from a set of nodes that compete for a shared resource
(e.g, spectrum). With game theory, the nodes can be modeled as players of a game, and
thus the many game-theoretic studies that have been accomplished over decades can be
applied to these engineering problems as well. This would be a head start for network
engineers to better understand their problems.
Of all the different applications of game theory in networks (see [73] and references
therein), we focus on using game theory to analyze some problems that appear in wireless
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communication networks. Specifically, in a wireless network where many nodes share
a specific resource (e.g., computation power, storage, spectrum), the benefit achieved by
a node depends not only on its own decisions but also on those taken by other nodes.
For example, wireless devices that share the same spectrum and do not know of the each
other’s presence in their proximity, are bound to inflict unwanted interference on each
other. Thus, the transmission strategy of a node must be according to not only its own ca-
pabilities but also the amount of interference it receives from other nodes. Many research
efforts have been conducted in the literature to address interference management in wire-
less networks using game theory, such as controlling the power of transmitted signals [36],
beamforming for multi-antenna systems [39], and spectrum sensing [74].
There are three dominant mathematical representations of a game: 1) the strategic
form, 2) the extensive form 3) the coalition form [73]. In the following, we mainly focus
on strategic form-games, as this type of games is mainly what we exploit later on to
model several problems in wireless networks and propose solutions for them. We first
introduce the basic notions related to strategic-form games. Next, we give an example
of application of strategic-form games in wireless networks. Lastly, we introduce special
cases of strategic-form games that had a crucial rule in modeling our problems in this
dissertation.
To model a problem as a game, we need to identify three components:
• players of the game, whose interests conflict each other’s
• the strategy set of each player to determine what are the possible actions of each
player
• a utility function for each player to determine the amount of benefit that each player
can achieve by choosing a particular action.
48
2.2.1 Strategic-Form Games
A strategic-form game that has K players attributes a utility function to each player. De-
note these utility function as u1, . . . , uK . Let K = {1, . . . , K}. The utility function uk,
k ∈ K, is a function of the following form:
uk : S = S1 × . . .× SK → R
s = (s1, . . . , sK)→ uk(s) (2.14)
where Sk is the strategy set of player k, sk is the strategy of player k, and s is the strat-
egy profile. For player k, k ∈ K, the strategy profile can be equivalently shown as
s = (sk, s−k) where s−k , (s1, . . . , sk−1, sk+1, . . . , sk) denotes the strategies of all play-
ers except player k. Hence, uk(s) = uk(sk, s−k). We use this alternative notation for s to
emphasize that each player k, k ∈ K can only control its own strategy sk ∈ Sk. We define
the triplet G = (K, (Sk)k∈K, (uk)k∈K) to refer to the aforementioned strategic-form game.
In some terminologies, this assumption is what makes a strategic-form game to be called
a non-cooperative game. Such an assumption is closely related to the framework of dis-
tributed optimization in which the decision-making process is performed by independent
agents who have different objective functions (i.e., utilities).
In general, the notion of optimality of a strategy profile is unclear in this type of
games, as the strategies and utilities cannot be jointly controlled. The Nash equilibrium
(NE) is a fundamental solution concept for strategic-form games, based on which the
strategies of players can be found/designed. An NE of the game G is a strategy profile
s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s∗K) such that
∀k ∈ K, ∀sk ∈ Sk, uk(s∗k, s∗−k) ≥ uk(sk, s∗−k). (2.15)
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In other words, the NE is a strategy profile where no player is willing to unilaterally
deviate from its strategy given the other players’ strategies because any deviation degrades
its utility.
In what follows, we give an example of using strategic-form games to model a problem
in wireless communication networks.
2.2.2 Strategic Games in Interference Channels
A common wireless communication scenario is the interference channel, where several
wireless links are placed in the vicinity of each other, and thus their transmissions may
interfere with one another. A simple example for interference channel involves two trans-
mitters and receivers. The two transmitters interfere with each other as a result of attempt-
ing to reach their respective receivers. Many wireless networks are in fact instances of an
interference channel, such as
• multi-cell networks where the two (or more) transmitters belong to different cells
• a heterogeneous network where the transmitters belong to different network tiers
(e.g., small cells and macro-cells)
• a cognitive radio network where the two transmitters are primary users and sec-
ondary users, respectively.
Assume that the transmitters can either transmit at a power level P or backoff from trans-
mission. Obviously, the interference generated from a transmitter’s signal degrades the
signal quality of the other transmitter. Such a situation can be modeled as a game in
which a transmitter-receiver pair can be considered as a player, the strategy set of player
k, k ∈ K = {1, 2}, can be written as sk ∈ {0, P}. Depending on the finiteness of strategy
sets, we can judge on the existence of the NE based on the following theorem:
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Theorem 1. In a strategic-form game, if the number of players and the strategy set of
each player are finite, then there exists at least one possible NE either in pure or mixed
form [75]4.
In the physical-layer analysis of wireless networks, most common utilities for a link are
functions of end-to-end signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of its comprising
transmitter and receiver. Normally, SINR covers all requirements that the utility of a
player must have. Specifically, the quality of the signal that is captured at the receiver
side indicates the amount of satisfaction that a player gains from its action. Moreover,
the interference that is also reflected in the value of SINR signifies the effect of the other
player’s action on the overall utility of a player. Assuming that the communication channel
between a transmitter-receive pair is a flat-fading with AWGN noise , the SINR of player




, r 6= k, r ∈ {1, 2}. (2.16)
where hkk is the channel gain from the transmitter of link k to its corresponding receiver,
hrk is the channel gain from the transmitter of the rth link to the receiver of the kth link,
and σ2k is the power of noise at the receiver of the kth link.
Because the strategy set of each player is finite (i.e., sk ∈ {0, P}), we can establish
the table of strategies for both players and use Theorem 1 to find the NE. Apart from the
theorems of existence of NE, the NE uniqueness can also be studied [76, Ch.3]. When the
NE uniqueness is not guaranteed, there have been many studies on designing a mechanism
for NE selection, such that the best NE (according to a certain criterion) is chosen (see
4The mixed-strategic games and the concept of mixed NEs are used to analyze a type of games that have
the same structure of strategic-form games except that the action of a player is chosen in a probabilistic way
and the satisfaction level of each player is determined by taking the expectation of its utility w.r.t its actions.
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e.g., [77]).
2.2.3 Power Control Game with Continuous Powers
The power control game defined in the last section can be extended to the case where the
strategy set Sk, k ∈ K, is a continuous interval. In other words, assume Sk = {sk ∈
R : 0 ≤ sk ≤ P}. The existence of NE in such a setting can be analyzed based on the
following theorem:
Theorem 2. In a strategic-form game, if the strategy set of each player is compact and
continuous, then the game has at least one NE either in pure or mixed form [78].
Depending on the utility functions and the (compact) strategy sets, the NE of a
strategic-form game with continuous strategy sets can be found from several ways (see
[73] and references therein). In this section, we focus on one framework which is the
foundation of most of our research efforts.
It has been shown that the NE of a non-cooperative game can often coincide with the
convergence point of an interaction between several independent agents that implement
an iterative or learning algorithm. Therefore, the concepts of non-cooperative games are
closely related to those of multi-agent learning methods. To continue further with the idea
of connecting non-cooperative games to iterative/learning algorithms, we need to define
the notion of best response:
Definition 1. The best response of player k, k ∈ K given the vector s−k is a set-valued
map defined as




Moreover, the composite best response of a game is defined as
BR = S → S
s→ BR1(s−1)× . . .BRK(s−K) (2.18)
Therefore, an alternative interpretation of NE can be given as follows:
Corollary 1. Let G = (K, (Sk)k∈K, (uk)k∈K) be a strategic-form game. A strategy profile
s∗ is the NE iff s∗ ∈ BR(s∗)
Using the interconnection between NE and best response of the players, the concept of
best-response dynamics can be established. Best-response dynamics is a simple interac-
tion between players in which a player is always given the best response of other players.
Such dynamics may lead to the NE of the underlying strategic-form game with continuous
strategy sets. Normally, best-response dynamics involves an iterative application of each
player’s best response whose convergence point coincides with the NE. In some problems
of communication networks, such as the one studied in [38], the best-response dynamics
of a game can be simplified to a fixed-point problem, thus many analyses of convergence
for fixed-point problems can be used to comment on the uniqueness of NE and designing
(distributed) algorithms to achieve it.
2.2.4 On Efficiency of NE
A natural question that one may ask about the NE of a game relates to the efficiency of
the NE. To answer this question, we first need to define our measure of efficiency, as the
notion of efficiency can be relative in games. A convenient way to examine the efficiency
of NE is to evaluate it in terms of Pareto-optimality. A profile s¯ is Pareto-optimal if there
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exists no s such that: 1) uk(s) ≥ uk(s¯), ∀k ∈ K. Of course a Pareto-optimal profile is
not dominated by the profiles for which uk(s) = uk(s¯), ∀k ∈ K, thus all of such points
are considered Pareto-optimal. The NE points of strategic-form games are not generally
guaranteed to be Pareto-optimal. Hence, many studies have been done to improve the
efficiency of NE to achieve Pareto-optimality. Examples of improving the performance
of NE include:
• modifying the utility functions of players [37]
• letting players interact more than once (i.e., repeated games) [79]
• letting players cooperate [80]
• determining conditions where a non-cooperative game yields Pareto-optimal solu-
tions [81].
Another appropriate measure of efficiency (i.e., social welfare) in a game would be
the sum of utilities of all players. Hence, the price of anarchy (PoA) of a game can be
defined as the ratio between the maximum sum-utility value and the minimum sum-utility
value that NEs yield. The closer the PoA is to 1, the higher the efficiency of the NE. An
important feature of PoA is that it can be upper-bounded in some special cases (e.g., [82]).
Such a property can give us a convenient measure on the efficiency of NE, as finding the
maximum sum-utility can lead to a non-convex optimization problem. With this intro-
duction on game theory, we are now ready to apply these concepts to our problems in
PHY-layer security of wireless networks. More game-theoretic concepts are introduced
in next chapters which mainly stem from the fundamental concepts we described so far.
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CHAPTER 3
Game-Theoretic Techniques for Precoding in MIMO
Wiretap Interference Networks
3.1 Overview
In this chapter, we consider a peer-to-peer multi-link interference network where the trans-
mission of each link (i.e., transmit-receive or Alice-Bob pair) is wiretapped by a group of
eavesdroppers (Eves). Each node in the network is equipped with multiple antennas and
each Alice accompanies her transmissions with TxFJ to blind nearby Eves. Our goal is to
design a framework through which the co-channel interference at each Bob is minimized
while the aggregate interference at Eves remains high. Because nodes cannot cooperate
with each other in our settings, each link independently aims to maximize its secrecy
rate by designing the covariance matrices (essentially, the precoders) of its information
and TxFJ signals. This independent secrecy optimization can be modeled under a game-
theoretic framework in which the utility of each player (i.e., link) is his secrecy rate, and
the player’s strategy is to optimize the covariance matrices of information and TxFJ sig-
nals. It turns out that finding the best response of each link requires solving a non-convex
optimization problem. Thus, the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) cannot be proved
using traditional concepts of convex (concave) games (See Theorem 2 of Section 2).
To study this non-convex game, we utilize a relaxed equilibrium concept called quasi-
Nash equilibrium (QNE) [83]. QNE is the solution of a variational inequality [84] ob-
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tained under the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (K.K.T) optimality conditions of the players’ prob-
lems. We show that under a constraint qualification (CQ) condition for each player’s
problem, the set of QNEs also includes the NE. Sufficient conditions for the existence
and uniqueness of the resulting QNE are provided. Then, an iterative algorithm is pro-
posed to achieve the unique QNE. We also derive the conditions for the existence and
uniqueness of the resulting QNE.
Due to no coordination among links, QNEs of a purely non-cooperative game often
suffer from social-welfare loss. Furthermore, it turns out that the uniqueness conditions
are too restrictive, and do not always hold in typical network scenarios. Thus, the pro-
posed game often has multiple QNEs, and convergence to a QNE is not always guaranteed.
To overcome these issues, we modify the utility functions of the players by adding several
specific terms to each utility function. The modified game converges to a QNE even when
multiple QNEs exist. Furthermore, players have the ability to select a desired QNE that
optimizes a given social objective (e.g., sum rate or secrecy sum-rate). Depending on the
chosen objective, the amount of signaling overhead as well as the performance of resulting
QNE can be controlled. We propose three possibilities for QNE selection, each provid-
ing different benefits and requiring a different amounts of communication overhead. The
proposed QNE selection algorithm can improve the performance of the formerly proposed
non-cooperative game while keeping the communication overhead reasonably low.
While the works in [42, 43, 85] proposed interesting ideas for precoding/power con-
trol in wiretap interference networks, they all considered two-user scenarios and global
availability of CSI, which limits their applicability. Specifically, in [42] one of the users
generates only interference to provide PHY-layer security for the other user, so providing
the PHY-layer secrecy of the former user is overlooked. Moreover, although [85] and [43]
considered providing secrecy for both users, they assume full coordination between the
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two users. In this chapter however, we aim to provide PHY-layer security for all users
while limiting the amount of coordination as much as possible.
The concept of QNE has been recently used in [86] in sum-rate maximization in cog-
nitive radio users. However, no effort has been made to improve the performance of
achieved QNEs. The work in [87] also considers the use of QNEs to jointly optimize the
sensing and power allocation of cognitive radio users in the presence of primary users.
Although in this work some improvements have been made on the performance of the
resulting QNEs, they are specific to cognitive radios and thus not extendable to other net-
works. The framework we propose can be generalized to any similarly structured game.
Overall, our major contributions in this chapter are as follows:
• We propose a non-cooperative game to model the PHY- layer secrecy optimization
in a multi-link MIMO wiretap interference network. Due to the non-convexity of
each player’s optimization problem, the analysis of equilibria is done through the
concept of QNE. We show that the set of QNEs includes NE as well.
• Because many network scenarios may involve multiple QNEs, purely non-
cooperative games do not always guarantee the convergence to a unique QNE.
Hence, we introduce the additional terms in the utility function of the players to
guarantee the convergence to a QNE.
• We design mechanisms that allow us to select a QNE of a specific interest from
multiple QNEs. QNE selection makes it possible to improve the resulting secrecy
sum-rate of the modified game compared to a purely non-cooperative game.
• We find out that managing the network interference (through both information sig-
nal and TxFJ) is more effective than aiming to increase the interference at eaves-
droppers, in terms of improving the network secrecy sum-rate.
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3.2 System Model
Consider an interference network where Q Alices, Q > 1, communicate with Q corre-
sponding Bobs. The qth Alice is equipped withNTq antennas, q = 1, . . . , Q. The qth Bob
has NRq antennas, q = 1, . . . , Q. The link between each Alice-Bob pair may experience
interference from the other Q− 1 links. There areK non-colluding Eves overhearing the
communications. The kth Eve, k = 1, . . . , K, has Ne,k receive antennas1. The received
signal at the qth Bob, yq, is




Hrqur + nq, q ∈ Q (3.1)
where Hrq (Hqq) denotes the NRq × NTr (NRq × NTq ) channel matrix between the rth
(qth) Alice and qth Bob, uq is the NTq × 1 vector of transmitted signal from the qth Alice,
nq is the NRq × 1 vector of additive noise whose elements are identically-independently-
distributed (i.i.d) zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (ZMCSCG) with
unit variance, and Q , {1, . . . , Q}. The term∑Qr=1
r 6=q
H˜rqur is the multi-user interference




Gqkuq + ne,k, k ∈ K (3.2)
whereGqk is theNe,k×NTq channel matrix between the qth Alice and the kth Eve, ne,k is
theNe,k×1 vector of additive noise at the kth Eve, andK , {1, . . . , K}. The transmitted





signal uq has the following form:
uq , sq + wq (3.3)
where sq is the information signal and wq is the TxFJ. We use the Gaussian codebook for
the information signal and the Gaussian noise for the TxFJ2. The matrices Σq and Wq
indicate the covariance matrices of sq and wq, respectively.
The qth link, q ∈ Q, together with K Eves form a compound wiretap channel for
which the achievable secrecy rate of the qth link is written as [88]:
Rsecq (Σq,Wq) , Cq(Σq,Wq)−max
k∈K
Ce,q,k(Σq,Wq), q ∈ Q (3.4)
where Cq(Σq,Wq) is the information rate and Ce,q,k(Σq,Wq) is the received rate at the
kth eavesdropper, k ∈ K, while eavesdropping on the qth link, q ∈ Q. Specifically,
Cq(Σq,Wq) , ln
∣∣I + M−1q HqqΣqHHqq∣∣ = ln ∣∣Mq + HqqΣqHHqq∣∣+ ln ∣∣M−1q ∣∣ (3.5)




Hrq (Σr + Wr)HHrq and
Ce,q,k(Σq,Wq) , ln
∣∣I + M−1e,q,kGqkΣqGHqk∣∣ = ln ∣∣Me,q,k + GqkΣqGHqk∣∣+ ln ∣∣M−1e,q,k∣∣
(3.6)




Grk (Σr + Wr)GHrk. The termMq is the covari-
ance matrix of received interference at the qth Bob andMe,q,k is the covariance matrix of
2Other practical codebooks for the information signal (e.g., QAM) can be approximated to a Gaussian
codebook with a capacity gap (see [20]).
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interference received at the kth Eve while eavesdropping on the qth link3. Notice that both
Mq andMe,q,k include the information signal and TxFJ of otherQ−1 links. Furthermore,
we require Tr(Σq + Wq) ≤ Pq for all q ∈ Q, where Tr(.) is the trace operator and Pq is
a positive value that represents the amount of power available (for both information and
TxFJ signals) at the qth Alice.
3.3 Problem Formulation
We assume that the qth link, q ∈ Q, optimizes its information and TxFJ signals
(through their covariance matrices Σq and Wq) to maximize its own secrecy rate. The
dynamics of such interaction between Q links can be modeled as a non-cooperative game
where each player (i.e., link) uses his best strategy to maximize his own utility (i.e., se-
crecy rate) given the strategies of other players. The best response of each player can be




s.t. (Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq, q ∈ Q (3.7)
where Fq , {(Σq,Wq)|Tr(Σq + Wq) ≤ Pq, Σq  0, Wq  0} is the set of all Hermi-
tian matrices (Σq,Wq) that are positive semi-definite (i.e., Σq  0, Wq  0) and meet
the link’s power constraint.
Unfortunately, (3.7) is a non-convex optimization problem. In the remainder of this
section, we aim to find a tractable solution for this problem. To that end, we first mention
3Specifically, while eavesdropping on a user, an eavesdropper is treating interference as additive (col-
ored) noise.
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the following identity for a positive definite matrixMq of size NRq [89, Example 3.23]:
ln |M−1q | = f(S∗) = max
S∈CNRq×NRq ,S0
f(S) (3.8)
where f(S) , −Tr(SMq) + ln |S|+NRq and S∗ ,M−1q is the solution to the most right-
hand-side (RHS) of (3.8). Applying the reformulation in (3.8) to the term ln |M−1q | in
(3.5) and ln




s.t. (Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq, Sq,k  0, q ∈ Q, k ∈ {0} ∪K (3.9)
where {Sq,k}Kk=0 = [STq,0, . . . ,STq,K ]T , and
fq(Σq,Wq, {Sq,k}Kk=0) , ϕq(Σq,Wq,Sq,0)−maxk∈K ϕe,q,k(Σq,Wq,Sq,k) (3.10a)
ϕq(Σq,Wq,Sq,0) , −tr(Sq,0Mq) + ln |Sq,0|+NRq + ln
∣∣Mq + HqqΣqHHqq∣∣ (3.10b)
ϕe,q,k(Σq,Wq,Sq,k) , tr(Sq,k(Me,q,k + GqkΣqGHqk))− ln |Sq,k| −Ne,k − ln |Me,q,k| .
(3.10c)
Problem (3.9) is still non-convex with respect to (w.r.t) (Σq,Wq, {Sq,k}Kk=0). How-
ever, it is easy to verify that problem (3.9) is convex w.r.t either (Σq,Wq) or {Sq,k}Kk=0
(by checking its Hessian). A stationary point to problem (3.7) that satisfies its K.K.T
optimality conditions then can be found by solving (3.9) sequentially w.r.t (Σq,Wq) and
{Sq,k}Kk=0 [26, Section IV-B]. Specifically, in one iteration, problem (3.9) is solved w.r.t
only {Sq,k}Kk=0 to find an optimal solution {S∗q,k}Kk=0. Next, with {S∗q,k}Kk=0 plugged in
(3.10a), the problem in (3.9) is optimized w.r.t (Σq,Wq) to find an optimal solution
(Σ∗q,W
∗
q). This Alternating Optimization (AO) cycle continues until reaching a conver-
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), is as follows:
(Σnq,W
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, k 6= 0 (3.11c)
where Σ0r and W
0
r (for r 6= q) denote the received interference components at the qth
Bob prior to solving (3.9). Incorporating (3.11b) and (3.11c) in (3.11a), the solution
to the convex problem (3.11a) can be found using a convex optimization solver. Notice
that in (3.11b) and (3.11c), the users do not coordinate with each other in the middle
of finding a stationary point for (3.9), for all q ∈ Q. Hence, the terms Σ0r and W0r ,
r 6= q remain constant during the AO iterations. To solve problem (3.9) faster, the authors
in [26] solved the smooth approximation of (3.7) based on the log-sum-exp inequality [89,
chapter 3.1.5], which states that













s.t. (Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq, q ∈ Q (3.13)
where





exp {βCe,q,k(Σq,Wq)}), q ∈ Q. (3.14)

































remain the same as (3.11b) and (3.11c)4. After plugging (3.11b) and
4As far as optimality is concerned, it is shown in [26] that in the single-user scenario, the limit point
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(3.11c) into (3.17), the solution to (3.17) at the nth iteration is computed using the Pro-
jected Gradient (PG) algorithm. The lth iteration of PG algorithm while solving (3.17) is





 Σn,lq + αl∇Σq f¯n,lq













where αl and εl are step sizes that can be determined using Wolfe conditions for PG






||W− W˜||2F + ||Σ− Σ˜||2F ; (3.20)
and (∇Σq f¯n,lq ,∇Wq f¯n,lq ) =
(







of AO iterations done using (3.17), (3.11b), and (3.11c) are very close to the solutions found from AO
iterations done using (3.11a), (3.11b), and (3.11c).
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q ,Wn,lq ,Sn−1q,j )
, (3.21c)






































The projection in (3.20) can be efficiently computed according to [26, Fact 1]. We refer
to the game where the actions of the players are defined by (3.15) as the proposed smooth
game. Now that we have the response of each user, we can analyze the dynamics of the
proposed smooth game.
A pseudo-code of the proposed smooth game mentioned so far is shown in Algorithm
1. As mentioned earlier, finding a stationary point for (3.15) for each user consists of two
nested loops. The inner loop involves the gradient projection which is shown in (3.18) and
(3.19) (i.e., the loop in Line 6 of Algorithm 1). Once the optimal solution to inner loop
is found, one AO iteration is done by recalculating {Sq,k}Kk=0 according to (3.11b) and
(3.11c) in the outer loop (i.e., Line 4). After the AO iterations converge to a stationary
point, the users begin their transmissions using the computed precoders of information
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signal and TxFJ5. Therefore, one round of this competitive secrecy rate maximization is
done. Notice that according to Line 2, players will be notified of actions of each other
(i.e., recalculate the received interference) only after the AO iterations has converged6.
The last round of the game will be the one where the convergence is reached.







q ) < Pq, ∀q ∈ Q
1: repeat
2: Each link q computesMq,Me,q,k, ∀k ∈ K locally
3: for q =1,. . . ,Q do
4: for n = 1,. . . do
5: Compute Sn−1q,k , k = 0, . . . , K
6: for l = 1,. . . do









8: Compute (Σn,l+1q ,W
n,l+1




12: until Convergence to QNE
3.4 Game-Theoretic Analysis
Before we begin to analyze the existence and uniqueness of the QNE, we review fun-
damentals of variational inequality (VI) theory as the basis of our analyses.
Variational Inequality Theory
Let F : Q → RN be a vector-valued continuous real function, whereN > 1 andQ ⊆ RN
is a non-empty, closed, and convex set. The variational inequality VI(F,Q) is the problem
5Although the optimization of covariance matrices of information signal and TxFJ has been taken into
account so far, the precoders can be found using eigenvalue decomposition.
6Such procedure in Line 2 of Algorithm 1 also explains the reason whyW0r and Σ0r in (3.11) and (3.21)
remain constant during AO iterations.
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of finding a vector x∗ such that
(x− x∗)TF (x∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q. (3.22)
The relation between VI and game theory is summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 3. [84, Chapter 2] Consider Q players in a non-cooperative game with utility
function fq(x) for the qth player (not to be confused with the fq defined in (3.9)), where
x ∈ Q and x = [x1, x2, ..., xQ]T , xq is the qth player’s strategy, and fq(x) is concave
w.r.t xq for all q. The set Q is comprised of all strategy sets (i.e., Q =
∏Q
q=1Qq, where
Qq is the qth player’s strategy set). Assuming the differentiability of fq(x) w.r.t xq and
that Qq is a closed and convex set for all q, the vector x∗ is the NE of the game if for
F (x) = [−∇x1f1(x),−∇x2f2(x), ...,−∇xQfQ(x)]T we have:
(x− x∗)TF (x∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q.
3.4.1 Variational Inequality in Complex Domain
The theory of VI mentioned in (3.22) assumes that Q ⊆ Rn. However, this assumption
might not be of our interest because the strategies of the players in our proposed game
are two complex matrices (i.e., Σq andWq). Therefore, an alternative definition for VI in
complex domain is needed. We use the definitions derived by the authors in [91] to define
VI in complex domain.
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Minimum Principle in Complex Domain




s.t. Z ∈ K (3.23)
where f : K → R is convex and continuously differentiable on K where K ⊆ CN ′×N ,
N ′ > 1, and N > 1. X ∈ K is an optimal solution to (3.23) if and only if we have [91,
Lemma 23]
〈Z− X,∇Zf(X)〉 ≥ 0, ∀Z ∈ K. (3.24)
where 〈A,B〉 = Re (Tr (AHB)).
Using the definition of minimum principle in complex domain, we can now define the
VI problem in the domain of complex matrices. For a complex-valued matrix FC(Z) :
K → CN ′×N where K ⊆ CN ′×N , the VI in the complex domain is the problem of finding
a complex matrix Y such that the following is satisfied [91, Definition 25]
〈
Z− Y, FC(Y)〉 ≥ 0, ∀Z ∈ K. (3.25)
3.4.2 Quasi-Nash Equilibrium
It should be emphasized that the optimization problem of each player mentioned in (3.13)
is non-convex. Hence, the solution found for each link by solving (3.15) at Line 10 of
Algorithm 1 is only a stationary point of problem (3.13). As a consequence, traditional
concepts of concave games used in proving the existence of a NE are not applicable here.
Specifically, according to [78], the quasi-concavity of each player’s utility w.r.t his strat-
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egy is required in proving the existence of a NE– an assumption that is not true in our
game. Instead, we analyze the proposed (non-convex) smooth game based on the re-
laxed equilibrium concept of QNE [83]. In the following, a formal definition of QNE is
given [83].
Consider a non-cooperative game withQ player each of whose strategies are restricted
by some private constraints denoted as
Xq = {xq ∈ Xq|hq(xq) ≤ 0}. (3.26)
The setXq is a convex set, and hq : ξq → Rlq is a continuously differentiable mapping on
the open convex set ξq containing Xq. No convexity assumption is made on hq. Hence,
although Xq is a convex set, Xq is not necessarily so. Player q has an objective function
gq : ξ → R, assumed to be continuously differentiable where ξ =
∏Q
q=1 ξq. The action of




s.t. xq ∈ Xq. (3.27)
Obviously, the equivalent formulation can be written for when the action of each player
is maximizing an objective (e.g., utility). Given the actions of other players, i.e., x∗−q,
and provided that a CQ condition holds at a point x∗q , a necessary condition for x
∗
q to
be an optimal point of player q’s optimization problem (i.e., action) is the existence of a
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non-negative constant vector µ∗q ∈ Rlq+ such that




q) = 0, (3.28b)
hq(x
∗
q) ≤ 0, xq ∈ Xq. (3.28c)
If any CQ is satisfied at x∗q , the optimality conditions in (3.28) can be written as a VI over
the set Xq. That is, the necessary condition for x∗q to be an optimal solution to player q’s
optimization problem is if x∗q solves VI(∇xqLq(•, x∗−q, µ∗q), Xq) [84, Proposition 1.3.4].
Furthermore, the existence of a non-negative vector µ∗q together with the complementarity
of µ∗q and hq(x
∗
q) can be interpreted as µ
∗
q being such that
− (µq − µ∗q)Thq(x∗q) ≥ 0, ∀µq ∈ Rlq+. (3.29)
Clearly, if hq(x∗q) is not binding, i.e., hq(x
∗
q) < 0, then µ
∗
q = 0 satisfies (3.29). Further-
more, when hq(x∗q) is binding, i.e., hq(x
∗
q) = 0, inequality (3.29) is trivially satisfied for
all µq ∈ Rlq+. Hence, using (3.29) and the fact that x∗q solves VI(∇xqLq(•, x∗−q, µ∗q), Xq),
the pair (x∗q, µ
∗
q) solves the following VI:




Γq(x, µq) ≥ 0, ∀(xq, µq) ∈ Rq = Xq × Rlq+ (3.30)
where
Γq(x, µq) =
 ∇xqLq(•, x∗−q, µ∗q)
−hq(x∗q)
 . (3.31)
Notice that although it might seem that VI(∇xqLq(•, x∗−q, µ∗q), Xq) and (3.29) cannot be
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combined to build (3.30), using the fact that VI is a generalized definition of a set-valued
mapping7, we are able to justify (3.30). it can be proved that for the set-valued mappings
NXq(xq) and NRlq+
(µq), we have NXq×Rlq+
(xq, µq) = NXq(xq)×NRlq+ (µq) [92]. The same
conclusion holds for VI problems. Hence, inequality (3.30) can be deduced.
Concatenating the inequality in (3.30) over the set of players, the QNE can be defined
as follows:






, q = 1 . . . , Q, that satisfies the following
inequality:

















(Xq × Rlq+) (3.32)
where (•)Qq=1 denotes a column vector.
Notice that the set
∏Q
q=1Rq is a convex set, and if the actions of each player is a
convex program, the QNE reduces to NE. In our scenario, since the private constraints for
each player is a convex set, we embedded the private constraints into the set Rq defined
in (3.32). We need to emphasize the fact that the constant vectors µ∗q for all q can only
be defined if the optimization problem of each player satisfies some CQ conditions. For
players with convex problems, these constant vectors are trivially satisfied since the K.K.T
conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality in convex programs.
One intuition that can be given on the concept of QNE is as follows. QNE is point
where no player has an incentive to unilaterally change his strategy because any change
7A point-to-set map, also called a multi-function or a set-valued map, is a map N from Rn into the
power set of Rn, i.e., for every x ∈ Rn, NRn(x) is a (possibly empty) subset of Rn [84, Chapter 2.1.3].
71
makes a player not satisfy the K.K.T conditions of his problem. This is in contrast with
the definition of NE in which the lack of incentives at NE is because of losing optimality.
Again, optimality and satisfying the K.K.T conditions are equivalent when players solve
convex programs.
3.4.3 Analysis of QNE
According to the aforementioned definition, the QNEs are tuples that satisfy the K.K.T
conditions of all players’ optimization problems. Under a constraint qualification, station-
ary points of each player’s optimization problem satisfy its K.K.T conditions. To begin
the analysis of the QNE, we first show that the stationary point found using AOmentioned
previously (i.e., Line 4-10 of Algorithm 1) satisfies the K.K.T conditions of (3.13).
Proposition 1. For the qth link, q ∈ Q, the stationary point found using AO (i.e., Line
4-10 of Algorithm 1) satisfies the K.K.T conditions of (3.13).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Now that the K.K.T optimality of the stationary point found by AO iterations is proved,
we rewrite the K.K.T conditions of all players to a proper VI problem [83]. The solution(s)
to the obtained VI is the QNE(s) of the proposed smooth game. For the proposed smooth
game defined using (3.15), we can establish the following VI to characterize the QNE
points. Let the QNE point be as follows
Y = {Yq}Qq=1 , [ΣT ,WT ]T = {[ΣTq ,WTq ]T}Qq=1 (3.33)
where {[ΣTq ,WTq ]T }Qq=1 = [ΣT1 ,WT1 ,ΣT2 ,WT2 , . . . ,ΣTQ,WTQ, ]T . The function FC(Z) is writ-
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ten as





,{[−(∇Σq f¯q)T ,−(∇Wq f¯q)T ]T}Q
q=1
(3.34)
where the terms∇Σq f¯q and∇Wq f¯q are given in (3.21). Therefore, the system of inequali-
ties indicated as V I(FC,K) can be established according to (3.25), where K = ∏Qq=1Fq.
Furthermore, for a given response Σq and Wq, the solutions of {Sq,k}Kk=0 are uniquely
determined by (3.11b) and (3.11c) for all q. Hence, from now on, we assume that the val-




, so we drop the term
{Sq,k}Kk=0 in the subsequent equations for notational convenience.
In order to show that K.K.T conditions are valid necessary conditions for a stationary
solution of (3.13), an appropriate CQ must hold [93]. We use the Slater’s CQ [93] as
the strategy set of each player is a convex set. Moreover, at NE (if it exists) all of the
players use their best responses, i.e., each player has found the optimal solution to his
optimization problem and will not deviate from that. Since the optimal solution for each
player also satisfies the K.K.T conditions, then NE must be a QNE [83]. In fact, the set
of QNEs includes the NE.
3.4.4 Existence and Uniqueness of the QNE
To begin our analysis in this part, we consider the VI described by (3.25), (3.33), and
(3.34) again. In the case of the domain of Z being square complex matrices, the definition
of VI in complex domain can be further simplified to achieve the same form of VI in the
real case (i.e., (3.22)). More specifically, let FC be a 2N ×N matrix and let vec(FC) ,
[(F1)
T , . . . , (FN)
T ]T denote a 2N2 × 1 vector where Fi , [FC(Z)]:,i, i = 1, . . . , N ,
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denotes the vector corresponding to the ith column of FC(Z). Furthermore, let vec(Z) =
[[Z]T:,1, . . . , [Z]T:,N ]T be the vector version of the complex matrix Z. Hence, the vector
version of the VI in complex domain can be expressed as
(vec(Z)− vec(Y))H vec(FC(Y)) ≥ 0, ∀Z ∈ K. (3.35)
In order to further simplify the VI in complex domain to be completely identical








]T and ZR ,
[Re {vec(Z)}T , Im {vec(Z)}T ]T where Re{...} and I{...} are the real and imaginary
parts, respectively. Therefore, the real-vectorized representation of (3.25) can be writ-
ten as (
ZR − YR)T (FR(YR)) ≥ 0, ∀ZR ∈ KR, where KR ⊆ R2N2 . (3.36)
The vector form of (3.33) and (3.34) are as follows:
vec(Z) = [vec(Σ¯)T , vec(W¯)T ]T =
{










Hence, the vector form of the complex VI problem V I(FC,K) can be written as
(












FR ≥ 0, ∀(ΣR,WR) ∈ KR, KR ⊆ Rm, (3.40)
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and the equivalent real-vectorized representation of the VI in (3.25) that complies with






the set of matrices (Σ1, . . . ,ΣQ,W1, . . . ,WQ) that are in K =
∏Q
q=1Fq are the ones
whose real-vectorized versions will be inside KR. Now that the proposed smooth game is
modeled as a real-vectorized VI, we can use the following theorem to prove the existence
of the QNE.
Theorem 4. The proposed smooth game, where the actions of each player is given by
(3.15) admits at least one QNE.
Proof. See Appendix A
The uniqueness of the QNE is discussed in the following theorem:





|||DZlFCq (Zq)|||2, q ∈ Q (3.41)










 DΣl(−∇Σq f¯q) DWl(−∇Σq f¯q)
DΣl(−∇Wq f¯q) DWl(−∇Wq f¯q)
 . (3.42)
Proof. See Appendix A.
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3.5 Analysis of Proposed Game in the Presence of Multiple QNEs
3.5.1 Convergence of Proposed Algorithm
The conditions for the uniqueness of QNE do not guarantee the convergence of Algorithm
1 to a (unique) QNE. Since the optimization of each player is non-convex, only stationary
points of players’ utilities could be achieved. Hence, solving each player’s optimization
problem using AO does not necessarily lead to the best response of each player. This hin-
ders us from proving the convergence of Algorithm 1. However, we verified the conver-
gence via simulations. In this section, we present a slightly modified algorithm, namely
the gradient-response algorithm with proof of convergence. Furthermore, the gradient-
response algorithm paves the way for further performance improvements introduced later
in this chapter.
3.5.2 The Gradient-Response Algorithm




x(i) − γFR(x(i), {S(i)q,k}Kk=0)
)
(3.43)






, the superscript (i) is the
number of iterations, and γ = diag([γ1, . . . , γm]T ) is a diagonal matrix which indicates
the step size that each player takes in the improving direction of his utility function. The
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solutions to {S(i)q,k}Kk=0 are as follows:
S(i)q,0 , (M(i)q )−1 =
(







































where (3.44b) holds for k 6= 0. It is easy to confirm that the iteration in (3.43) is a simpli-
fied version of the projection done by each user in (3.18) and (3.19). Notice that the only
difference of the gradient-response algorithm, characterized by iteration in (3.43), from
Algorithm 1 is that at each round of the gradient-response algorithm, a player only does
one iteration of the PG method (i.e., (3.18)) and one iteration according to (3.44). The
real-vectorized version of the gradient-response algorithm is shown in (3.43). Since the
values of {S(i)q,k}Kk=0 are uniquely determined for a given x(i), we drop the term {S(i)q,k}Kk=0
from the argument of FR for notational convenience.
Assuming that FR is strongly monotone (with modulus cs/2)8 and Lipschitz con-
tinuous (with constant L)9 w.r.t (Σq,Wq), the convergence to a unique solution fol-
lows if γi′ = d < csL2 , ∀i′ = 1, . . . ,m, where d is constant. Hence, the mapping
x→ ΠKR
(
x− γFR(x)) becomes a contraction mapping and the fixed points of this map
are solutions of the VI in (3.40) [84, Chapter 12]. It turns out that sufficient conditions
for strong monotonicity of V I(FR,KR) are in fact the same as the conditions derived in
(3.41) for the uniqueness of the QNE10. Therefore, based on (3.43), a pseudo-code of the
gradient-response algorithm is given in Algorithm 2. Note that the operation in Line 6 of
8The notion of strong monotonicity is a basic definition in the topic of VI (see [91, Appendix A]).
9It can be seen from (3.18) and (3.19) that the power constraint of each user makes the variations of
∇Σq f¯q and∇Wq f¯q bounded for all q ∈ Q. Hence, FR is Lipschitz continuous on KR.
10More explanation can be found in Appendix A.
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Algorithm 2 is the same as the iteration in (3.43). In fact, since the set KR is a Cartesian
product of players’ strategies, the iteration in (3.43) can be easily converted back to its
















 ,∀q ∈ Q.
(3.45)
Notice that γ′q is a diagonal matrix that can obtained by dividing the matrix γ intoQ block-
diagonal matrices. That is, with a slight abuse of notations, γ = diag([γ1, . . . , γm]T ) =
γ′ = diag(γ′1, . . . , γ
′
Q), Q < m. Therefore, the gradient response in (3.43) can be shown
as an iteration that is done in each link, independent of other links. This is essentially a
distributed implementation. The gradient-response algorithm is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 The Gradient-Response Algorithm
Initialize: Σ(1)q ,W(1)q , Tr(Σ
(1)
q + W(1)q ) < Pq, ∀q
1: repeat % superscript (i) indicates the iterations starting from here
2: ComputeMq,Me,q,k, ∀(q, k) ∈ Q×K





q,k), ∀(q, k) ∈ Q×K
5: for q =1,. . . ,Q do
6: Compute (Σ(i+1)q ,W(i+1)q ) using (3.45)
7: end for
8: until Convergence to QNE
The convergence point of Algorithm 2 is a QNE of the game where players’ actions
are defined by (3.15). Specifically, assume that for i → ∞, the convergence point is
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denoted as (Σ¯, W¯). Hence, we have for all q ∈ Q
S¯q,0 = arg max
Sq,00
ϕq(Σ¯q, W¯q,Sq,0) (3.46a)
S¯q,k = arg max
Sq,k0
ϕe,q,k(Σ¯q, W¯q,Sq,k), k 6= 0. (3.46b)
The solution of (3.46a) and (3.46b) is the same as (3.44a) and (3.44b) for i → ∞.
By plugging the solutions of (3.46a) and (3.46b) in ∇Σq f¯q(Σ¯q, W¯q, {Sq,k}Kk=0) and
∇Wq f¯q(Σ¯q, W¯q, {Sq,k}Kk=0), the convergence point of Algorithm 2 is a QNE of the pro-
posed game. Overall, by using the gradient-response algorithm, the uniqueness of the
QNE and γi′ = d < csL2 , ∀i′ = 1, . . . ,m directly suggest the convergence of the iteration
in (3.43). Hence, a separate proof for the convergence of Algorithm 2 is not needed.
The iteration proposed in (3.43) has two major issues. First, the Lipschitz constant of
FR(x) has to be known. Apart from being difficult to derive, the knowledge of Lipschitz
constant requires a centralized computation. Second, the strong monotonicity of FR can-
not be always guaranteed. In fact, the conditions derived in (3.41) are very dependent on
the channel gains and network topology. Hence, in most typical network scenarios, the in-
equality in (3.41) cannot be satisfied. This means that in some situations, the game might
have more than one QNE. Consequently, the convergence of Algorithm 2 is in jeopardy.
However, on the condition that FR is monotone11, which is a weaker condition than strong
monotonicity, the ability to choose between multiple QNEs is possible. This means that
the users are able to select the QNE that satisfies a certain design criterion, thus guar-
anteeing convergence in the case of multiple QNEs. Moreover, depending on the design
criterion, the performance of the resulting QNE in terms of the achieved secrecy sum-rate
can be improved. To do this, we first review the regularization methods proposed for VIs.
11See [94] to recall the difference between monotonicity and strong monotonicity.
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3.5.3 Tikhonov Regularization
The general idea of regularization techniques is to modify the players’ utility functions
such that the VI becomes strongly monotone (and hence easily solvable by using Algo-
rithm 2), and the limit point of a sequence of solutions for the modified VI converges
to some solution of the original VI. In Tikhonov regularization, the process of regular-
izing VI(FR,KR) involves solving a sequence of VIs, where the following iteration is
characterized for a given  [84, chapter 12]:
x(i+1) = ΠKR
(
x(i) − γT (FR(x(i)) + x(i))) . (3.47)
The solution to (3.47) when i → ∞ is denoted as x(). Given that FR is monotone,
solving a sequence of (strongly monotone) VI(FR(x) + x,KR)’s while → 0 has a limit
point, (i.e., lim→0 x() exists) and that limit point is equal to least-norm solution of the
VI(FR,KR) [84, Theorem 12.2.3].
3.5.4 QNE Selection Using Tikhonov Regularization
Generalizing the applicability of Tikhonov regularization, we are more interested in con-
verging to the QNE that is more beneficial to the links. In our approach to QNE selection,
we define benefit as when the selected QNE satisfies a particular design criterion. Let the
set of solutions of VI(FR,KR) be denoted as SOL(FR,KR). We want to select the NE
that minimizes a strongly convex12 function Φ(x) : KR → R. In fact, the QNE selection
12A strongly convex function is a function whose derivative is strongly monotone. We use the definitions
of [94] to distinguish between different types of convexity.
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satisfies the following design criterion13
minimize Φ(x)
s.t. x ∈ SOL(FR,KR). (3.48)
The optimization in (3.48) is convex because the monotonicity of FR suggests that
SOL(FR,KR) is a convex set [84, Chapter 2]. The unique point that solves problem
(3.48), is the solution to VI(∇Φ(x),SOL(FR,KR)). However, as there is no prior knowl-
edge on SOL(FR,KR) (i.e., QNEs are not known), this optimization cannot be solved
easily. To overcome this issue, we modify the function FR in VI(FR,KR) to
FR , FR + ∇Φ(x). (3.49)
As the function Φ(x) is a strongly convex function, its derivative w.r.t x is strongly mono-
tone. Assuming that FR is monotone, then the function FR is strongly monotone and the
solution to VI(FR ,KR), namely x(), is unique for all values of  > 0 (i.e., convergence
to a QNE can be guaranteed). Note that the iteration used for QNE selection is the same
as (3.47) with the difference that the multiplier of  in (3.47) is replaced by ∇Φ(x). The
following theorem shows the potential of using (3.49) in (3.43) for QNE selection:
Theorem 6. [84, pp. 1128 and Theorem 12.2.5] Consider VI(FR ,KR) with x() as its
solution. Assume that KR is closed and convex, and SOL(FR,KR) is non-empty. The
following claims hold:
• The assumption that KR is closed and convex together with the non-emptiness of
SOL(FR,KR) (i.e., the existence of the QNE, proved in Theorem 4) are necessary
13The discussion on how we determine the function Φ(x) will be tackled in Section 3.6.2.
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and sufficient for x∞ = lim
→0
x() to exist.
• Assuming that FR is monotone14, x∞ is the solution of VI(∇Φ(x), SOL(FR,KR)).
This means that a QNE among several QNEs can be selected.
3.5.5 Guaranteeing Monotoncity of FR in Tikhonov Regularization
Theorem 6 requires FR to be monotone to be applicable. However, the monotonicity of
FR, as highlighted by Theorem 5, depends on many factors such as channels between
different nodes in the network, meaning that it is not possible to always guarantee the
monotonicity of FR. In order to guarantee the monotonicity, we add a strongly concave
term to the utility of each player. Let this term be − τq
2
(||Σq − YΣq ||2F + ||Wq − YWq ||2F )
where ||.||F indicates the Frobenius norm. Hence, the utility of each player defined in






(||Σq − YΣq ||2F + ||Wq − YWq ||2F ) ,
s.t. (Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq, Sk  0, q ∈ Q, k ∈ K (3.50)
where YΣq and YWq are complex constants and will be characterized later. With this
modification on the utility of each player, a new VI problem, V I(FRτ ,KR) is established
where:
FRτ (x) = F
R(x) + τ(x− y) (3.51)
where y is the vector that contains the vectorized versions of YΣq and YWq , and τ =
diag(τ1, τ2, . . . , τm) is an m × m diagonal matrix. This perturbation is also known as
proximal-point regularization method [84, Chapter 12.3.2]. Recalling Definition 4 in
14Later on, we elaborate on the monotonicity assumption for FR (see Section 3.6.3).
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Appendix A, the augmented Jacobian matrix of FRτ (x), namely Jτ , is as follows
Jτ , J + τI (3.52)
whereJ is the augmented Jacobian matrix of FR and I is the identity matrix. Considering
the matrix τ as a free parameter, we can choose a suitable value for each diagonal element
of τ , such that the matrix Jτ becomes a diagonally dominant matrix. In the following we
exploit the diagonal dominance of Jτ to establish the monotonicity property of FRτ 15.
Let D(di, [Jτ ]ii), i = 1, . . . ,m be the closed disc centered at [Jτ ]ii with radius di =∑
j 6=i |[Jτ ]ij|, where [.]ii denotes the diagonal element and [Jτ ]ii = [J ]ii + τi. Using the
Gerschgorin circle theorem [95], for all i = 1, . . . ,m, every eigenvalue of Jτ is within at
least one of the discs. We also know that for the function FRτ , in order to be monotone,
the matrix Jτ has to be APSD (see Appendix A). Hence, provided that a suitable value
for τi is chosen for all i = 1, . . . ,m, all the radii of the Gershgorin circles must be less
than their respective diagonal elements, ensuring that Jτ remains APSD. Using this fact,
the value for τi that guarantees Jτ to be APSD is
τi ≥ di − Jii, ∀i. (3.53)
Therefore, using the condition (3.53) with equality, the matrix Jτ becomes an APSD
matrix, and consequently, FRτ becomes monotone. Therefore, the Tikhonov regularization
changes to solving the problem V I(FRτ,,KR) where
FRτ, , FR(x) + τ(x− y) + (j)∇Φ(x) (3.54)
15Later as we proceed, we present the equivalent regularization for the complex version of FR, i.e., FC
as well.
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Building upon the perturbation in (3.51), we can now use FRτ instead of F
R in the
original VI in (3.40) which makes us able to use Tikhonov regularization and perform
equilibrium selection. One might argue that using FRτ instead of F
R is actually creating
a new game with different solutions. In the following we give a property that makes the
use of FRτ reasonable. It can be easily seen that the perturbation F
R
τ does not change
the fact that the NE in V I(FRτ ,KR) still exists, i.e., the set SOL(FRτ ,KR) is non-empty
(see Theorem 11). Furthermore, the addition of a monotone term (i.e., τ(x− y) does not
change the convexity of utilities to their actions. We set the vector y to be y = x((j−1)),
which means that while computing the j-th member of solutions of V I(FRτ,,KR), namely
x((j)), the vector y is the same as the solution found for V I(FRτ,,KR) when  = (j−1).
Therefore, in the limit point where x∞ ∈ SOL(FRτ ,KR), we have
x∞ ∈ SOL(FRτ ,KR)⇒ (x− x∞)FRτ (x∞) > 0
⇒ (x− x∞)
(
FR(x∞) + τ(x∞ − x∞)
)
> 0
⇒ x∞ ∈ SOL(FR,KR). (3.55)
Hence, the term τ(x∞ − x∞) vanishes since the limit point is guaranteed to be reached.
3.5.6 Distributed Tikhonov Regularization
Tikhonov regularization (QNE selection) is done in two nested loops. In the inner loop,
for a given (j), the solution to VI(FR ,KR) will be found from the iteration in (3.47)
(where the multiplier of  is replaced with ∇Φ(x)). In the outer loop, the next value of
(j) will be chosen (according to a predefined sequence such that limj→∞ (j) = 0) until
the solution to VI(∇Φ(x),SOL(FR,KR)) is reached (see Theorem 6).
Despite having the ability to select a specific QNE among multiple QNEs, QNE se-
84
lection requires heavy signaling and centralized computation because still the Lipschitz
Continuity constant L and strong monotonicity modulus of FR (x) (or F
R
τ,(x)) must be
known (see Section 3.5.2). In order to address these issues, we introduce another regular-
ization method. In this regularization, a term θ(i)(x(i) − x(i−1)) is added to the function
FRτ,(x) to build a function F
R
τ,,θ(x) , FRτ,(x) + θ(i)(x(i)−x(i−1)) where θ(i) is a diagonal
matrix. Considering this modification, the following property can be used:
Proposition 2. Let FRτ,(x) be a strictly monotone and Lipschitz continuous mapping16;
maxz∈KR ||x|| ≤ C, and maxz∈KR ||FRτ,|| ≤ B where C and B are positive constants.
Furthermore, suppose that for a given (j), the solution to VI(FRτ,,KR) is denoted as





FR(x(i)) + τ(x(i) − x((j−1))) + (j)∇Φ(x(i)) + θ(i)(x(i) − x(i−1)
))
(3.56)
where the step size matrix γ(i) is changing with the iterations. Lastly, set γ(i)θ(i) = c =












(γ(i)max − γ(i)min) <∞. (3.57)
where γ(i)max and γ
(i)
min are respectively the maximum and minimum diagonal elements of
the matrix γ(i). Therefore, we have limi→∞ x(i) = x((j)).
The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in [96, Proposition 3.4]. However, note that
the assumption of strict monotonicity of FRτ,(x) is immediately satisfied as F
R
τ,(x) is
already strongly monotone. The conditions maxz∈KR ||x|| ≤ C and maxz∈KR ||FRτ,|| ≤ B
can also be satisfied due to having power constraints on each link. According to [96,
Proposition 3.4], the step size γ(i) can be chosen as γ(i)i′ = (i + αi′)
−ω where αi′ is a
positive integer for i′ = 1, . . . , N and 0 < ω < 1. Hence, we can write
16Note that Lipschitz continuity of FRτ,(x) requires both F
R(x) and ∇Φ(x) to be Lipschitz continuous.
Hence, the proposed choices for Φ(x) in the next section are all Lipschitz continuous.
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γ(i)max = (i+ αmax)
−ω, γ(i)min = (i+ αmin)
−ω. (3.58)
Note that in Proposition 2, θ(i) is already set to θ(i) = c
γ(i)
. Using Proposition 2, we
can design a distributed transmit optimization algorithm without the knowledge of Lip-
schitz constant and strong monotonicity modulus of FRτ,. The next section discusses the
implementation of QNE selection using (3.56)17.
3.6 QNE Selection Algorithm
In this section we propose the QNE selection algorithm together with three possi-
ble choices for the design criterion (i.e., Φ(x)). Each of these choices imposes a certain
amount of signaling overhead as well as a certain amount of improvement on the perfor-
mance of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
3.6.1 Algorithm Description
The pseudo-code for the QNE selection algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3. As mentioned
previously, it can be seen that the QNE selection algorithm is comprised of two nested
loops: outer loop (i.e., line 1), and inner loop (i.e., line 3). In the outer loop the jth
member of (j)’s is selected. In the inner loop, the game s played among the players,
and the players update their strategies according to (3.56). The sequence (j) must be a
decreasing sequence such that limj→∞ (j) = 0. The operation in line 10 of Algorithm 3
17Note that in all of the proposed algorithms throughout this chapter, it was assumed that at each round
of the game, all of the players are maximizing the utilities. This update fashion is also known as Jacobi
implementation. The feasibility of implementing the algorithms using other update fashions (e.g., Gauss-
Seidel or Asynchronous) can be a subject of future research.
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 Σ(i)q + γ′q
(


















Notice that θ(i)q is a diagonal matrix that can obtained via dividing the matrix θ(i)
into Q block-diagonal matrices. That is, (with a slight abuse of notations) θ(i) =
diag(θ(i)1 , . . . , θ
(i)
Q ). In the next subsection, we specifically explain the terms ∇ΣqΦ(x)
and ∇WqΦ(x) in line 10, so that Algorithm 3 will be completely defined. Lastly, notice
that all of our analysis on VI problems were under the assumption that every player is
solving a minimization problem as his strategy. Hence, if maximization is the strategy of
each player, the proximal terms in (3.59) appear as a negative values. Furthermore, the
addition of∇ΣqΦ(x) and∇WqΦ(x) means that Φ(x) must be a strongly concave function
of x.
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Algorithm 3 The QNE Selection Algorithm
Initialize: Σ(1)q ,W(1)q , Tr(Σ
(1)
q + W(1)q ) < Pq, ∀q, and j = 1
1: repeat % Outer loop: superscript (j) indicates the iterations starting from here
2: Choose the jth member of the sequence (j)
3: repeat % Inner loop: superscript (i) indicates the iterations starting from here
4: ComputeMq,Me,q,k, ∀(q, k) ∈ Q×K





q,k), ∀(q, k) ∈ Q×K
7: for q = 1,. . . ,Q do
8: Update the values of τq for all q = 1, . . . , Q such that the inequality in (3.41) is
satisfied


























11: Compute (Σ(i+1)q ,W(i+1)q ) using (3.59)
12: end for
13: until Convergence to QNE % x(j) is found
14: j = j+1
15: until Convergence to limit point of x(j)’s
3.6.2 Criterion for QNE Selection
Assume that the derivatives of Φ(x) are described as follows:
∇Φ(x) , [∇RΣ1,W1Φ(x)T , . . . ,∇RΣQ,WQΦ(x)T ]T , (3.60a)
∇RΣq ,WqΦ(x) , [∇RΣqΦ(x)T ,∇RWqΦ(x)T ]T , q ∈ Q, (3.60b)
∇RΣqΦ(x) , [Re{vec(∇ΣqΦ(x))}T , Im{vec(∇ΣqΦ(x))}T ]T , (3.60c)
∇RWqΦ(x) , [Re{vec(∇WqΦ(x))}T , Im{vec(∇WqΦ(x))}T ]T . (3.60d)
We are now ready to present the possible choices of the criterion function Φ(x):
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Maximizing the sum of information rates
We aim to select the QNE that maximizes the sum-rate of all links. Recalling the reformu-






















Notice that although we wrote Φ as a function of x, one can easily relate the vector x to
the covariance matrices {(Σq,Wq)}Qq=1 using (3.60) and (3.43). Hence, the derivatives of











































lr , with Σ
?
q
andW?q being the limit points of Σq andWq. Integrating (3.62a) w.r.t. Σ?q and integrating






ϕr(Σr,Wr,Sr,0). Hence, at the
end of Algorithm 3, the QNE that is a stationary point of sum-rate of all links is selected,
i.e., the point that is the unique solution of VI(∇Φ(x), SOL(FR,KR)).
Minimizing the received rates at Eves




























Glk (Σl + Wl)GHlk (3.63c)
where the term ρr,k is defined in (3.72). Following the same reasoning used in









k=1 exp{βϕe,r,k(Σr,Wr,Sr,k)}), where ϕe,r,k(Σr,Wr,Sr,k) is de-
fined in (3.10c). Hence, the selected QNE guides the game to the stationary point
of minimizing Eves’ received rates, i.e., the point that is the unique solution of
VI(∇Φ(x), SOL(FR,KR)).
Maximizing the sum of secrecy rates
In this criterion, a simple addition of previous design criteria gives us another QNE selec-
tion method, in which the QNE that is a stationary point of secrecy sum-rate is selected.
3.6.3 Signaling Overhead and Running Time
While the distributed implementation of our proposed algorithms is now complete (see
(3.45) and (3.59)), we still need to make sure that the amount of coordination that each
link has to do (to make each QNE selection method possible) is reasonably low. That
is, we need to check how much (if any) information a link needs to know about other
links’ corresponding channels and transmission attributes (i.e., covariance matrices of
information signal and TxFJ) in order to execute one iteration of each algorithm.
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Algorithm 1 only requires each link to measure the interference at its receiver to per-
form the optimization in (3.15). By examining the iteration in (3.45) for each link, where
∇Σq f¯q and ∇Wq f¯q are given in (3.21), we can deduce that Algorithm 2 requires the same
amount of coordination as Algorithm 1. The amount of coordination for Algorithm 3,
however, depends on the choice of the function Φ(x). Here, we compare all of the flavors
of Algorithm 3 in terms of how much signaling overhead they impose on the network.
If maximizing sum-rate is the criterion, from (3.61) it can be seen that during the
computation of x((j)), at each iteration, the qth link, q ∈ Q, needs the values of received
signal, noise-plus-interference, and Sr,0 (r ∈ Q, r 6= q) of other links. Furthermore,
the cross-channel gains of the qth link with other (unintended) legitimate receivers (i.e.,
Hqr,∀r ∈ Q, r 6= q) should also be available. Note that the cross-channel gains need not
to be acquired multiple times at each iteration, as they are fixed throughout the coherence
time of the channels18. If the rth receiver sends training signals to its corresponding
transmitter, for (implicit) channel estimation, r ∈ Q, r 6= q, the channel gains Hqr can be
estimated by the qth transmitter using channel reciprocity. Moreover, it should be noted
that while the qth link, q = 1, . . . , Q, is using this criterion, it does not need to know any
information about the channel gains between other links and Eves. This feature makes
this design criterion more practical than other criteria, which require obtaining E-CSI
(i.e., Grk and Sr,k, ∀r 6= q,∀k) of all other links.
For the case of passive Eves, it does not seem difficult to derive the responses (or
gradients) while assuming the knowledge of only statistics of E-CSI. This can be done if in
(3.16) we replace the term ϕe,q,k with E [ϕe,q,k] where the expectation is w.r.tGqk,∀q, k ∈
Q×K. Note that including the expectation operator in the utilities, does not compromise
the generality of any of the analyses done in previous sections. Despite general difficulties








Figure 3.1: A (clustered) MANET where two clusters (indicated by green circle) of ad-
hoc nodes are near each other.
in acquiring E-CSI, some applications can be considered as practical examples where the
knowledge of E-CSI can be easily captured. One such example is mobile ad-hoc networks
(MANETs) where the ad-hoc links of one cluster are interfering with one another, and can
be considered as the legitimate links of our setup (See Figure 3.1). On the other hand, the
receivers of another cluster may try to overhear the communications of the legitimate links
in the nearby clusters. These receivers can be considered as the external eavesdroppers of
our setup. The clustering may have been done to ease the routing process in the network.
It is possible that the clustering algorithm requires the links to exchange their location,
power, and (possibly) channel state information (CSI). Hence, provided that the coherence
time of the channels are long enough, each link can maintain the CSI between itself and
the links from another cluster. Hence, the E-CSI can be known to the links.
Another instance of our setup involves the downlink scenario of current cellular net-
works. Specifically, assume that the communication of the BS of a cell is interfering with
other nearby cells. Each BS-user pair can be assumed as a legitimate link in our scenario.
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We assume that no MU-MIMO technique is done in this scenario, so a BS is only com-
municating with one receiver (i.e., UE) at a given time. There might be other idle users
in such network that are interested in overhearing the current communications. We can
consider these idle users as the external eavesdroppers. It is possible that during the cell
association phase, the idle users –which are now the external eavesdroppers– exchange
their location information (using known packets) with all the nearby BSs to eventually
select a cell for their respective communications. Hence, the BSs can extract the CSI
between themselves and the external eavesdroppers and maintain it (till the end of one
coherence time) for use in PHY-layer security optimizations.
The issue of knowledge of E-CSI has also been investigated in the recent literature.
One example is when Eve is acting as a reactive jammer. That is, after some eavesdrop-
ping on the current transmissions, Eve injects her jamming signal to disrupt the ongoing
communications. In such a case when jamming happens, assuming that the jamming sig-
nal of Eves are previously known, the E-CSI can be extracted by the legitimate links using
channel reciprocity. Moreover, in [97], it was shown that in a massive MIMO scenario, a
passive Eve cannot be very dangerous and must therefore be active and attack the training
phase. This active attack can make Eve exposed, and hence the legitimate links can ac-
quire some knowledge about E-CSI. Recently, the authors in [98] proposed a method with
which the legitimate nodes can detect the passive eavesdropper from the local oscillator
power leaked from its RF front end. Hence, an approximation on the location of Eve can
be acquired. Lastly, in some scenarios where the legitimate nodes can detect the transmis-
sions from Eves (e.g., active eavesdropping attacks), blind channel estimation techniques
can be exploited to capture E-CSI [99, 100].
An interesting research question regarding the justification of signaling overhead is as
follows: If a given algorithm requires each link to acquire its interfering channel gains,
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then why not use a ZF-based solution to nullify the interference of a link on unintended
(but legitimate) nodes? To answer this question, we first need to mention that the type
of interference network that we consider in this chapter inherently assumes that an Alice-
Bob pair consists of (most probably) nodes of the same specifications; that includes for
example the number of antennas at each node, number of RF chains, etc. Hence, if an
Alice wants to nullify her interference on unintended Bobs she must have more antennas
than the total number of antennas of unintended Bobs, which may not be according to our
aforementioned (implicit) assumption.
The possibility of using ZF-based solution would make sense in a multi-cell network
where the cell-edge users are interfered by the transmissions of base stations of neighbor-
ing cells19. Such a scenario complies with an interference network model in which each
Alice-Bob pair is a base station and its intended cell-edge (downlink) user. Now, it is
possible to assume that each Alice has large number of antennas, so a ZF-based solution
may be a good strategy. Studying this scenario can be a good subject of future research20.
Regarding the computation of the proximal term τq as described by (3.53), through
numerous simulations we found that regardless of the topology of the network and the
channel gains, the value found for τq is always a vary small value (i.e., τq < 10−4). This
does not compromise the validity of inequality (3.53). However, in practice it seems
that the transmit optimization game is always a monotone VI problem. The derivation
of inequality (3.53) was done because of the fact that it is not that obvious to see the
monotonicity of V I(FC,K).
It is also interesting to understand how the choice of design criterion changes the
running time of our proposed algorithm. To do this, we start from analyzing the computa-
19We focus on downlink scenario of multi-cell networks. The discussion for uplink communications can
be easily drawn form that for downlink communications.
20More details on this potential future work are given in Chapter 7.
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tional complexity of Algorithm 1 and extend it to the analysis of our proposed algorithms.
Algorithm 1
In Line 2 of Algorithm 1, there is no need to compute every term ofMq andMe,q,k; that is,
in measuring the interference, only the aggregate value is needed. Hence, the complexity
of Line 2 is equivalent to the complexity of calculating the covariance matrix of the re-
ceived interference. More specifically, at the receivers of legitimate links, the covariance
matrix calculation of theNRq×1 received interference vector (i.e.,Mq) yields a complex-
ity of O(N2Rq). Similar computation is needed to obtainMe,q,k, which has the complexity
of O(∑Kk=1N2ek). Line 5 of Algorithm 1 involves a matrix inversion for Sq,0 and a matrix
multiplication together with a matrix inversion for {Sq,k}Kk=1. The total complexity of this
line isO(∑Kk=1(NTqN2e,k+Ne,kN2Tq +N3e,k)+N3Rq). Computation of the gradients in Line
8 requires the computation of ϕe,q,k for all k ∈ K and (Mn,lq +HqqΣqHHqq)−1. Computation







+ N3e,k) due to
matrix multiplications and determinant calculations (see (3.10c)). The inverse of (Mn,lq +
HqqΣqHHqq) yields an additional complexity ofO(N3Rq +N2RqNTq +NRqN2Tq). Notice that
in calculating Mn,lq and M
n,l







qk must be carried at each iteration of the PG method (i.e.,
Line 6 of Algorithm 1), which respectively have complexities of O(N2RqNTq + NRqN2Tq)
and O(∑Kk=1 NTqN2e,k + Ne,kN2Tq)). The other computations that were not mentioned
in gradient derivation are redundant and do not affect the general complexity. Apart
from the gradient derivations, the Euclidean projection also has its own complexity. The
projection in (3.20) requires eigenvalue decomposition, and thus has O(N3Tq) complex-
ity. Adding all of the aforementioned computations, the complexity of Algorithm 1 for























. Note that one might also multiply this complex-
ity by the amount of iterations in the PG method and the AO process. Let the constants
NPG andNAO denote the iterations taken in the PG method and AO process, respectively.











This algorithm can also be handled with the same complexity as Algorithm 1 with the dif-
ference that the number of iterations in Algorithm 2 (i.e., repeating the loop at Line 1 of
Algorithm 2) is more than Algorithm 1, and hence a slower algorithm compared to Algo-
rithm 1. Let the convergence time of the loop in Line 1 of Algorithm 2 beNGR. Thus, the











In this algorithm, some additional calculations are generally required. For the criterion
of sum-rate maximization, the derivation of the gradients of Φ(x) are shown in (3.61),








). In the case
of minimizing Eves’ rates as the QNE selection method, according to (3.63), computing









convergence time of Algorithm 3 is generally different from that of Algorithm 2 due to
the presence of criterion function in Algorithm 3. Setting NQNE as the convergence time
of the loop in Line 1 of Algorithm 3, the total complexity of Algorithm 3 is obtained as
follows:
• Under sum-rate maximization as the QNE selection method, for every player q, the
21Notice that this result only makes sense when the QNE is unique. Otherwise if QNE is not unique,


































• Under the minimization of Eves’ rates as the QNE selection method, for every
































• Under the maximization of the secrecy sum-rate as the QNE selection method, for
































We also computed the actual running time of our algorithm using MATLAB on a com-
mercial PC with the following specifications:
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• CPU: 2.4 GHz Intel Core i5.
• RAM: 8 GB 1333 MHz DDR3.
• OS: Mac OS X El Capitan v. 10.11.6.
We show the results in Figure 3.2 for one iteration of Algorithm 3 while using different
criteria. Hence, in comparing these results with the theoretical derivations, one should
skip the term NGR and NQNE . Each point in the presented curves is averaged over the
number of iterations and also over 100 channel realizations of a given (random) network
topology. The results in Figure 3.2 show that the running time of the QNE selection when
secrecy sum-rate is the criterion (i.e., Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate)) is relatively higher than
the other two QNE selection methods. It can be seen in Figure 3.2 (a) that as the number
of links grows, the difference in the computational complexity of Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates)
(i.e., QNE selection when minimizing Eves’ rates is the criterion) and Alg. 3 (Secrecy
sum-rate) appears to be in the slope of the curves, which complies with theoretical deriva-
tions in (3.65) and (3.66). However, this difference becomes clear when the number of
links/antennas are high enough22. It can be seen from Figure 3.2 (b) that both Alg. 3
(Secrecy sum-rate) and Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates) have the same slope. This can be seen in
the theoretical derivation for the complexity of both QNE selection methods in (3.65) and
(3.66), where for both criteria, the complexity w.r.t K is a multiple QN3e,k. For the case
of Alg. 3 (Sum-rate) the complexity w.r.t K is only a multiple of N3e,k. The gap between
the Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) and Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates) in Figure 3.2 (b) is because of the
additional complexity of Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate), which is independent of the number
Eves (i.e., K).
22Note that the theoretical derivations are derived for the worst case.
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Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate)
Alg. 3 (Eves' rates)
(a) (b)
Figure 3.2: Comparison of the actual running time of the pro-
posed algorithms vs. (a) number of links, (b) number of Eves(
rcirc = 30 m, K = 5, NTq = 5, Nrq = 5 ∀q,Ne,k = 5 ∀k, dlink = 10 m, Pq = 40 dBm
)
.
3.6.4 Effect of Initial Conditions
In general, the initial values for the covariance matrices of information and TxFJ sig-
nals can affect the results. Given the non-convexity of links’ optimization problems, and
the fact that at a QNE links operate at their stationary points, which are not necessarily
unilaterally optimal, it is theoretically expected that different initial values can make the
algorithm converge to different stationary points, thus affecting the final results. However,
in our simulations, we did not see any significant variations in the secrecy sum-rate when
the initial values of information and TxFJ covariance matrices are changed. For example,
by changing the initial values, for networks with 10 to 16 links, a maximum difference
of 3 nats/sec/Hz and maximum of 150 iterations until convergence were observed. The
results can be seen in Figure 3.3, where the simulated convergence behavior of all three
QNE selection methods is depicted for one channel realization. A point at the nth itera-
tion of a curve represents the resulting secrecy sum-rate of that particular QNE selection
method at the nth iteration, averaged over 100 random initial points. The corresponding
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Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate)
Alg. 3 (Sum-rate)
Alg. 3 (Eves' rates)
Figure 3.3: Comparison of convergence trend of the proposed QNE selection methods:(
8 links (Q = 8) and 7 Eves (K = 7), rcirc = 30 m, NTq = 5, Nrq = 2 ∀q,Ne,k = 2 ∀k,
dlink = 10 m, Pq = 40 dBm).
95% confidence intervals are also shown. The tightness of the confidence intervals in-
dicate that while the performance varies when the initial points change, this variation is
negligible. Note that in all of our simulations, we considered random initializations for
each channel realization of a given (random) network topology.
3.7 Centralized Precoder Design
So far, our efforts were in the direction that facilitated distributed implementation with
minimum amount of signaling overhead. However, no discussion on the efficiency of the
resulting QNEs has been given yet. In this section we discuss this issue and design a
centralized algorithm that can be considered as a measure of efficiency in our game.
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An appropriate measure of efficiency (i.e., social welfare) in our game would be the
sum of utilities of all players or the secrecy sum-rate. Hence, the price of anarchy (PoA)
can be defined as the ratio between the performance of the optimal centralized solution for
the secrecy sum-rate maximization problem and the worst NE. However, such definition
of PoA requires us to solve the secrecy sum-rate maximization problem, which is a non-
convex problem. Moreover, as explained earlier, all of the proposed algorithms converge
to the QNEs of the proposed game, which are not necessarily NEs. Hence, direct PoA
analysis is not feasible.
To evaluate the goodness of QNEs, we propose a centralized algorithm that provides
locally optimal solutions for the secrecy sum-rate maximization problem. We refer to this
algorithm as Centralized Secrecy Sum-rate Maximization method (CSSM). We used the
objective value of the solutions found via the CSSM as the social welfare or measure of
efficiency in our game. In the following, a summary of the CSSM method is given.
In CSSM, the objective is to find a stationary solution for the following optimization
problem:
maximize




Using the reformulation techniques given in Section 3, the secrecy sum-rate maximization







s.t. (Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq, ∀q ∈ Q,
Sq,k  0, ∀(q, k) ∈ Q× {0} ∪K. (3.68)
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The problem in (3.68) can be shown to be convex w.r.t either [Σ,W] = {Σq,Wq}Qq=1 =[
[Σ1,W1]T , . . . , [ΣQ,WQ]T
]
or S = {Sq,k}∀q,k = [S1,0, . . . ,S1,K ,S2,0, . . . ,S2,K , . . . ,SQ,K ]T .
Hence, a stationary point that satisfies the K.K.T optimality conditions of (3.67) can be
found by solving (3.68) sequentially w.r.t. [Σ,W] and S. That is, in one iteration, problem
(3.68) is solved w.r.t. only S to find an optimal solution S∗. Next, with S∗ plugged in
the objective of (3.68), problem (3.68) can be optimized w.r.t. [Σ,W] to find an optimal
solution [Σ∗,W∗] = {Σ∗q ,W∗q}Qq=1. This Alternating Optimization (AO) cycle continues
until reaching a convergence point. It can be seen that problem (3.68) is separable w.r.t.
every element of S. Hence, the elements of S∗ can be written as
S∗q,0 , arg maxSq,00
Q∑
q=1
f¯q(Σq,Wq,Sq,k) = (Mq)−1 (3.69a)
=
I + HqqWqHHqq + Q∑
r=1
r 6=q














I + Gqk(Σq +Wq)GHqk + Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
Grk (Σr + Wr)GHrk

−1
, k 6= 0. (3.69d)
Now, while S∗ is plugged in the objective of (3.68), we can solve (3.68) w.r.t [Σ,W]. We
use the augmented Lagrangian multiplier method [101] to derive a centralized solution
for [Σ∗,W∗]. Let cq = Tr(Σq +Wq)− Pq < 0. The augmented Lagrangian of (3.68) can
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be written as [101]23









(max{aq + pcq, 0})2 + a2q
}
(3.70)
where p is a positive penalty (to prevent violating the constraints) and aq, q = 1, . . . , Q,
are the non-negative Lagrange multipliers. At a stationary point, the following equalities




































































23We converted the problem in (3.68) to a minimization problem by considering the negative of the
objective function.
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Note that the second term in the RHS of (3.71a) is a continuously differentiable function
w.r.t Σq when r = q [101, pp. 397]. Thus,
∂
∂Σq
(max{ar + pcr, 0})2 =

2p(aq + pcq)Σq , r = q & aq + pcq > 0
0 , otherwise.
(3.73)


































(max{ar + pcr, 0})2 =

2p(aq + pcq)Wq , r = q & aq + pcq > 0
0 , otherwise.
(3.75)
To satisfy the conditions in (3.71), we used gradient descent with a line search satisfying
Armijo rule. The details of the centralized algorithm is presented in Algorithm 4. The
centralized nature of Algorithm 4 can be seen in Line 12, where the equalities in (3.71)
are checked for all q ∈ Q and Line 11, where the Armijo rule is applied. The convergence
of this algorithm can be proved by extending the proof of [102, Corollary 2], which is
skipped here for the sake of brevity. Note that Algorithm CSSM is sensitive to the initial
values of [Σ,W]. Thus, we simulated this algorithm with random initializations and
averaged its performance over the total number of initializations.
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Algorithm 4 The Centralized Secrecy Sum-rate Maximization Algorithm
Initialize: Σ(1)q ,W(1)q , Tr(Σ
(1)
q + W(1)q ) < Pq , ∀q, i = 0
1: repeat i = i+1 % superscript (i) indicates the iterations starting from here
2: Compute S(i)q,k, ∀(q, k) ∈ Q×K, p = 1, aq = 0, ∀q, and st (Armijo step size)
3: repeat Setm = 1
4: repeat Set n = 1 % superscript (m) indicates the iterations starting from here
5: Set [dΣq , dWq ]
T = −[ ∂∂ΣqL(m)
T
, ∂∂WqL
(m)T ], ∀q ⇒ d = {dΣq , dWq}Qq=1
6: Set [Σˆ, Wˆ] = [Σ(m),W(m)] + d
7: Set [Σ(m+1),W(m+1)] = [Σ(m),W(m)] + snt ([Σˆ, Wˆ]− [Σ(m),W(m)])
8: repeat % superscript (n) indicates the iterations starting from here
9: sn+1t = st(s
n
t )
10: Set [Σ(m+1),W(m+1)] = [Σ(m),W(m)] + sn+1t ([Σˆ, Wˆ]− [Σ(m),W(m)])
11: until L(Σ(m+1),W(m+1), a(m+1),p,S(i)) < L(Σ(m),W(m), a(m),p,S(i)) +
snt d
T { ∂∂ΣqL(m), ∂∂WqL(m)}
Q
q=1
12: until ∂∂ΣqL =
∂
∂WqL = 0, ∀q
13: aq = max{aq + pcq, 0}
14: p = p× u % u ≥ 1 increase the penalty.
15: until max{c1, . . . , cq} ≤ 0
16: until Convergence of L(Σ,W, a,p,S)
3.8 Simulation Results and Discussion
In this section, we simulate and compare all the algorithms presented so far. In these
simulations, we set the noise power to 0 dBm. Q links as well as K Eves are randomly
placed in a circle, namely the simulation region, with radius rcirc. The distance between
the transmitter and the receiver of each link is set to be a constant dlink = 10 m. The
path-loss exponent is set to 2.5. For all simulated algorithms, β = 5 (see (3.12)) and
the termination criterion is set to when the normalized relative difference in each link’s
secrecy rate for two consecutive iterations is less than 10−3. For the QNE selection algo-
rithms, we set their parameters as follows: The step size matrix (i.e., γ′) is set such that
γ′(i)j = γ0i
(−0.6), j = 1, . . . ,m, where γ0 is a positive constant24, c = 0.08Im×m, and
24We found out that setting the maximum value of γ0 = 20000 brings the best performance for our
algorithms.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.4: (a) Convergence of secrecy sum-rate when QNE is unique; (b) convergence of
secrecy sum-rate when multiple QNEs exist; (c) secrecy sum-rate vs. rcirc : Q = 8, K =
5, NTq = 5, Nrq = 2 ∀q,Ne,k = 2 ∀k, rcirc = (a) 100 m, (b) 20 m,




Figure 3.4 (a) compares the three proposed algorithms in a channel realization for the
case when the QNE is unique. According to the uniqueness condition in Theorem 5, it is
generally expected that if links are far enough from each other, then the resulting QNE is
likely to be unique. We simulate this scenario by increasing rcirc significantly. We con-
sider the secrecy sum-rate as the measure of comparison between the algorithms. It can
be seen that all of the algorithms converge to almost the same point. This result indicates
the equivalence between the QNEs found by both Algorithms 1 and 2. Furthermore, it can
be concluded that the QNE selection algorithm with sum-rate as its design criterion (in-
dicated by Alg. 3 (Sum-rate)) does not outperform Algorithm 2 when the QNE is unique
(i.e., the condition in Theorem 5 is satisfied). That is, if the QNE is unique the QNE se-
lection algorithms only have one QNE to choose from. It should be noted that Algorithm
1 converges faster than other algorithms. This might be because Algorithms 2 and 3 use
smaller steps towards the QNE at each iteration.
Figure 3.4 (b) compares the achieved secrecy sum-rate in a channel realization be-
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tween Algorithm 2 and different versions of Algorithm 3, indicated by “Alg. 3 (Secrecy
sum-rate)” when secrecy sum-rate is the design criterion, “Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates)” when
reducing Eves’ rates is the design criterion, and “Alg. 3 (Sum-rate)” when sum-rate is the
design criterion. Furthermore, due to the existence of multiple QNEs, Algorithm 2 is os-
cillating between QNEs and never converges even after 70 iterations25. We increased the
number of iterations to 1000, but did not see the convergence of Algorithm 2. However,
all of the versions of Algorithm 3 converge to a QNE26.
Figure 3.4 (c) shows the secrecy sum-rate resulting from different algorithms vs. rcirc.
For Algorithm 2, we limit the iterations to 100. For Algorithm 3, we limit the iterations of
the inner loop (i.e., line 3 in Algorithm 3) and the outer loop (i.e., line 1 in Algorithm 3) to
50 and 3, respectively. Each point in the figure is the result of averaging over 50 random
network topologies, where in each topology, 200 channel realizations are simulated and
averaged. It can be seen that when rcirc is small (i.e., high interference), Alg. 3 (Sum-rate)
and Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) have higher secrecy sum-rate than Algorithm 2. This is due
to the fact that the myopic maximization of secrecy rates in Algorithm 2 is not guaranteed
to converge to a QNE. Moreover, it can be seen that in Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates), we cannot
increase the secrecy rate as much as other versions of Algorithm 3. This is due to the
fact that in minimizing the received rate at Eves, too much TxFJ power creates unwanted
interference on legitimate receivers, preventing any improvement on the secrecy sum-rate.
Figure 3.5 (a) compares the secrecy sum-rate of Algorithms 2 and 3 for different
number of links. Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) and Alg. 3 (Sum-rate) consistently outperform
25Recall that convergence of Algorithm 2 is tied to the uniqueness of the QNE. Furthermore, due to the
similarity in the behavior of Algorithms 1 and 2, we only showed Algorithm 2 in subsequent simulations.
26The result in Figure 3.4 (b) should not be confused with the previous simulation in Figure 3.4 (a). In
fact, equal secrecy sum-rate for all of the algorithms happen only when QNE is unique (i.e., the condition
in Theorem 5 is satisfied). However, Figure 3.4 (b) is showing results when the condition in Theorem 5 is
not likely to be satisfied.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.5: Comparison of (a) secrecy sum-rate, (b) sum-rate, (c) sum of Eves’ received
rates vs. number of links:
rcirc = 30 m, K = 5, NTq = 5, Nrq = 2 ∀q,Ne,k = 2 ∀k, dlink = 10 m, Pq = 40 dBm.
Algorithm 2 in terms of secrecy sum-rate (Figure 3.5 (a)) and sum-rate (Figure 3.5 (b)),
and Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates) does not result in a secrecy sum-rate as high as the other two
flavors of Algorithm 3. As shown in Figure 3.5 (c), using Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates) slightly
reduces sum of Eves’ received rates by increasing interference at Eves, but this directly
affects legitimate transmissions as well. Furthermore, Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) does not
have a significant advantage over Alg. 3 (Sum-rate). Another interesting point is that Alg.
3 (Secrecy sum-rate) has slightly higher sum-rate and higher leaked rate compared to Alg.
3 (Sum-rate). Hence, the performance of Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) is not necessarily a
combination of Alg. 3 (Sum-rate) and Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates), but rather a good tradeoff
point. Lastly, it can be seen that the proposed algorithms have lower secrecy sum-rates
compared to CSSM. We conjecture that this might be due to the fact that CSSM has a
larger solution space compared to our methods. Note that the solution space of CSSM
may contain some points that are not necessarily the QNEs of the game, whereas both
Algorithms 2 and 3 can only converge to QNEs of the game. The difference between
Algorithms 2 and 3 is that Algorithm 3 selects the best QNE (according to a criterion),
but Algorithm 2 does not. As can be seen in Figure 3.5 (a), for the case of 16 links, the
108































Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate)
Alg. 3 (Eves' Rates)




















   
   
   


















Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate)
Alg. 3 (Eves' rates)





















   
   














Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate)
Alg. 3 (Eves' rates)
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.6: Comparison of (a) total power (b) power allocated to information signal
(c) power allocated to artificial noise (TxFJ) vs. number of links: rcirc = 30 m, K =
5, NTq = 5, Nrq = 2 ∀q,Ne,k = 2 ∀k, dlink = 10 m, Pq = 40 dBm.
loss of Algorithm 3 compared to CSSM is less than 25% when either secrecy sum-rate or
sum-rate is the criterion for the QNE selection phase of Algorithm 3. Despite this loss,
using Algorithm 3 facilitates not only a distributed implementation, but also the flexibility
in the amount of coordination. The latter gives us freedom to keep the coordination as
low as possible. Neither of these features are available in CSSM.
In Figure 3.6 (a)–(c) the power consumption of different algorithms are compared.
The total power in Figure 3.6 (a)–(c) is normalized w.r.t the total power budget
∑
q Pq.
Generally, Alg. 3 (Sum-rate) is the most energy efficient algorithm. Both Alg. 2 and Alg.
3 (Eves’ rates) perform poorly in energy efficiency as the increase in the power of TxFJ
creates interference at other legitimate receivers. This makes the links to spend even more
power on the information signal which eventually leads to neither a high sum-rate nor a
high secrecy sum-rate. Moreover, the increase in the power of TxFJ seems to be more
significant in Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates), as the design criterion forces the users to carelessly
increase the interference at Eves. Lastly, Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) and Alg. 3 (Sum-rate)
decrease the power of TxFJ as the number of links increases because as the links abound,
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of secrecy sum-rate vs. number of Eves:
rcirc = 30 m, Q = 8, NTq = 5, Nrq = Ne,k = 2, Pq = 40 dBm
they automatically create additional interference at Eves. Hence, the links do not spend
more power on TxFJ.
Figure 3.7 shows that as the number of Eves in the network increases, Alg. 3 (Sum-
rate) and Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) still outperform Algorithm 2 in terms of secrecy
sum-rate, and Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates) still achieves a low secrecy sum-rate. Overall, in these
simulations, maximizing sum-rate as a design criterion seems to be the best choice to
increase the secrecy sum-rate because other proposed criteria cannot add significant im-
provements despite requiring more extensive signaling between the links (e.g., knowledge
of E-CSI). Lastly, minimizing Eves’ rates as the design criterion although brings poor
performance to the QNE selection, it gives us valuable insights on the importance of in-
terference management such that if it is overlooked, the secrecy sum-rate in the network
can be severely decreased.
3.9 Summary
In this chapter, we designed a game-theoretic secure transmit optimization for a
MIMO interference network with several MIMO-enabled Eves. We proposed three algo-
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rithms to increase secrecy sum-rate. In the first algorithm, the links myopically optimize
their transmission until a quasi-Nash equilibrium (QNE) is reached. Because of the in-
ferior performance of first algorithm in case of multiple QNEs, we designed the second
algorithm based on the concept of variational inequality. The second algorithm enables us
to analytically derive convergence conditions, but achieves the same secrecy sum-rate as
the first algorithm. To increase the secrecy sum-rate, we proposed the third algorithm in
which links can select the best QNE according to a certain design criterion. Simulations
showed that not every criterion is good for the performance improvement. Specifically,
reducing co-channel interference is a better criterion compared to increasing interference
at Eves to improve secrecy sum-rate.
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CHAPTER 4
Pareto-Optimal Power Control with Rate Demands in
MIMOWiretap Interference Networks
4.1 Overview
In this chapter, we focus on secure power control in MIMO wiretap interference net-
works. Contrary to the contributions made in the previous chapter, here we use more
practical precoders which are based on zero-forcing TxFJ on intended Bob. In addition
to being more practical, such choice of precoders give us more freedom in approaching
Pareto-optimal points of the secrecy rate region. Moreover, we show that analysis of the
network with partial knowledge of E-CSI is also possible. Each contending link acts
selfishly, motivating us to leverage non-cooperative game theory for distributed power
control. The non-cooperative game designed to model our power control scheme assumes
that each player (i.e., Alice-Bob pair) seeks to maximize its secrecy rate subject to a given
information-rate constraint and a power budget. The strategy profile of each player is to
control the amount of TxFJ it generates. Achieving (Pareto-)optimal points of the secrecy
rate region is done by proposing a price-based game, in which each link is penalized for
generating interference on other legitimate links. Under the exact knowledge of E-CSI,
we show that the price-based game has a comparable secrecy sum-rate to a centralized
approach. Lastly, study of the network under partial knowledge of E-CSI is possible by
leveraging mixed-strategy games.
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One of the main differences between this chapter and previous chapter is that here we
assume that each link performs MIMO beamforming, i.e., the covariance matrix of the
information signal of a given Alice is rank one. Such an approach has been shown to
be optimal for rate maximization under several channel models (see [103]). Although in
our case beamforming is a suboptimal approach in terms of rate maximization, it helps
us achieve more resilience [to cope with Eve’s capabilities] and gain valuable insight
into solving the underlying optimization problems. We further assume that legitimate
nodes cannot implement multi-user (secure) encoding. Hence, the problem reduces to
controlling the power distribution between the information and TxFJ signals at each link.
4.2 System Model
While the network under our study in this chapter is mostly similar to the one con-
sidered in the previous chapter, due to the different problem considered here, we briefly
go over the system model that we introduced in Chapter 3 again and then evolve on it to
introduce the problem that is the focus of this chapter. Consider Q transmitters, Alice1,
. . . , AliceQ, (Q ≥ 2) that communicate with their respective receivers, Bob1, . . . , BobQ.
Let Q = {1, . . . , Q}. Aliceq and Bobq, q ∈ Q, have Nq andMq antennas, respectively. A
passive Eve with L antennas is also present in the network1. The received signal at Bobq
is




H˜rqur + nq (4.1)
where H˜rq ∈ CMq×Nr , r ∈ Q, is the Mq × Nr complex channel matrix between Alicer

















Figure 4.1: System model.
and Bobq, uq ∈ CNq is the transmitted signal from Aliceq. The term nq ∈ CMq is the
complex AWGN at Bobq; its power is N0 and its covariance matrix is E[nqn†q] = N0Mq I.
The received signal at Eve is




G˜rur + e (4.2)
where G˜q ∈ CL×Nq , q ∈ Q denotes the channel matrix between Aliceq and Eve, and e is
the noise term. Figure 4.1 depicts a visual representation of our system model defined by
(4.1) and (4.2). The signal uq = sq + wq consists of the information-bearing signal sq
and TxFJ signal wq. sq can be written as sq = Tqxq, where Tq is the precoding matrix
(precoder) and xq is the information signal. Assume that a Gaussian codebook is used for
xq, i.e., xq is a zero mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (ZMCSCG) random
variable with E[xqx†q] = φqPq , γq, where Pq is the total transmit power of Aliceq and
0 ≤ φq ≤ 1 is the portion of that power allocated to the information signal. For the
TxFJ signal, we write wq , Zqvq, where Zq ∈ CNq×(Nq−1) is the precoder of the TxFJ
signal, vq ∈ CNq−1 is a vector of i.i.d. ZMCSCG random variables, and E[vqv†q] = σqI2.
2 It was shown in [104] that structured signaling can have a better secrecy compared to Gaussian sig-
naling when channel gains are real numbers. However, to the best of our knowledge, proving the usefulness
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The scalar term σq =
(1−φq)Pq
Nq−1 denotes the power allocated to each dimension of vq. Let
H˜qq = UqΣqV†q denote the singular value decomposition (SVD) of H˜qq, where Σq is the
diagonal matrix of singular values, and Uq and Vq are left and right matrices of singular
vectors, respectively. We set Zq = V(2)q , where V
(2)
q is the matrix of Nq − 1 rightmost
columns of Vq. We assume that Aliceq knows the channel state information (CSI)3. The
precoder Tq is set to Tq = V(1)q , where V
(1)
q is the first column of Vq. Let Hqq , H˜qqV(1)q ,
H′qq , H˜qqV(2)q , Hqr , H˜qrV(1)q , H′qr , H˜qrV(2)q , Gq , G˜qV(1)q , and G′q , G˜qV(2)q . The
terms Gq and G′q indicate the E-CSI components. Hence,






(Hrqxr + H′rqvr) + nq




(Grxr + G′rvr) + e.
The choice of precoders (i.e., beamformers) for TxFJ signals in this chapter is mainly
driven by the fact that acquiring E-CSI knowledge may not be always possible. For a
single-link scenario, it was shown in [26] that optimizing the precoders of information
and TxFJ signals requires knowledge of E-CSI. However, in this chapter, the beamforming
vector of TxFJ signal for each link depends only on the channel between the two nodes
comprising that link.
After receiving yq at Bobq, a linear receiver dq ∈ CMq is applied to estimate xq.
dq, q ∈ Q, is assumed to be chosen according to the maximum ratio combining (MRC)
method. Hence, dq = U(1)q , where U
(1)
q is the first column of Uq. Hence, the estimate xˆq
of structured codes for the case of complex channels and interference networks is still an open problem.
3Acquiring CSI between Alice and her corresponding Bob is assumed to be done securely. For example,
implicit channel estimation (i.e., Bob sending pilot signals to Alice) can be used to avoid having to send
explicit CSI feedback.
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can be described as




(Hrqxr + H′rqvr) + nq). (4.3)













q vq = 0. The information rate for the qth link can be written as









(∣∣d†qHrq∣∣2 γr + ∣∣d†qH′rq∣∣2 σr)+N0∣∣d†qHqq∣∣2 (4.5)
is the normalized interference received at Bobq. Assuming a worst-case scenario in which
Eve knows the channel between herself and each Alice (obtained by possibly spoofing on
the pilot sequences), Eve applies the linear receiver rq ∈ CL while eavesdropping on the
qth link’s communications so as to obtain the following estimate of xq
zˆq = r†q
(




(Grxr + G′rvr) + e
)
. (4.6)
Let G˜q = LqDqRq be the SVD of G˜q, where Lq and Rq are matrices of left and right
singular vectors, and Dq is the diagonal matrix of singular values. Eve chooses rq = L(1)q ,
where L(1)q is the first column of Lq, to perform MRC.
We need to point out that our choice of beamforming vector of information signal for
each link comes from the fact that the number of antennas at eavesdropper(s) may not be
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known in some cases. As pointed out in [22], the main limitation of the TxFJ method is
that if the eavesdropper has more antennas than the legitimate Tx, then the eavesdropper
may be able to nullify the effect of TxFJ on itself by a specific choice of decoder (i.e.,
linear receiver) at its receive antennas.
In general, the TxFJ signal from the qth Tx received at the eavesdropper can be written
as rqG˜qV′qvq where V
′











the SVD of the L×N matrix G′q, where L′q and R′q are matrices of left and right singular
vectors, respectively, and D′q is the diagonal matrix of singular values.
Considering G′q, if we have L > N , indicating that the channel G
′
q is a tall matrix,
then eavesdropper has more antennas than the total dimensions considered for the TxFJ
signal at the qth Tx. Hence, if eavesdropper knowsG′q it can choose rq to be the rightmost
L−N columns of the matrix L′q. This way, eavesdropper can nullify the TxFJ signal, i.e.,
rqG˜qV′q = 0. Therefore, an eavesdropper with sufficiently high number of antennas can
nullify the effect of TxFJ on itself. To prevent this, we need to make sure that L−N ≤ 0,
soN ≥ L. To ensure thatN ≥ L the qth Tx uses as many dimensions for the TxFJ signal
as possible. Hence, we set N to its maximum value, i.e., N = Nq − 1. This way, at
least we know that the qth Tx cannot do any better to prevent nullification of TxFJ on the
eavesdropper. Obviously, by choosing N = 1 (i.e., allocating one dimension to the TxFJ
precoder), even an eavesdropper with L = 2 antennas can nullify the effect of TxFJ on
itself.
Hence, the precoder of TxFJ signal Zq must include the Nq − 1 rightmost columns of
Vq. Accordingly, the information signal sq can be written as sq = Tqxq, where Tq is the
precoding matrix (precoder) and xq is the information signal. With the aforementioned
choice of TxFJ beamformer, the beamformer that can maximize the information rate of
the qth Tx would be Tq = V(1)q , where V
(1)
q is the Nq −N = Nq − (Nq − 1) = 1 leftmost
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column of Vq, i.e., the first column of Vq. Such choices of precoders forces xq to be a
scalar value, signifying that only single-stream signals are allowed to be transmitted.
Overall, with these choices of precoders, we first make sure that our precoders do not
require knowledge of E-CSI, then we make sure that our TxFJ signal will not be nullified
at an eavesdropper with relatively low number of antennas. Such an approach in assigning
precoders was also used in [23,24]. Notice that in the case of having knowledge of number
of antennas at eavesdropper, one can easily choose exact amount of dimensions for the
TxFJ beamformer to ensure that eavesdropper is not able to nullify the TxFJ at itself.
However, in case of collusion between multiple eavesdroppers, they can form a MIMO
receiver with higher number of receive antennas.
Such an approach in assigning precoders was also used in [23, 24]. Notice that in the
case of having knowledge of number of antennas at eavesdropper, one can easily choose
exact amount of dimensions for the TxFJ beamformer to ensure that eavesdropper is not
able to nullify the TxFJ at itself. However, here we assumed that the eavesdropper has
close specifications to the legitimate nodes. This forces us to allocate as many dimensions
as possible to the TxFJ beamformer, i.e., increase the rank of TxFJ beamformer as much
as possible (to prevent nullification of TxFJ at Eve) and use the remaining dimensions for
the precoder of information signal.
4.3 Problem Formulation
The multi-user channel between the Q Alices and Eve can be modeled as a multiple-
access channel. If Eve is capable of using successive interference cancellation (SIC),
she may be able to simultaneously decode all signals. To illustrate the impact of SIC,
consider the example of Q = 2. The rate region of Eve’s multi-access channel is shown
in Figure 4.2, where Ceq denotes the rate at Eve while decoding Aliceq’s signal (q = 1, 2).
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The points βq and ψq are defined later on in (4.7) and (4.10), respectively. Figure 4.2
suggests that to prevent Eve from using SIC, we must have Cq > βq for q = 1, 2 [42],
where





∣∣r†qG′q∣∣σq + (∣∣r†qGr∣∣2 γr + ∣∣r†qG′r∣∣2 σr)+N0∣∣∣r†qGq∣∣∣2 (4.8)
where r 6= q (cq is not to be confused with Cq defined in (4.4)). In this case, the secrecy
rate for Aliceq, q = 1, 2, would be Csecq = max{Cq−βq, 0} [42]. Because Cq > βq, it can
be guaranteed that Eve does not have complete knowledge of the qth information signal.
Thus, the rate at Eve while eavesdropping on Alicer’s signal, r 6= q, is Cer = βr, and the
secrecy rate of the rth link is











This operating point is shown as the tuple (β1, β2) in Figure 4.2. If Cq ≤ βq, Eve has
complete knowledge of Aliceq’s signal, q = 1, 2. Hence, Eve can consider Alicer’s sig-
nal, r 6= q, as interference and decode Aliceq’s signal. Knowledge of Aliceq’s signal










Figure 4.2: Rate pairs for the two eavesdropping channels shown as a two-user multiple
access channel.
interference. Hence, Cer = ψr and Csecr = max {Cr − ψr, 0} where





∣∣r†rG′r∣∣σr + ∣∣r†qG′q∣∣2 σq +N0∣∣∣r†rGr∣∣∣2 . (4.11)
This operating point can be shown as the tuple (ψ1, β2) or (β1, ψ2) in Figure 4.2, depend-
ing on which Alice is targeted first by Eve. Overall, in order to achieve the maximum
secrecy, both transmitters have to choose a transmission rate higher than Eve’s decodable
rate. ForQ > 2, in order to prevent Eve from using SIC, we must have Cq > ζq ∀q, where







(∣∣r†qGr∣∣2 γr + ∣∣r†qG′r∣∣2 σr)+N0∣∣∣r†qGq∣∣∣2 . (4.12b)
Hence,
Csecq = max{Cq − ζq, 0}. (4.13)
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q as the secrecy sum-rate, where C
sec
q is defined in (4.13)
and ζq is defined in (4.12a). We aim to maximize Csec while ensuring a minimum infor-






γq + σq(Nq − 1) ≤ Pq
Cq ≥ Rq
, ∀q
where γ , [γq]Qq=1 = [γ1, . . . , γQ] and σ , [σq]Qq=1. The first constraint imposes a
power constraint on each legitimate Tx; and the second constraint ensures a minimum
information rate Rq for each link q. The optimization in (4.16) is non-convex. We relax
this problem by assuming that the second constraint in (4.16) is satisfied with equality
for some amount of power for the information signal, i.e., Cq = Rq for some γ∗q , for all
q4. The second constraint can now be embedded into the objective function and the first






Nq − 1 , ∀q.
Recalling how we prevent Eve from applying SIC in (4.12a), σq is chosen such that





4Later on, when we propose our FJ control algorithm, we devise a procedure for finding γ∗q .















(|r†qGr∣∣2 γr + ∣∣r†qG′r∣∣2 σr) +N0
 (4.19a)
Bq ,
∣∣r†qG′q∣∣ ∣∣d†qHqq∣∣2 . (4.19b)
Simplifying (4.18), the following constraints can be established:
σq =
Pq − γ∗q
Nq − 1 if
Aq
Bq
≥ Pq − γ
∗
q









Nq − 1 (4.20b)
σq > 0 if Aq = 0. (4.20c)
σq = 0 if Aq < 0. (4.20d)
For the case in (4.20a), no amount of TxFJ power can prevent Eve from using SIC. Be-
cause the inequalities in (4.20b) and (4.20c) are strict, we define δq > 0 to denote an
arbitrarily small positive value, so that we can have
σq =
Pq − γ∗q
Nq − 1 if
Aq
Bq
≥ Pq − γ
∗
q
Nq − 1 (4.21a)
σq ≥ Aq
Bq





Nq − 1 (4.21b)
σq ≥ δq if Aq = 0. (4.21c)
σq = 0 if Aq < 0. (4.21d)
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and [a, b] denotes a continuous
interval between a and b. The optimization in (4.22) aims to find the best tradeoff (i.e.,
Pareto-optimal solutions) of secrecy sum-rate6. Unfortunately, the optimization in (4.22)
is still non-convex. Furthermore, it requires the knowledge of E-CSI (i.e., Gq and G′q).
4.4 Game Formulation
4.4.1 Greedy FJ Control
One method to reduce the complexity of (4.22), and at the same time enable distributed
implementation with low signaling overhead, is to let each Alice maximize the secrecy of
her transmission to the corresponding Bob and ignore the effect of her TxFJ on unintended
Bobs. This locally optimized TxFJ control leads to a game-theoretic interpretation of this
network. That is, a non-cooperative game can be formulated in which the best strategy of




s.t. σq ∈ Dq.
6To be more specific, the solutions of (4.22) only correspond to one Pareto-optimal solution on the
convex portion of the secrecy rate region. We skip the details of the relationship between the Pareto-optimal
points and (weighted) sum utility optimization for the sake of brevity (see [38, Section 6], Appendix B,
and [105]).
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In this game, the utility function of each player (link) is his secrecy rate and his strategy is
to choose the best TxFJ power to maximize his utility subject to a power constraint (i.e.,
strategy set). Although one may argue that the game formulation in (4.23) is essentially
different from the formulation in (4.22), we use (4.23) to build foundations on how we
find suitable solutions for (4.22).
The existence of a NE for game (4.23) can be proved by showing that the strategy set
of each player is a non-empty, compact, and convex subset ofR, and the utility function of
each player is a continuous and quasi-concave function of the TxFJ power [106]. Verifying
these properties in our game is straightforward, and is thus skipped for brevity. Since the
objective function in (4.23) is strictly concave in σq, the best strategy that maximizes





Nq−1 , q = 1, 2. When σq = P
jam
q ∀q, no player will be willing to
unilaterally change his own strategy because any other strategy can degrade the secrecy
rate of that player. Therefore, the point σq = P jamq , ∀q is the NE.
This NE point, however, may not always be efficient, because selfish maximization of
the secrecy rate by each player is not always guaranteed to be Pareto-optimal. Hence, we
seek a modification that prevents legitimate links from using all their TxFJ powers, so as
to reduce interference in the network.
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4.4.2 Price-Based FJ Control
The efficiency of the NE in the greedy FJ approach can be improved by using pricing
policies. Specifically, for all q, the utility of player q in (4.23) would be modified into:
maximize
σq
Csecq − λqσq (4.24)
s.t. σq ∈ Dq










The optimal TxFJ power can be found by writing the K.K.T. conditions for (4.24). A



























where •]ba denotes min{max{•, a}, b}, a ≤ b. It is easy to verify that in (4.4.2), by
setting λq = 0, we end up with the greedy TxFJ approach. By iteratively using (4.4.2) to
set the TxFJ power for all players, the game converges to a NE from which neither player
is willing to deviate. Later on, we further explain the feasibility of converging to a NE.
The following theorem clarifies the reason for setting the pricing factor as in (4.25).
Theorem 7. The NE of the game (4.24) where players apply (4.25) as the pricing factor
equals to that of a locally optimal solution to (4.22).
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Proof. See Appendix B.
Next, we introduce an important property of the price-based FJ control.
Proposition 3. The price-based FJ control admits a unique NE that is the global optimum
of the secrecy sum-rate maximization problem in (4.22) if the following conditions are
satisfied:




• Low interference at each Bob, i.e.,
∣∣d†qHqq∣∣2  ∑Qr=1
r 6=
(|d†qHrq|2γr + |d†qH′rq|2σr) +
N0, ∀q.
Furthermore, assuming only feasible strategies for all links, using (4.4.2) to update TxFJ
powers in a sequential manner (i.e., the Gauss-Seidel method in the sense of [107, Chapter
3]) for all q ∈ Q converges to a (unique) NE.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark: While we were not able to show the convergence under synchronous updates
(i.e., the Jacobi method in the sense of [107, Chapter 3]), where all links update their
actions simultaneously at each iteration, we verified it in our simulations.
4.4.3 Optimality of Greedy FJ Control
As a first attempt, w We now analyze the situation where the use of greedy FJ control
results in a unique Pareto-optimal point for the secrecy sum-rate maximization in (4.17).
This analysis allows us to find the conditions under which there is no need for an iterative
price-based FJ control optimization (and subsequently, no need for knowledge of E-CSI)
because each Alice sets her TxFJ power to the maximum available.
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Proposition 4. The greedy FJ approach results in the unique Pareto-optimal operating
point for problem (4.17) if the matrix∇Csec, whose (i, j) element is given by ∂Cseci
∂σj
, i, j ∈
Q, has non-negative elements and non-zero rows.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark: In the following, we give a simple side result of Proposition 4, which serves
as an intuitive example to understand Proposition 4.
Corollary 1. For a network of two legitimate links, the greedy FJ control results in a
unique Pareto-optimal point if λq ≤ 0, q = 1, 2.




Hence, a positive price is effective as long as the increase in one player’s TxFJ power
reduces the secrecy rate for the other link. Now, considering λq ≤ 0, the increase in one
player’s TxFJ power results in either no change (i.e., λq = 0) or an increase (i.e., λq < 0)
in the other player’s secrecy rate. Therefore, whenever λq ≤ 0 the right decision would
be to use the maximum TxFJ power (i.e., setting λq = 0).
Remark: We would like to clarify that in general, the efficiency of the Greedy FJ
control is not superior to that of the pricing-based approach. However, under some special
conditions, detailed in Proposition 4, the price-based FJ control reduces to greedy FJ
control (i.e., λq = 0, ∀q ∈ Q).
For the general case of Q > 2, we now aim at making sense out of the conditions in
Proposition 4, i.e., what would be the physical interpretation of these conditions.
Proposition 5. The Pareto-optimality of the greedy FJ method occurs when γq
σq
>> 1, ∀q.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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Remark: The result of Proposition 5 is rather intuitive because preserving positive
secrecy requires a link to spend a portion of its power for TxFJ. Therefore, whatever
scenario that leaves low power to the TxFJ of all Alices (e.g., low transmit power, high
rate demands or a dense network) can be the scenario where γq
σq
>> 1, ∀q.
4.5 Price-Based FJ Under E-CSI Uncertainties
When the E-CSI is unknown, it is difficult to compute σ∗q and λq. Besides, the use of
greedy FJ cannot be always guaranteed to be a Pareto-optimal point. In the following, we
propose a method to overcome the issue of not having complete knowledge of E-CSI. We
first need to introduce some new definitions for our game.
Let Uq(sq, s−q) be the utility of the qth player, where sq and s−q denote the strat-
egy taken by player q and by other players except q, respectively. Without loss of
generality, assume that the lower bound on σq for guaranteeing positive secrecy (as in
(4.20)) has not been taken into account yet. Hence, the strategy space for each player
q is a continuous interval, which can be written as σq ∈ [0, P jamq ]. The strategy set
of each player has infinitely many real numbers. In order to proceed further with our
analysis, we need to make the strategy sets countable and finite. Hence, we discretize
the TxFJ power. Assuming that we have n bits to convey M = 2n power levels, the
power level increment is ∆σq =
P jamq
2n
. The strategy set of the qth player now becomes
Sq = {0,∆σq, 2∆σq, . . . , (M − 1)∆σq, P jamq }. Discretizing the players’ strategies allows
us to leverage a property of games with finite strategy sets for the players (i.e., finite
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games): Every finite game has a mixed-strategic NE [108].
4.5.1 Mixed-Strategy Game Formulation
Definition 3. A mixed-strategy vector for the qth player Aq ={
[αi,q]
M
i=1 | 0 ≤ αi,q ≤ 1,
∑
i αi,q = 1, ∀q
}
is a probability distribution of the qth
player’s strategies. In other words, the qth player chooses power level i∆σq with
probability αi,q.
In the mixed-strategy jamming game, players choose their TxFJ powers based on
probability distributions. Hence, the best response of each player is to maximize the
expected value of his own utility. We note that some games can be limited to only
pure strategies. In particular, if the utility function of a player is concave w.r.t. his
strategy, then using Jensen’s inequality, we deduce that ∀(sq, s−q) ∈ Sq × S−q, where




] ≤ Es−q [Uq (Esq [sq], s−q)] . (4.27)
Equation (4.27) is satisfied with equality if and only if sq reduces to pure strategies.
Hence, using pure strategies is more efficient than using mixed strategies. However, suf-
ficiency of pure strategies cannot be guaranteed if the utility function of a player is not
concave w.r.t. his action. Hence, mixed strategies should also be investigated for non-
concave utilities. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, even though the existence
of a mixed NE in games with finite strategy spaces is guaranteed regardless of concavity
of utility functions [109], finding the mixed NE in games with non-concave utilities is in
general difficult. In our case, we limit our study to Q = 2, for which the mixed-strategy
games are well-understood.
Before exploring the application of mixed-strategy games in our FJ control problem,
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we present an important observation related to the behavior of price-based FJ control
when Q = 2. Assume now that the constraints imposed on σq in (4.20) are taken into
account.
Conjecture 1. When Q = 2, the optimal update of one player in (4.4.2) is a monotonic
function of the TxFJ power of the other player’s action, i.e., σ∗q is a monotonic function of
σ∗r for q = 1, 2 and r 6= q.
Although we were not able to analytically prove the above relationship between the
two TxFJ powers, we verified it via the following simulation. We replaced the term λq
in (4.4.2) with the right hand side (RHS) of (4.25) and examined whether the optimal
update on TxFJ of one link is a monotonic function of TxFJ of another link. We randomly
placed both links as well as the eavesdropper in a circle with radius rcirc = 25 m. The
distance between the transmitter and the receiver of each link is set to be a constant dlink =
15 m. Due to the importance of this conjecture, we have a high number of runs for this
simulation. we ran this simulation for a total of 100 random link placements. For each link
placement, we created 1000 channel realizations. Then, the probability of monotonicity
of TxFJ powers w.r.t each other can be calculated by counting the number of times that
σ∗q is a monotonic function of σr, r, q ∈ Q and dividing this number by 100 ∗ 1000. This
simulation is done for different transmit powers at both Alices. We assumed that both
Alices use the same amount of transmit power for each run. It can be seen in Figure 4.3
that the monotonicity of TxFJ powers w.r.t. each other occurs almost every time we run
this simulation. We ended up with the same results for different values of rcirc and dlink
as well. Such verification of Conjecture 1 allows us to conclude the following:
Proposition 6. If Q = 2 and λq > 0, the NE tuple of TxFJ powers (σ1, σ2) will take one
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Prob. of Monotonically Decreasing
Prob. of Monotonically Increasing
Prob. of Monotonicity
Figure 4.3: Probability of monotonicity of σ∗q w.r.t. σr, (r, q) = 1, 2, r 6= q.
of the following forms:
(σ1, σ2) = (σint, χ2) or (σint, P
jam
2 ) or (χ1, σint) or





where χq < σint < P jamq .
Proof. See Appendix B.
For Q = 2, we can establish the strategy table shown in Table 4.1. A util-
ity matrix Uq, q = 1, 2, can be obtained such that the (i, j)th entry is [Uq]ij =
{Uq(i∆σ1, j∆σ2)| (i, j) ∈ {0, . . . ,M}2, r 6= q} where Uq is the utility function of the qth
player and will be characterized shortly. Because problem (4.22) is non-convex w.r.t the
TxFJ powers, the Pareto-optimal points can be found via exhaustive search in Table 4.1.
Considering a finite jamming game, the complexity of this optimization is in the order
of O(n2), where n is the number of strategies for each player. Proposition 6 reduces the
complexity to O(4n− 4) signifying that only a small set of TxFJ power tuples comprises
the NE points of price-based FJ game
In price-based FJ, the utility function of each player changes at every iteration due to
131
s1\s2 0 ∆σ2 . . . P jam2
0 U1(0, 0), U2(0, 0) U1(0,∆σ2), U2(0,∆σ2) . . . U1(0, P
jam
2 ), U2(0, P
jam
2 )
∆σ1 U1(∆σ1, 0), U2(∆σ1, 0) U1(∆σ1,∆σ2), U2(∆σ1,∆σ2) . . . U1(∆σ1, P
jam










1 , 0), U2(P
jam













Table 4.1: Strategy table for the two-link finite jamming game with pricing.
the price updates. However, such update cannot be shown in a strategy table, i.e., the terms
U1(i∆σ1, j∆σ2) and U2(i∆σ1, j∆σ2), (i, j) ∈ {0, . . . ,M}, in Table 4.1 can only show
the utilities of the two players (at s1 = i∆σ1 and s2 = j∆σ2) for one iteration. Hence,
it is not possible to designate the objective function in (4.24) as a utility function in the
strategy table. In order to establish the strategy table, we inspect (4.22) again. Theorem
1 suggests that the K.K.T. conditions of secrecy sum-rate maximization in (4.22) are met
at the NE point of the price-based game. Hence, we consider the utility of each player at
the NE point to be Uq(s1, s2) = Csec(σq), q ∈ {1, 2}, which is in general a non-concave
function w.r.t. σq. Because the two players have the same utility, it is reasonable for the
qth player, q = 1, 2 to assume that the rth player (r 6= q, r = 1, 2) chooses a strategy that
is towards maximizing the utility of the qth player. Considering this fact and Proposition
6, the objective of player 1 (and equivalently for player 2) in the mixed-strategy FJ control












0 < αi,1 < 1, ∀i









with d•e denoting the
ceiling function. In other words, the qth player mixes his strategies to maximize the
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maximum utility that is seen from rth player’s action.
4.5.2 Robust Solutions
So far, our derivations are based on complete knowledge of E-CSI. However, if Eve is a
passive device, this assumption is unrealistic. For the qth player, the computation of the
secrecy rate defined in (4.9) depends on Cq and Ceq. Because we assumed that Bob can
measure his received interference level and Alice is aware of the channel between herself
and her corresponding Bob, the computation of Cq can be done locally. Each component
of (unknown) E-CSI can be equivalently shown as the product of some large-scale and
small-scale fading parts, so
∣∣r†qGq∣∣2 = |G¯q|2dqe−η and |r†G′q|2 = |G¯′q|2d−ηqe , where G¯q and
G¯′q represent the small-scale fading parts, and are, respectively, scalar and 1 × (Nq − 1)
matrix with i.i.d. standard complex Gaussian entries7; dqe is the distance between Aliceq
and Eve in meters, and η is the path-loss exponent. The secrecy rate is now given by
Csecq = Cq − E[dqe, G¯q ,dre, G¯r,G¯′q , G¯′r] [Ceq] = Cq−
E
log
1 + ∣∣r†qGq∣∣2 γq∣∣∣r†qG′q∣∣∣2 σq + ∣∣∣r†qGr∣∣∣2 γr + ∣∣∣r†qG′r∣∣∣2 σr +N0

 (4.30)








. We rewrite (4.30) as







7Note that the transmit precoders Tq and Zq, ∀q ∈ Q are unitary matrices that do not change the
characteristics of the original channel matrices H˜rq, G˜q , and G˜′q (see (4.2) and Section 4).
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whereWq , [G¯q, G¯′q, G¯r, G¯
′


































with diag{fT} representing an m × m diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are the
entries of f with size m. The expectation in (4.31) w.r.t. Wq and Yq can be efficiently
computed using the random matrix result in [110, Appendix A, Lemma 2]. However,
according to (4.31) Ceq is still a random variable over the distances dqe and dre. Since we
were not able to analytically formulate this distribution, we numerically approximate the
expectation of Ceq w.r.t. distances. To do this approximation, in simulations, we assume
that Eve is uniformly distributed within a circle of a given radius. The center of this circle
is determined depending on our simulation scenario (see Section 4.5.2 for more details).
A similar idea can be found in [111]. Another example is [112] where the authors assumed
that the location of Eve follows a Poisson point process.
Following the same technique used to manipulate (4.31), we take the expectation of
(4.18) and end up with:
σq >



















The numerator and the denominator inside the first expectation term in (4.34) correspond
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to a central Wishart matrix [113]. The numerator inside the second expectation term
corresponds to the quadratic form of a Wishart matrix, which preserves the Wishartness
property [114]. Hence, both expectation terms correspond to the ratio of two Wishart
matrices. Since we assumed a MIMO single-stream system, all Wishart matrices are
in fact scalars. Hence, the expectations in (4.34) can be computed using the result in
[115, Section 1]. Computing the expectation w.r.t. dqe, ∀q can be tackled numerically as
explained above.
Since (4.30) and (4.34) are computable, we can set Uq(s1, s2) = E[Csec(σq)], q ∈
{1, 2}, where the expectation is w.r.t. E-CSI components. Hence, the objective function
of (4.29) can be defined without knowledge of E-CSI. Hence, we can establish Table
4.1 to solve (4.29). A summary of the procedure to solve (4.29) is given in Algorithm
5 (Line 3 to 14). The solution found after Line 14 for each player is the probability
set {αi,q}Mi=1, q = 1, . . . , Q. Creating a probabilistic TxFJ power assignment is done
by converting the uniform distribution to a probability mass function corresponding to
{αi,q}Mi=1 for q = 1, 2 , which is as follows [116]: 1) Generate a uniform random variable
U(0, 1); 2) Determine the index I such that
∑I−1
i=1 αi,q ≤ U <
∑I
i=1 αi,q; 3) Use the TxFJ
power I∆σq. Such a probabilistic TxFJ power assignment must be done several times
to approximate the probability mass {αi,q}Mi=1. The expected value of secrecy sum-rate
can be calculated by averaging achieved secrecy rates using the probabilistic TxFJ power
assignment8.
8Such a procedure for practical implementation of mixed solutions may not be of interest because all
probabilistic transmissions have to be done in one channel realization. However, in practical scenarios,
the coherence time is not long enough to accommodate more than a few transmissions. We examine this
deficiency in the simulation section.
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Algorithm 5 Robust Friendly Jamming Control




2: for q = 1 to 2 do
3: for i = 1 toM do
4: Set σq = i∆σq.
5: Compute σr = χr, r 6= q.
6: Compute χq.
7: if σq < χq then Set αi,q = 0.
8: else Compute and store Uq(σq, σr).
9: end if
10: end for % do the same loop again but change
11: % line 5 to “Set σr = P
jam
r ”.
12: Uq(σq) = max
σr
Uq(σq, σr).
13: Find {αi,q}Mi=1 by solving (4.29) (with Uq(σq) as the summands in the objective function).
14: end for % Choose the probability set that maximizes the
15: % secrecy sum-rate.
16: for q = 1 to 2 do % Rate adjustment procedure:
17: if Cq < Rq −  then Set γq = γq + δ.
18: if γq > Pq then Set γq = Pq.
19: end if
20: else
21: if Cq > Rq +  then Set γq = γq − δ.
22: end if
23: end if
24: end for % γ∗q is found.
25: until Rq −  < Cq < Rq +  ∀q.
Lines 15 to 24 of Algorithm 5 aim at satisfying the rate constraints for both links, i.e.,
finding γ∗q mentioned in (4.17). For some choice of δ and , as long as the rate require-
ments are feasible, the linear adjustment used in lines 16 and 20 converges without the
need for central control (similar procedure can be found in [117, Algorithm 1]). Hence,
this linear adjustment ensures that each link achieves its minimum target rate. If the tar-
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get rates are not achievable, then line 17 limits the links to their maximum total transmit
powers, i.e., no power will be allocated to TxFJ. The linear adjustments used in line 16
and 20 can be easily added to the price-based game for multiple links in (4.24) as well.
Specifically, the loop between lines 3 and 14 can be replaced with the game (4.24). Then,
at the convergence point of the game (4.24) or after reaching the maximum iteration num-
ber, the rate adjustments in lines 15 and 24 (to satisfy the information rate constraints) can
be done for price-based game as well.
4.6 Comparison of Signaling Overhead
In this section, we compare the signaling overhead requirement of our proposed dis-
tributed schemes.
In the case of price-based FJ control where the links’ actions are defined by (4.24),
notice that compared to (4.17), problem (4.24) only sets σq as the decision variable. This
means that the qth link is responsible to only find a solution for its own TxFJ power.
Each link needs to solve (4.24) and start transmission with the obtained solutions. This
makes up one iteration of price-based FJ control. At the next iteration, each link q needs
to recalculate the pricing factor λq and update the parameters of its objective function.
This update procedure taken before solving individual problems is the message exchange























Method Utility Functions, # of Players Type of NE Local optimality Amount of Message Exchange
∀q ∈ Q (Q) (How achieved) of the solution ∀q
Greedy FJ Control Csecq Q ≥ 2 Pure NE Not guaranteed None
(one-shot)




(Full E-CSI) (iterative) |r†rG′q |2 ∀r 6= q, r ∈ Q
Price-based FJ Control E[Csec1 + C
sec
2 ] Q = 2 Mixed NE Guaranteed
ar
br
, E[log(1 + cr
dr
)], ∀r 6= q, r ∈ Q
(Unknown E-CSI) (one-shot)
[49] Csec Q ≥ 2 Pure NE Guaranteed Same as Price-based FJ control
(Iterative) under Full E-CSI + Calculation
of Lagrange multipliers to satisfy
cooperative jammers’ power budgets




(iterative) ∀r 6= q, r ∈ Q













(|r†rGt|2γt + |r†rG′t|2σt) + |r†rG′r|2σr +N0
|r†rG′q|2
(4.37)





are SINR levels at the rth link and Eve, respectively. From (4.35), one can
deduce that to calculate the price in (4.25) and the optimal TxFJ power in (4.4.2), the qth
link, q ∈ Q, needs to acquire the following: 1) interference and SINR levels at both the rth
link and eavesdropper(s) while eavesdropping on the rth link, r 6= q, r ∈ Q, and 2) the
the equivalent channel gains (after beamforming) caused from the information and TxFJ
signals of the qth link on the rth link and eavesdropper’s receptions, i.e., |r†qGq|2, |r†qG′q|2
and |d†rH′qr|2, |r†rG′q|2, ∀r 6= q ∈ Q9. On the contrary, a centralized approach aims
to solve (4.17) in one shot. This necessitates knowledge of all channel gains between
legitimate nodes and eavesdropper(s). By distributing the problem between links in the
9Clearly, recalculation of pricing factor and the objective function requires a link to know the eavesdrop-
per’s CSI (E-CSI), which is not practical when eavesdroppers are passive nodes. The explanation regarding
how to relax such knowledge is discussed in detail in Section 4.4.3.
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price-based approach, the problem can be solved iteratively and the message exchange re-
duces to interference and SINR levels plus a portion of channel gains, which are relatively
easier to obtain.
In the greedy FJ control, the price λq = 0, ∀q ∈ Q. Therefore, there is no need
to update the objective function of the qth link, q ∈ Q, after each iteration because we
showed that the maximum available TxFJ power maximizes the secrecy rate of the qth
link in the greedy approach. This greatly reduces the amount of message exchange at the
cost of losing the performance.
In Section 4.4.3, we established another framework that relaxes knowledge of E-CSI
at legitimate links. Notice that a According to Algorithm 5, each link’s utility function is
set to E[Csec], where E[•] is the expectation over E-CSI. As for the amount of message
exchange, this approach requires SINR levels of both links (which is the same as that of
price-based scheme) plus the expectation of leaked rate at Eve where the expectation is
w.r.t. E-CSI components.
In what follows, we have provided a detailed analysis of the messaging overhead of
the techniques in [49, 55, 118] and compare them to ours10. One important note about
the works in [49, 55] is that both of these works assume full knowledge of E-CSI in
their analyses. Hence, we compare these schemes with our price-based FJ method for
which full knowledge of E-CSI must be available. We first give a summary of each of
these works and then characterize the amount of messaging overhead they impose on the
network.
The authors in [49] investigated the secrecy sum-rate maximization problem in an in-
terference network with cooperative jammers. The decision variables for their optimiza-
10It is difficult to compare our approach to those in [42, 43, 47, 61], as such works differ in the system
model and/or optimization variables.
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tion problem are the powers of legitimate links and the powers of cooperative jammers.
The work in [49] also imposes a constraint on the total power budget of the cooperative
jammers. This is a shared constraint between the legitimate links, and cannot be decom-
posed to enable distributed implementation.
The work in [118] studied power control for a dense network of small cells that coexist
with some macrocells. They focused on the uplink communication of small-cell networks
and proposed a distributed power optimization to maximize the sum of uplink rates subject
to constraints on transmission powers as well as a tolerable interference level at macrocell
users. The solution method in [118] closely follows the work in [49]. The constraint on
interference level at macrocell users is a shared constraint and cannot be decomposed to
enable distributed implementation. Thus, the amount of overhead in [118] is comparable
to [49].
The work in [55] considers the Physical-layer security for a multi-channel interference
network with full-duplex-enabled nodes. The authors did not assume that Alices are ca-
pable of generating TxFJ and only focused on the power allocation of information signals
to study the problem of greedy secrecy-rate maximization. They proposed a water-filling-
like power allocation to different channels of a given link. While the system model in [55]
is quite different from ours in terms of adopting multi-channel and full-duplex commu-
nications, due to the greedy nature of this algorithm, we can compare this method to our
proposed greedy method. In other words, no pricing model (i.e., any attempt on secrecy
sum-rate maximization) was considered in [55]. We found out that the method in [55]
requires each link to know the interference and SINR at the receiver as well as the in-
terference and SINR at Eve. In contrast, in our work, due to the adoption of TxFJ, no
messaging is needed to implement the greedy algorithm.
Table 4.2 shows a more unified comparison between our methods (greedy FJ control,
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price-based FJ control with perfect E-CSI and imperfect E-CSI) and those in [49] and [55]
in terms of messaging overhead.
4.7 Numerical Results
We consider a four-link network with one eavesdropper. To assess different aspects of
our method, we manipulate the placement of these links as well as the eavesdropper from
one simulation to another.
Figure 4.4 (a) shows the probability of convergence of the price-based game in (4.24)
under different interference levels. The total power of each Alice is Pq = 13 dBm ∀q ∈ Q.
We also set the rate demands such that γq = 10 dBm ∀q ∈ Q. All interfering distances
drq, (r, q) ∈ Q, r 6= q are equal to each other. Also, the direct distance between Aliceq
and Bobq is set to dqq = 10 m,∀q ∈ Q. The path-loss exponent is set to η = 2.5, and
N0 = 0 dBm. We ran the game (4.24) iteratively between all links using the Jacobi
iterative method. For each point on a curve in Figure 4.4 (a), we calculate the probability
of convergence by counting the number of times that solving (4.24) iteratively for all links
converges to a point, and divide this number by a total of 1000 times running the iterative
optimization. Each run creates a different realization of small scale-fading components
of all channels. The maximum number of iterations was set to 50. We plotted the the
probability of convergence of our algorithm vs. the ratio drq
dqq
for four different locations of
Eve. Same as interfering distances, the distance between all Alices and Eve, dqe ∀q ∈ Q
are equal to each other.
It can be seen that when Eve is close to Alices, the probability of convergence is very
low, such that for drq
dqq
= 10,∀(r, q) ∈ Q only a convergence probability of 0.2 can be ex-
pected. The reason is that when Eve is close to Alices, large amounts of TxFJ is needed to
guarantee positive secrecy. In some realizations where the required TxFJ power exceeds
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Figure 4.4: (a) Probability of convergence (b) Secrecy sum-rate of price-based FJ control
for different interference levels and different Eve locations, (Q = 4, Pq
N0
= 30 dB, Nq =
5,Mq = 4, L = 4).
the maximum available power at Alice, achieving positive secrecy for some or all Alices
becomes infeasible, which also violates the first condition of Proposition 3. Thus, the NE
uniqueness and consequently the convergence of iterations cannot be guaranteed. How-
ever, it can be seen that as Eve becomes farther from Alices, the convergence probability
increases. Lastly, it can be seen that the second condition in Proposition 3 is not very
strict, as for dqq
drq
> 3, no noticeable improvement in convergence can be seen.
Figure 4.4 (b) shows the resulting secrecy sum-rate of the four curves plotted in Fig-
ure 4.4 (a). We compared the performance of our price-based FJ control with that of an
exhaustive search method which solves (4.17). All solid/dashed curves show the result-
ing secrecy sum-rate of the price-based/exhaustive approach11. A pair of curves with the
same markings show the performance of the two methods for a certain value of dqe. It can
be seen that for a relatively far Eve, which satisfies the first condition of Proposition 3,
there is not much difference between the price-based approach and the exhaustive search
approach. This indicates that the local optimum point(s) of the secrecy-sum-rate becomes
11To do exhaustive search, we discretize TxFJ powers of all links to very small increments and find the
combination that results in the highest secrecy sum-rate.
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Figure 4.5: Convergence of (a) price-based FJ control (Jacobi Method) (b) price-based FJ
control (Gauss-Seidel) (c) rate demands, (Q = 4, Pq
N0
= 30 dB, Nq = 5,Mq = 4, L = 4)
the global optimum when the conditions of Proposition 3 are satisfied. It should be noted
that for both Figure 4.4 (a) and (b), similar results can be obtained if instead of changing
the proximity of Eve to Alices, all links adopt high information rate demands.
Figure 4.5 (a) and (b) show the convergence of the TxFJ power of each link for price-
based FJ control under Jacobi and Gauss-Seidel methods, respectively. Both figures are
plotted in the same channel realization with the same placement of links. The initial
TxFJ power is set randomly for each link. Each curve shows the value of TxFJ of a link
normalized by the maximum available TxFJ of that link over 20 iterations. Although
the Jacobi method was not proved to be convergent in our analyses, we did not find any
case where Jacobi method does not follow the same convergence behavior as the Gauss-
Seidel method. Furthermore, the Jacobi method was found to be a bit faster in rate of
convergence, as all links simultaneously update their TxFJ powers compared to the Gauss-
Seidel method in which at each iteration only one link updates its TxFJ power.
Figure 4.5 (c) shows the convergence of the rate adjustment for one channel realiza-
tion. We randomly initialize γq, ∀q, and then the rate adjustments are done the same way
as it is shown in lines 15 to 24 of Algorithm 5. The maximum value of γq in this sim-
ulation is 10 dBm. Each iteration of Figure 4.5 (c) consists of running the game (4.24)
until the convergence. Then, the qth q ∈ Q, link adjusts γq by increasing or decreasing
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it. During our simulation, we found out that setting δ (as the increment of γq) to 0.2γq
gives us a fast and reliable convergence for all links. We terminate these iterations once
the information rate of a link is within a tight neighborhood of its rate demand (e.g.,
0.95Rq < log(1 +
γq
aq
) < 1.05Rq). It can be seen that the convergence of rate adjustments
is fairly quick once a suitable increment for the power of information signal and a suitable
neighborhood around rate demands is considered.
Figure 4.6 (a) and (b) show the secrecy sum-rate of the greedy FJ control compared to
the price-based FJ control and exhaustive search method for different power constraints
of Alices. We assumed that all Alices use the same amount of power constraint. For both
figures of Figure 4.6, all Q links as well as the eavesdropper are randomly placed in a
circle, namely, the simulation region with radius rcirc = 25 m. The distance between the
transmitter and the receiver of each link is set to be a constant dlink = 5 m. The required
rate demand for each link is set to Rq = 2 nats/sec/Hz, ∀q ∈ Q. The maximum number
of iteration for both the pricing part and rate adjustment is set to 50. We ran each method
for a total of 30 link placements. For each placement, we tested 100 channel realizations.
It can be seen that for low transmit powers, the greedy FJ has a comparable secrecy sum-
rate to the exhaustive approach, verifying Proposition 5. As the transmit power increases,
the secrecy sum-rate of the greedy method becomes more inferior to the exhaustive and
pricing approaches, as high interference decreases the information rate of legitimate links,
thus lowering the total secrecy in the network.
We see that for the simulation in Figure 4.6 (a) which is a more realistic scenario
compared to the settings of Figure 4.4 (b), the price-based FJ control has a comparable
performance to the exhaustive search for low transmit powers, indicating that convergence
is a less concerning issue in more realistic scenarios. Figure 4.6 (b) shows the same com-
parison with the difference that now the four links’ placements is done in a circle with
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Figure 4.6: Optimality of the greedy FJ control under different scenarios, (Q = 4, Nq =
5,Mq = 4, L = 4)
rcirc = 20 m and dlink = 15 m. It can be seen that the secrecy sum-rate of greedy FJ
control is very close to that of the exhaustive search. The reason is that this simulation is
done in a denser network in which each link experiences more interference on links and
each Bob receives a weaker information signal. Thus, each link has to spend a lot of its
power on the information signal to meet its rate demand (Rq = 2 nats/sec/Hz, ∀q ∈ Q).
The rest of the power left for TxFJ is small, forcing each user to spend all the remaining
power on TxFJ to preserve positive secrecy. Such network conditions satisfy the condi-
tions of Proposition 4, allowing the greedy FJ control to have a performance close to that
of the exhaustive search method.
We now consider a two-link scenario to assess the performance of the price-based
game with partial knowledge of E-CSI. In all simulations of this part, the noise floor at
both Bobs and at Eve is set to N0 = −50 dBm. The information rate constraints are
chosen such that Alices allocate no more than 1/3 of their total transmit powers for the
information signal. In all figures, the horizontal axis is the horizontal coordinate for the
center of the circle within which Eve is uniformly distributed. Each point on every plot is
the result of averaging over 10 random locations for Eve (in order to approximate (4.30)
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Link 1: Pricing (Full ECSI)
Link 1: Pricing (No Positive Secrecy)
Link 1: Greedy FJ
Link 2: Pricing (Full ECSI)
Link 2: Pricing (No Positive Secrecy)
Link 2: Greedy FJ
Figure 4.7: Effect of SIC on individual secrecy rates:(
Alice1 =(−50, 10), Bob1 = (5, 10), Alice2 = (−50,−10),Bob2 = (50, 10), yˆe = 0,
rˆe = 10, Pq = 0 dBm, Nq = 3,Mq = L = 1
)
.
w.r.t. distances). At each random location, 500 channel realizations are simulated and
then averaged. We compare the performance of the proposed price-based FJ control under
complete/partial knowledge of E-CSI (indicated by “Pricing (Full E-CSI)”/“Robust”) with
other methods including when every link allocates all its power to information signal
(indicated by “No Jamming”), exhaustive search (indicated by “Exhaustive Search”), and
the greedy FJ control (indicated by “Greedy FJ”).
In Figure 4.7, we depict, individual secrecy rates for when constraint (4.18) is taken
into account in the price-based FJ control (indicated as “Pricing (Full E-CSI) and for when
it is not (indicated as “Pricing (No Positive Secrecy)”). It can be seen that applying con-
straint (4.18) in the price-based FJ control significantly affects the secrecy sum-rate such
that if it is overlooked, the performance of the price-based FJ control can be even lower
than the greedy approach with zero secrecy rate for one or both links at some locations of
Eve.
In Figure 4.8 (a), we compare the performance of Algorithm 5 (indicated as “Ro-
bust”) with other approaches. The spatial distribution for Eve is the same as in previous
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simulation, but with Pq = 10 dBm. For the pricing method with full CSI, transmitters
sequentially apply (4.4.2) to optimize their TxFJ powers (i.e., the Gauss-Seidel method is
used [107, Chapter 3]). Note that because the performance of the pricing method gener-
ally depends on the starting point for the iterative procedure (except for when the condi-
tions of Proposition 3 hold), for each channel realization, the performance of the pricing
method is the result of averaging the convergence point of Gauss-Seidel method over 30
different starting points. For the robust TxFJ control algorithm, we use 8 bits to quantize
power levels. After finding the probability set {αi,q : i = 1, . . . ,M} that maximizes the
expected utility in (4.29), probabilistic assignment of the TxFJ powers in robust jamming
control is done as follows. The qth player generates a sample from the probability set
{αi,q : i = 1, . . . , }. Depending on the value of this sample, player q selects TxFJ power,
say i∆σq, and starts transmitting. This procedure is repeated 50 times per channel real-
ization and the expected utility in (4.29) is approximated by averaging over these repeats.
It can be seen that the robust approach is 25% better than the greedy approach. When
E-CSI is known, the advantage of price-based FJ becomes more significant.
The expected value in (4.29) must be computed after averaging over several samples
of data transmissions for one channel realization. However, in practical scenarios, the
coherence time is not long enough to accommodate more than a few transmissions. In
order to test this limitation, we compare the performance of robust optimization between
50 data transmissions and 1 data transmission per each channel realization so as to ap-
proximate the expected utility in (4.29). To reduce the effect of other parameters on this
comparison, we simulated 50 channel realizations at each location of Eve. It can be seen
in Figure 4.8 (b) that averaging over 1 data transmission (indicated as “Robust(1)”) does
not affect the secrecy sum-rate very much, compared to averaging over 50 data trans-
missions (indicated as “Robust(50)”). Therefore, the robust jamming control can also be
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Pricing (Full ECSI) Robust (1) Robust (50) Greedy FJ
(a) (b)
Figure 4.8: Effect of (a) Eve’s location (b) number of transmissions on the secrecy
sum-rate for two links:
(a) : Alice1 = (−40, 20),Bob1 = (40, 20),Alice2 = (−40,−20),Bob2 = (40,−20), yˆe = 25,
rˆe = 20, Pq = 10 dBm.
(b) : Alice1 = (−20, 20),Bob1 = (20, 20),Alice2 = (−20,−20),Bob2 = (20,−20), yˆe = 10,
rˆe = 20, Pq = 10 dBm.
implemented in channels with low coherence times.
4.8 Software-Defined Radio Implementation of TxFJ for a Single-User Scenario
We implemented a MIMO-capable Alice-Bob link that is tapped by an external multi-
antenna Eve. All three nodes are based on National Instruments USRP-2922 software-
defined radios. The USRP-2922 is a tunable RF transceiver for streaming baseband sig-
nals to a host PC over Ethernet port using any carrier frequency from 400 MHz to 4.4
GHz and the maximum bandwidth of 20 MHz. It can be used for experimentation in
a plethora of applications such as WiFi, WiMax, and 2.4GHz industrial, scientific and
medical (ISM) band transceivers. Each USRP-2922 device has one receiving chain and
one transmitting chain. Thus, for MIMO transmission/reception, several USRP-2922 de-
vices should be connected together via a proprietary MIMO cable. There is also lim-
ited ability to simultaneously transmit and receive over the two chains. However, more
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self-interference suppression is required to enable in-band full-duplex capability in these
devices.
In our experiment, each of Alice, Bob and Eve has two antennas. For simplicity,
single-carrier transmission was implemented between Alice and its corresponding Bob.
We used carrier frequency of 2.4 GHz and instantaneous bandwidth of 1MHz for sig-
nal transmission. The LabView program written for this experiment covers the essential
PHY-layer tasks required to enable an end-to-end MIMO communication, such as frame
synchronization (finding the beginning of a frame), channel estimation, pulse-shaping,
precoding and decoding. To simplify the process of phase/frequency offset estimation,
we used one of the Ettus’ centralized clock generators, namely Ettus OctoClock, to pro-
vide synchronous and coherent carrier frequencies for Alice, Bob and Eve. Note that
providing a coherent and synchronous carrier for Eve is one aspect of realizing the worst-
case scenario where Eve has the same PHY-layer abilities as the legitimate nodes. In our
initial experiments reported here, Bob and Eve are both located 3’5" away from Alice,
respectively. Both Bob and Eve have a line of sight (LoS) to Alice. Figure 4.9 shows our
experimental setup.
To keep her transmission secret from Eve, Alice creates a bogus signal, known as
TxFJ, along with her secret message to confuse Eve. This TxFJ signal is created in a way
that does not affect Bob’s reception. To do that, same as what is explained in Section
4 Alice uses precoding such that the TxFJ signal falls in the null space of the channel
between herself and Bob. To enable precoding and subsequently creating the TxFJ signal,
Alice must acquire the channel estimate between herself and Bob. Bob also needs the
channel estimate to perform equalization. As another aspect of the worst-case scenario,
we assume Eve is also able to perform equalization, to recover the secret message of




Figure 4.9: Experimental setup for TxFJ in a single-link scenario.
and Alice.
To estimate the CSI between Alice and Bob, pilot sequences were sent at the beginning
of each packet. CSI estimates obtained at Bob are fed back to Alice for precoding and
design of TxFJ signal. Each pilot sequence consists of 8 known BPSK symbols. The
pilot sequences assigned to each of the two antennas are orthogonal to each other. To
ensure accurate channel estimation, 20 repetitions of the same assigned pilot sequence are
concatenated and used to produce a “training packet”. One training packet is prepended
to each data packet, as described later on. CSI estimation is performed for each pilot
repetition and the final channel estimate for the given Tx-Rx pair is taken as the average
over all 20 repetitions. Our chosen method of estimation is the minimum mean-square
estimation (MMSE). The MMSE method is an unbiased estimation technique that mainly
focuses on minimizing the variance of the estimation error. The MMSE method is more
robust to signal strength variations when compared to the least-squares estimation method
because it takes into account the noise perturbations in its design procedure.
No encryption was done for pilot symbols, so Eve is also able to estimate the channel
between herself and Alice. This way, Eve can choose from a variety of powerful detection
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and estimation techniques that rely on acquired Alice-Eve CSI to eavesdrop on legitimate
communications. Although representing a worst-case scenario, facilitating channel esti-
mation for Eve allows us to identify any limitations in our design. In fact, considering a
strong eavesdropping scenario such as ours not only enables us to obtain a lower bound
on the performance of our techniques, but also helps us correct our design to cope with
less stringent environments. The secret information message transmitted from Alice to
Bob is a 512-by-512 (in pixels) image, with each pixel represented by 8 bits. The image
is transmitted as QPSK symbols at a symbol rate of 1 M symbols/sec.
Each training packet is prepended to a data packet to construct one data-link frame.
The size of a data packet can vary depending on the coherence time of the propagation
environment. In our case, to ensure an up-to-date channel estimate in most environments,
we let the data packet consist of 1000 QPSK symbols. For simplicity, data packets are
always transmitted using QPSK. The training packets are also exploited for frame syn-
chronization. In fact, because the pilot sequences are globally known, then Bob (Eve) can
cross-correlate a sample training packet with the frames he (she) receives. Over a period
of a data frame, the time when the result of the cross-correlation has the maximum value
marks the beginning of a frame.
Each antenna transmits at Tx power of 20 dBm (100 mW). Due to the non-linearity
of the power amplifier of the USRPs, we kept the total transmit power fixed at this value.
However, we varied the power assignment between the TxFJ and information signals. In
some of our experiments, we kept the power assignment of information signal fixed at
half of the total transmit power and varied the power allocated to TxFJ from zero to the
half of the transmit power. This way, we can keep the power of information rate fixed at
a given value and vary the power of TxFJ signal. The TxFJ signal is designed in a way
to not interfere with the information signal. Specifically, we used MIMO precoding, so
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that the TxFJ signal falls in the null space of the channel between Alice and Bob, thus not
affecting Bob’s reception. Each stream of the information and TxFJ signals occupies one
degree of freedom (DoF) to be transmitted from Alice. Because in our experiment Alice
has two antennas (thus two DoFs), we can only send a single-stream information signal
and a single-stream TxFJ signal to fully exploit Alice’s DoFs for both data transmission
and secrecy. To enable spatial multiplexing (i.e., sending multi-stream information signals
to achieve multiples of the single-stream information rate), more than two antennas are
needed. Our experimental testbed can be easily extended to cover multi-stream cases as
well.
We observed that given a fixed power for information signal, the secret message was
transmitted error-free regardless of the amount of power allocated to the TxFJ signal. This
means that the FJ signal was nullified at Bob perfectly. However, Eve could not in general
nullify the effect of FJ on itself. At low power for FJ (below 20% of the transmit total
power), Eve was still able to decode the secret message despite receiving a less clean
signal compared to Bob. However, for a sufficiently high FJ power (e.g., above 30% of
the total transmit power), Eve was not able to decode any of Alice’s transmitted packets,
despite its closer distance to Alice than Bob. Exemplary received constellations at both
Bob and Eve are shown in Figure4.10.
We then observed the effect of channel estimation on the nullification of FJ at Bob
by using different types of pilot signals. It turned out for some pilot signals, the FJ is not
nullified completely thus increasing the BER at Bob. We also observed that in an office
room, the wireless channel always exhibits rich-scattering behavior. The absence of rich-
scattering environment creates the so-called “vulnerability zone”around Bob. This zone
can span several wavelengths around the Bob, and if Eve is placed anywhere in this zone,
Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels would become similar to each other. The immediate
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.10: Received QPSK constellation on (a) Bob (b) Eve, with half of total power
allocated to TxFJ.
result of such similarity is that the null spaces of Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels be-
comes similar to each other. Hence, the FJ signal created at Alice would be nullified at
both Eve and Bob, causing Eve to receive a clean signal without any disturbance from FJ.
In previous studies in literature, it has been reported that the area of the vulnerability
zone at ISM frequency bands can span up to 10 wavelengths around Bob. However, we
found out that the real-world wireless channel of an office room precludes the presence of
the vulnerability zone, such that even if Eve is placed extremely close to Alice the FJ still
affects Eve’s receptions. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the symbol-error-rate (SER) results that
are achieved by placing Eve in different locations. As mentioned earlier, Bob and Eve are
both located 3’5" away from Alice. For each experiment, Eve is placed according to one
of the settings shown in Figure 4.11. For SNR variation, we added an AWGN signal to the
digital transmit signal at Alice side. The reason for doing so is that changing the transmit
power of USRP may not be possible due nonlinearities in power amplifier. Hence, we














Figure 4.11: Placements of Eve for experiment: (a) 90◦, (b) 45◦, (c) 10◦.
SNR SER for 90◦ SER for 45◦ SER for 10◦
6 0.479282 0.556779 0.617551
8 0.271464 0.365629 0.345778
10 0.036926 0.068769 0.068504
12 0.013100 0.010599 0.015118
14 0.001448 0.002469 0.004381
Table 4.3: SER of the main channel for different Eve placements.
SNR SER for 90◦ SER for 45◦ SER for 10◦
6 0.817053 0.790755 0.814479
8 0.720394 0.926080 0.907803
10 0.771758 0.704939 0.792374
12 0.770608 0.811839 0.843291
14 0.720957 0.735692 0.745816
Table 4.4: SER of the eavesdropping channel for different Eve placements.
noise from Alice side. Because of the close distance between USRPs, the additive noise at
the receive (i.e., Bob or Eve) is negligible, so the AWGN noise at Alice side controls the
SNR value. It can be seen from both tables that first the SER at Eve remains high despite
the increase in SNR. Second, such SERs at Eve seem to not depend on Eve’s placement,
even when Eve is resided very close to Bob (see results for “10◦”).
Another important observation that was made in our simulations was the effect of LoS
on our results. Specifically, in simulations we noticed that under Rayleigh fading (i.e., no
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LoS), even in the absence of FJ, Eve still requires complete knowledge of the channel be-
tween Alice and Bob (i.e., legitimate channel) to successfully decode the secret message.
Without such knowledge, Eve still has a high BER. This is related to the beamforming of
the information signal at Alice, which increases the directionality of Alice’s transmission
to Bob. Hence, Eve must know where Alice beam is pointed to in order to perform better
equalization. However, in a Rician fading environment, where LoS exists between Alice
and Eve, Eve only has to know the channel between herself and Alice. The reason for
such phenomenon is that the LoS component makes the legitimate channel and Alice-Eve
channel comparable to each other (provided that Eve is reasonably close to Bob).
4.9 Summary
In this chapter, we studied distributed design of FJ control in a MIMO wiretap inter-
ference network. We showed that greedy FJ is not an optimal approach in terms of total
network secrecy rate. Accordingly, we designed a price-based TxFJ control that guaran-
tees a local optimum point in maximizing the secrecy sum-rate. Through simulations, we
observed a noticeable improvement in the secrecy sum-rate when pricing is leveraged for
FJ control. We then introduced uncertainty in E-CSI and designed a robust method. We
showed via simulations that the robust method achieves a higher secrecy sum-rate than
the greedy FJ approach.
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CHAPTER 5
Distributed Asynchronous Power Control for TxFJ and
RxFJ
5.1 Overview
In this chapter, we study PHY-layer security in a wiretap interference network where both
TxFJ and RxFJ are utilized by each link. Our design parameters are the RxFJ power,
and the power assignment (PA) between the information and TxFJ signals. The joint
optimization of these parameters is a non-convex, computationally intractable problem.
To address it, instead we seek sub-optimal solutions but distributed solutions that can be
implemented by individual links.
Our work is motivated by the following simple observation: For a given link, when
no secrecy is required, the higher the power budget at Alice, the higher is the information
rate at the intended receiver (Rx). However, when secrecy is also a requirement, although
information rate still increases monotonically with Alice’s power, secrecy rate may not
necessarily behave as such because more power transmitted from Alice also increases the
leakage rate at Eve. Using this observation, we find a lower bound on TxFJ power above
which positive secrecy is achievable for a given link. Once positive secrecy is achieved,
secrecy rate becomes a monotonically increasing function of Alice’s power, thus having
the same trend as information rate. Therefore, the rest of Alice’s power can be allocated
to information signal.
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Although guaranteeing positive secrecy does not offer any sort of optimality in terms
of individual or network-wide secrecy, it ensures that no link experiences zero secrecy.
In contrast, when the aim is to maximize the sum of secrecy rates, we cannot ensure
that every link achieves a non-zero secrecy rate [65]. A zero secrecy scenario can be
exploited by Eve, who can perform sophisticated multiuser detection techniques (e.g.,
successive interference cancellation or SIC) to decode ongoing communications. Such
an issue was reported in [42], and it was shown in [66] that an SIC-capable Eve can
significantly decrease the network secrecy if some links experience zero secrecy rates.
By ensuring that every link achieves a non-zero secrecy rate, Eve cannot apply SIC1.
We assume that when legitimate nodes set their transmission parameters, there is no
centralized authority responsible for computations and optimization. Hence, links have
to make distributed decisions. Such a design inevitably produces interference at several
links. However, because Eve also receives interference from all links, a careful design
ensures that interference at legitimate links is properly managed while interference at Eve
is kept high as much as possible. We model these interactions between legitimate links
using the theory of non-cooperative games.
The works in [43, 46, 119] studied secure precoding in wiretap interference networks.
Moreover, the authors in [55] studied power control in a multi-channel interference net-
work without considering TxFJ and RxFJ. All of these works assumed that Alice has full
knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel state information (E-CSI), which may not be a
practical assumption. Regarding the power assignment between the information and TxFJ
signals, the works in [71] and [120] focused only on a single-link scenario, and their ap-
proaches are not extendable to the case of multiple links. The authors of [56] exploited
1A full description of the effect of a zero secrecy rate on the secrecy of an interference network was
given in Section 4, where we showed that Eve can cancel the interference coming from links with zero
secrecy rates, thus increasing her received SINR.
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full-duplex capability at the base station of a broadcast/multiple-access wiretap channel to
secure multiple half-duplex downlink and uplink users by generating RxFJ/TxFJ for up-
link/downlink communications. They proposed a multi-objective optimization framework
to find the best tradeoff in minimizing downlink and uplink powers, subject to certain
constraints on information and secrecy rates of downlink and uplink users. Furthermore,
in [121] the case of imperfect knowledge of Alice-Eve channel was modeled using elliptic
uncertainty, which assumes there is a bounded error in the knowledge of E-CSI. While
this assumption helps to gain tractable results, it is not always practical to make because
knowledge of the error bound might be difficult to acquire. In contrast, we assume that
only the distribution of the E-CSI is known to Alices.
Overall, our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Using TxFJ and RxFJ, we define a lower bound on the power allocated to the TxFJ
that guarantees positive secrecy for each given link.
• We propose a non-cooperative game to model a power control problem. Assuming
first that Alice-/Bob-Eve channels are fully known, we derive sufficient conditions
under which the proposed non-cooperative game admits a unique NE.
• We propose alternative sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the NE. Such
conditions allow for predicting the existence of a unique NE in a distributed fashion.
• We show that our distributed design can be implemented using an asynchronous
update algorithm. This algorithm is robust to transmission delays over various links.
• Lastly, we relax the assumption of full knowledge of E-CSI at each Alice and pro-
pose a version of our algorithm that is robust to uncertainties in knowledge of E-
CSI.
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Same as previous chapter, we first propose the distributed design under full knowledge of
E-CSI to build foundations for our distributed algorithm and establish important perfor-
mance metrics. After conducting such analysis, we then relax knowledge of E-CSI and
propose a version of our algorithm that is robust to uncertainties in E-CSI knowledge.
5.2 System Model
We first describe a model for the network under consideration and introduce the main
performance metrics. Due to the use of RxFJ in this chapter, we require to re-introduce
the basic notations for a better flow of this chapter. Consider Q transmitters (Q ≥ 2),
Alice1, . . . , AliceQ, that communicate with their respective receivers, Bob1, . . . , BobQ.
Let Q , {1, 2, . . . , Q}. Aliceq, q ∈ Q, has Nq transmit antennas, and Bobq has Mq
antennas. A passive Eve with L antennas is also present in the communication range2.
The received signal at Bobq is






(H˜rqur + H′rqmr) + nq (5.1)
where H˜rq ∈ CMq×Nr , r ∈ Q, is the Mq-by-Nr complex channel matrix between Alicer
and Bobq, uq ∈ CNq is the transmitted signal from Aliceq, τq ∈ R+ and H′qq ∈ CMq×Mq
are, respectively, the positive-real-valued self-interference-suppression (SIS) factor and
the self-interference channel at Bobq due to imperfect SIS3. This self-interference model
was adopted in several works (see [56, 122]), and practical implementations of it ex-
2L can be assumed to be large enough to represent multiple multi-antenna colluding eavesdroppers [22].
However, for ease of presentation, we consider the L-antenna Eve as a single entity.
3In-band full-duplex communications requires suppression of the transmitted signal of the FD-enabled
device at its receive chain to allow for simultaneous transmission and reception. However, such suppression
may not be perfect, leading to residual self-interference at the receive chain [29].
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ist in the literature (see e.g., [31])4. mr ∈ CMr , r ∈ Q is the RxFJ signal cre-
ated by Bobr, which is a zero mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random
variable (ZMCSCG-RV) with covariance matrix of E[mrm†r] = p′rI where p′r is RxFJ
power. Tr(mqm†q) = Mqp′q ≤ P ′q where P ′q denotes the power limit at Bobq for RxFJ.
H′rq ∈ CMq×Mr , r 6= q, is the channel from Bobr to Bobq because the RxFJ created
by other Bobs interfere with Bobq’s reception. nq ∈ CMq is the complex additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) whose covariance matrix is E[nqn†q] = N0I with N0 ∈ R+. We
assume H˜rq = H¯rqd
−η/2
rq , where H¯rq ∈ CMq×Nr represents the small-scale fading, drq is
the distance between Alicer and Bobq in meters, and η is the path-loss exponent. The same
equivalent assumption holds forH′rq, r 6= q, i.e.,H′rq = H¯′rqd′rq−η/2 where H¯′rq ∈ CMq×Mr
and d′rq is the distance from Bobr to Bobq.
The received signal at Eve is




(G˜rur + G′rmr) + e (5.2)
where G˜q ∈ CL×Nq , q ∈ Q denotes, the complex channel matrix between Aliceq and
Eve. Let G˜q = G¯qd
−η/2
qe , where G¯q ∈ CL×Nq and dqe is the distance between Aliceq and
Eve. G′q ∈ CL×Mq is the channel between Bobq and Eve, and G′q = G¯′qd′qe−η/2 where
G¯′q ∈ CL×Mq and d′qe is the distance from Bobq to Eve. Finally, e has the same statistical
characteristics as nq. For Aliceq, q ∈ Q, its transmitted signal uq = sq + wq consists
of the information signal sq and TxFJ wq. We only consider the case of single-stream
data transmission using multiple antennas. That is, we set sq , Tqxq, where Tq ∈ CNq
is the precoder and xq ∈ C is the information signal. In other words, we use multiple
4We assume that FD receivers are not experiencing dynamic range issues (as pointed out in [123]),
that cause the additive noise at the receive chain to be dependent on the transmit power of the FD device.
Relaxing this assumption is a subject for future research.
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transmit and receive antennas at each link to achieve MIMO-diversity gain, and spatial-
multiplexing gain, i.e., multiple antennas are used for beamforming5.
Assume that a Gaussian codebook is used for xq, i.e., xq is distributed as a ZMCSCG-
RV with E[xqx†q] = φqPq, where Pq is the total transmit power of Aliceq and 0 ≤ φq ≤
1 is the fraction of transmit power allocated to the information signal. For the TxFJ,
we write wq , Zqvq, where Zq ∈ CNq×(Nq−1) is the precoder for the TxFJ signal and
vq ∈ C(Nq−1) is the TxFJ signal with i.i.d. ZMCSCG entries and E[vqv†q] = σqI. The
scalar value σq =
(1−φq)Pq
Nq−1 denotes the TxFJ power
6. Let H˜qq = UqΣqV†q denote the
singular value decomposition (SVD) of H˜qq where Σq is the diagonal matrix of singular
values in descending order, and Uq and Vq are left and right matrices of singular vectors,
respectively. We set Zq = V(2)q whereV
(2)
q denotes the matrix ofNq−1 rightmost columns
of Vq corresponding to the smallest singular values [22]. We assume that Aliceq knows
H˜qq7. The information signal precoder Tq is set to Tq = V(1)q , where V
(1)
q is the first
column of Vq corresponding the largest singular value , achieving the maximum transmit-
diversity gain [72]. LetHqq , H˜qqV(1)q ,Hjqq , H˜qqV(2)q ,Hqr , H˜qrV(1)q ,Hjqr , H˜qrV(2)q ,
Gq , G˜qV(1)q , and Gjq , G˜qV(2)q . The terms Gq and Gjq , ∀q ∈ Q, denote the E-CSI
5Later on, we explain the rationale behind this choice.
6Notice that the TxFJ power is distributed uniformly between various dimensions of vq . In the case of
full knowledge of E-CSI, such power division is not optimal. However, when no knowledge of E-CSI is
available (which we assume later in this chapter), it was shown that uniform distribution of TxFJ power
among different dimensions of vq is optimal (see [22, 71]).
7Acquiring channel state information (CSI) between Aliceq and its corresponding Bobq is assumed to
be done securely. For example, a two-phase channel estimation can be performed, where in the first/second
time-slot, Aliceq/Bobq sends the pilot signals to Bobq/Aliceq . This way, we avoid having to send explicit















Figure 5.1: System model.
components. Hence, (5.1) and (5.2) can be written as






(Hrqxr + Hjrqvr + H
′
rqmr) + nq (5.3a)






(Grxr + Gjrvr + G
′
rmr) + e. (5.3b)
An illustration of the system model under study is given in Figure 5.1 for a two-link
network. It can be seen that the interference components at each Bob include his self-
interference signal as well as information, TxFJ, and RxFJ signals of the other link. Eve
also receives all information, TxFJ, and RxFJ signals.
After receiving yq at Bobq, a linear receiver dq ∈ CMq is applied. Assuming that














8Note that the choice of the linear receiver (to be discussed near the end of this section) affects this
assumption. In this chapter, we choose the linear receiver so that this assumption holds.
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Hence, the information rate for the qth link is expressed as:














Eve also applies a linear receiver rq ∈ CL while eavesdropping on qth link’s signal to
obtain the following estimate of xq
zˆq = r†q
(











Thus, the rate at Eve while eavesdropping on Aliceq (i.e., leaked rate of Aliceq at Eve) is
















Finally, the secrecy rate of Aliceq can be written as9
Csecq , max{Cq − Ceq, 0}. (5.10)
The linear receivers dq and rq, q ∈ Q, are chosen according to the maximal ratio com-
bining (MRC) [72] method so as to maximize the reception of the signal at Bobq and
Eve, respectively. Hence, dq = U(1)q , where U
(1)
q is the first column of Uq (recall that
H˜qq = UqΣqV†q). Using this linear receiver, the TxFJ signal of Aliceq will be nullified
at Bobq. In other words, d†qHjqqvq = 0. Let G˜q = LqDqRq be the SVD of G˜q where Lq
and Rq are matrices of left and right singular vectors, respectively, and Dq is the diagonal
matrix of singular values in descending order. Thus, while eavesdropping on the qth link,
Eve sets its linear receiver rq = L(1)q , where L
(1)
q is the first column of matrix Lq10.
We need to emphasize that the choice of precoder (i.e., beamformers) for TxFJ signal
in this chapter is mainly driven by the fact that acquiring E-CSI knowledge may not be
possible in cases where Eve is a passive node. For a single-link scenario, it was shown
in [26] that optimizing the precoders of information and TxFJ signals requires complete
knowledge of E-CSI. However, in this chapter, the beamforming vector for the TxFJ signal
for each link depends only on the channel between the two nodes comprising that link,
which is relatively more practical to obtain.
Our choice of the beamforming vector Tq comes from the fact that the number of
antennas at Eve may not be known. As pointed out in [22], the main limitation of the
TxFJ method is that if Eve has more antennas than Alice, then Eve may be able to nullify
9Because none of the links knows whose transmission Eve is interested in, each link tries to protect its
own transmission from Eve. Thus, the secrecy rate of each link can be determined by (5.10) (see [61]).
10Other decoders (such as MMSE [72]) can also be employed by Eve. This issue will be discussed later
in the simulation section.
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the effect of TxFJ on itself.
5.3 Problem Formulation
In this section, we present conditions to achieve positive secrecy and establish the
foundation for our game-theoretic formulation. We form the following optimization prob-




s.t. 0 ≤ φq ≤ 1
0 ≤ p′q ≤ P ′q. (5.11)
Due to the non-concavity of the objective function in (5.11) w.r.t. the decision variables11,
the optimization in (5.11) is non-convex. To find a tractable (and yet suboptimal) solution,
we decompose the analysis of RxFJ and power assignment (PA) between information and
TxFJ signals into two sub-problems. We first propose a tractable solution for p′q. Then,
we propose a method to find a suboptimal PA between information and TxFJ signals.
5.3.1 Computation of RxFJ Power
Removing themax{•} and log(•) operators fromCsecq in (5.10), the secrecy maximization







s.t. 0 ≤ p′q ≤ P ′q. (5.12)
11The non-concavity of objective function can be easily seen by examining the Hessian matrix of the
objective function.
165
One can do a simple one-dimensional search to find the optimal value of p′q. However,
such an approach demands knowledge of multiuser interference (MUI) at Eve (i.e., cq),
which may not be available to Bobq. In the remainder of this section, we propose a a
different method for setting the RxFJ power. While at first it may seem that our method
requires knowledge of MUI at Eve, we later show that this method can be relaxed to handle
the case when knowledge of Eve’s MUI is not available.
We first obtain conditions that result in positive secrecy at link q. Positive secrecy in
(5.10) is achievable if and only if the objective value in (5.12) is larger than one. It can
be easily shown that this is true if and only if the optimal objective value of the following













s.t. 0 ≤ p′q ≤ P ′q. (5.13)
Note that the relationship between the solutions of (5.12) and (5.13) (that result in their
corresponding objective values being larger than one) is of necessary-and-sufficient type.
Hence, if we are seeking a set of conditions/solutions that result in positive secrecy, we
can examine these solutions by checking the objective value they yield for (5.13) instead
of (5.12). The first and second derivatives of g(p′q) are as follows:
∂g(p′q)
∂p′q









12 One can simply set the objective of (5.12) to be larger than one and end up with g(p′q) > 1 (and vice
versa), where g(p′q) is defined in (5.13).
166
Hence, the optimal value of p′q (i.e., p
′
q





P ′q if bq <
aqdq
cq












Later on, we show in simulations that whenever positive secrecy is achievable (i.e., the ob-
jective in (5.12) is larger than one), (5.15) often yields the optimal RxFJ power, signifying
that the solution to (5.13) is very likely the optimal solution to (5.12) as well.
Considering (5.16), we can conclude the following: Given cq and dq, if the (normal-









is small, the power of RxFJ should be very weak to maintain
positive secrecy, leading to p′q




is large, the effect of RxFJ on
Bobq is not as significant as MUI, so less suppression of self-interference can be allowed
and still maintain positive secrecy, i.e., p′q
∗ = P ′q becomes the favorable solution. An
equivalent intuition holds for dq/cq when
|d†qHqq |2
|d†qH′qq |2
and aq are given. Specifically, a large
dq/cq indicates that RxFJ degrades Eve’s reception more than the MUI received at Eve
(cq). Hence, smaller SIS suppression (i.e., larger τq) is allowed, indicating that p′q
∗ = P ′q
becomes the favorable solution.
It can be seen in (5.15) that the optimal RxFJ power that solves (5.13) depends on
two factors: MUI at Bobq (i.e., aq) and MUI at Eve while eavesdropping on the qth link
13Although when p′q = 0 the benefits of RxFJ are lost, one can set a minimum RxFJ power to prevent
RxFJ from going to zero.
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(i.e., cq). It may not be practical for a legitimate node to know the MUI at Eve. Later
on, we show that using a specific technique in setting TxFJ can help us to mitigate the
dependence on Eve’s MUI.
A full treatment of the optimal value of RxFJ in a single-link scenario is given in [28].
However, extending the approach in [28] would require knowledge of interference at both
Bobq and Eve, q ∈ Q. Such a requirement is not practical in our scenario, as there is no
cooperation allowed between legitimate links. Nevertheless, we show that our proposed
on-off solution in (5.15) helps us to mitigate the dependency of RxFJ on MUI at both
Bobq, q ∈ Q and Eve, thus facilitating our distributed design.
5.3.2 Power Allocation for TxFJ and Information Signals
After finding a set of conditions/solutions for RxFJ power (i.e., the rule in (5.15)), we now
focus on finding the optimal PA between TxFJ and information signals of Aliceq (i.e., φq).




s.t. 0 ≤ φq ≤ 1. (5.17)
Although the optimal φq can be found via a simple one-dimensional search, we would like
to eventually solve (5.17) without requiring knowledge of Eve’s MUI. In the remainder of
this section, we propose a solution to (5.17) in the perfect E-CSI scenario. Later on, we
show that our approach is extendable to the case of unknown E-CSI.
Similar to the approach taken in the previous section, we approach problem (5.17) by
first finding a bound on φq that guarantees positive secrecy of link q. Thus, the objective
168







Simplifying this inequality, we end up with the following:
cq > aq + (bq − dq)p′q. (5.19)
The inequality in (5.19) is a bound on the TxFJ power of Aliceq (i.e., σq) because accord-
ing to (5.9a), cq is a function of σq. Reducing (5.19) gives us a bound on the portion of
























For ease of presentation, we do not introduce the new notations in (5.3.2) yet; we do
so in in the next section. We refer to (5.19) as the lower-bound on TxFJ power of link
q to guarantee positive secrecy. To make use of this lower bound, we first introduce the
following result.
Lemma 1. If (5.19) is satisfied, the secrecy rate Csecq is a monotonically increasing func-
tion of Pq and φq.
Proof. The inequality in (5.19) can be written as
cq = aq + (bq − dq)p′q + δ (5.21)
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where δ > 0 is a positive real value. Replacing the term cq in (5.9a) with the RHS of












(aq + φqPq + bqp′q)(aq + φqPq + bqp′q + δ)
(5.22b)
which are both positive, and hence the lemma is proved.
Recall that in setting the RxFJ power in (5.15), we observed that its optimal value p′q
∗
depends on Eve’s and Bobq MUI. In order to mitigate knowledge of MUI at Bobq and Eve





P ′q, if bq < dq
0, if bq > dq.
(5.23)
Using the bound in (5.19), the following property shows the sufficiency of (5.23) to con-
clude (5.15).
Proposition 7. Provided that the following conditions hold, the conditions on the optimal
RxFJ power in (5.23) imply those of (5.15):
• cq satisfies (5.19) and aq + (bq − dq)p′q + δ > 0.
• (bq − dq)P ′q + δ < 0 when bq < dq
Proof. Assume that (5.23) is used to obtain the RxFJ power of link q. Hence, we set
p′q
∗ = P ′q when bq < dq. If cq > 0 and cq satisfies (5.19) (first condition of Proposition
7), then cq = aq + (bq − dq)P ′q + δ > 0 when bq < dq. Assuming that (bq − dq)P ′q + δ <
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0 (second condition of Proposition 7), one can conclude that aq > cq, or equivalently
aq > aq + (bq − dq)P ′q + δ. Hence, bq < dq is readily sufficient to deduce bq < aqdqcq that




Specifically, we set p′q = 0 according to (5.23). Given (5.19) and p
′
q = 0, cq must satisfy
cq = aq+δ, and since δ > 0, aq < cq. Therefore, bq > dq is sufficient to deduce bq >
aqdq
cq
that appears in (5.15).




, so both RxFJ schemes in (5.15) and (5.23) result in p′q
∗ = P ′q. However,








(suggesting p′∗q = 0 in (5.15)). Hence, we have conflicting decisions made
by (5.15) and (5.23). Condition (bq − dq)P ′q + δ < 0 sets an upper bound on δ, i.e.,
0 < δ < (dq − bq)P ′q if bq < dq. According to (5.6) and (5.9), the terms bq and dq are in
fact functions of self-interference, Alice-Bob, Bob-Eve, and Alice-Eve channels. Hence,





to decide whether RxFJ is needed or not. In other words, (5.23) is sufficient to set the
RxFJ power of Bobq14. The intuitive interpretation of (5.24) is that the SIS factor needs
to be small if the self-interference channel (i.e., |d†qH′qq|) has a large value, but if the Bob-
Eve channel (i.e., |r†qG′q|2) is large enough, it can cancel out the effect of self-interference
channel. In other words, Bobq must not use RxFJ if the self interference is not removed
well enough. However, if Eve suffers more from the generated RxFJ, then Bobq can use
it. Compared to (5.15), the RxFJ power assignment in (5.23) is more desirable, as it does
14The sufficiency of (5.23) is examined in Section 5.5.2.
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not require real-time tracking of Eve’s MUI at Bobq. Combining (5.19) and (5.23), we
have

cq > aq + (bq − dq)P ′q, if bq < dq
cq > aq, if bq > dq
. (5.25)
Since the inequalities in (5.25) are strict, we write the following:

cq = aq + (bq − dq)P ′q + δ, if bq < dq
cq = aq + δ, if bq > dq
. (5.26)
Using mathematical manipulations of Equations (5.18)–(5.26), we can convert problem




s.t. cq = aq + (bq − dq)p′q∗ + δ
cq > 0 (5.27)
0 < δ < (dq − bq)P ′q + J(1− tq)
0 ≤ φq ≤ 1
where p′q




1 if bq < dq
0 if bq > dq
. (5.28)
The first constraint in (5.27) is a constraint on φq, which is needed so that the optimal
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solution yields positive secrecy15. In other words, this constraint replaces the more general
constraint in (5.17), so that we can ignore the max{•} operator inCsecq = max{Cq−Ceq}.
This constraint together with the second and third constraints in (5.27) ensure that setting
p′q
∗ according to (5.23) is sufficient to satisfy the more general conditions in (5.15). Note
that tq is not a decision variable of (5.27), and can be easily computed by knowing bq and
dq.
Because cq is a function of φq, one can simplify the first constraint in (5.27) to find
the value of φq that yields positive secrecy for the objective of (5.27). However, we still
need to determine the value of δ to ensure that such value found for φq is the optimal one
for problem (5.27). A simple one-dimensional search in the interval defined by the third
constraint in (5.27) can provide us with the best value of δ and subsequently the optimal
value of φq. To avoid additional computation imposed by the one-dimensional search
process, we propose the following heuristic technique to obtain δ. On the one hand, we
do not wish to choose δ near its upper bound due to the fact that a higher δ increases the
lower bound on TxFJ, which subsequently decreases the amount of power allocated to
the information signal. On the other hand, selecting δ close to zero is also not desirable,
as in (5.22b) the growth rate of secrecy rate would be decreased. Hence, we choose
δ = 1
2
|dq − bq|P ′q. We show later that this heuristic choice of δ yields a performance
close to that of the optimal solution found by a one-dimensional search.
5.4 Game Formulation
In this section, using the ideas in Section 5, we propose a power control scheme based
on non-cooperative games. The first constraint in (5.27) can be written in a general form,
15Note that the term cq is a function of φq (see (5.9)). An equivalent expanded version of this constraint





cq ≥ aq + (bq − dq)P ′q + δ, if bq < dq
cq ≥ aq + δ, if bq > dq.
(5.29)
Simplifying (5.29) and taking into account the other constraints of (5.27), an upper bound
on φq can be written as in (5.3.2), with δ = 12 |dq−bq|P ′q and the newly introduced notations







































With every legitimate link following such a strategy, the resulting interaction between
them can be modeled as a non-cooperative game, where players are links, the strategy
set of the qth player is the set of constraints in (5.31), and the utility of each player is
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his secrecy rate. According to Lemma 1, upon achieving positive secrecy for link q (i.e.,
satisfying the constraint in (5.31)), the secrecy rate becomes a monotonically increasing
function of φq. Hence, the best-response of the qth link, q ∈ Q, is when φq meets its
upper bound in (5.3.2) with equality. The Nash equilibrium is a point at which no player
is willing to unilaterally change his strategy given the strategies of other players.
5.4.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
The first game-theoretic analysis that we perform is to examine whether the game charac-
terized by (5.31) admits a NE. An NE exists if the strategy set of each player is non-empty,
compact, and convex; and the utility function of each player is a continuous and (quasi-
)concave function of its action, i.e., Csecq is concave w.r.t. φq [106]. Convexity of each
player’s strategy set is easy to prove, and thus omitted for brevity. Replacing cq with
aq + (bq − dq)P ′q + δ in (5.10) (as the first constraint in (5.27) suggests) and taking the






aq + δ + φqPq + bp′q
− 1
aq + φqPq + bp′q
)
(5.32)
which is always negative, indicating that Csecq is concave w.r.t. φq. A necessary and
sufficient condition for the uniqueness of NE is proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 8. The game in (5.31), for which the best response of each player is when (5.3.2)
holds with equality, has a unique NE iff:
ρ(A + B) < 1 (5.33)
where ρ(•) indicates the spectral radius of a matrix (i.e., largest absolute value of eigen-
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Aq,r , r 6= q
0 , r = q
,∀(r, q) ∈ Q (5.34)





Bq,r , r 6= q
0 , r = q
. (5.35)
with Aq,r and Bq,r defined in (5.30).
Proof. The uniqueness of NE can be proved by leveraging the fixed-point theorem. In
fact, if the iterative computation of each player’s best-response (i.e., φq meeting its up-
per bound in (5.3.2) with equality for all q) has a fixed point, the convergence point is
the NE of the game [107]. We first analyze the existence of a fixed point for the ar-
gument inside max{min{•, 1}, 0} in (5.3.2). Then, we extend the analysis to include
max{min{•, 1}, 0}. Concatenating the best responses of all links, the following fixed-
point problem in its n−th iteration can be established:
Φ(n+1) = T (Φ(n)) = 1 + (A + B)Φ(n) + f (5.36)
where Φ = [φ1, . . . , φQ]T , 1 is a vector of appropriate size whose entries are all 1, and
f is a vector constructed by concatenating other terms in (5.3.2) for all q. The rest of the
proof is presented in Appendix C.
Remark 2: Using the condition in (5.33), the convergence of the Jacobi iterative algo-
176
rithm in the sense of [107, Ch. 2, Proposition 6.8] is guaranteed. In fact, at every iteration,
all players simultaneously update their actions. Later on, we prove the convergence of our
secure power control game under totally asynchronous updates (in the sense of [107, Ch.
6]).
5.4.2 Algorithm Design
We now design an algorithm to implement the proposed power control game. Let
Tq, ∀q ∈ Q, be the set of iteration numbers when the qth link updates its action. For
example, Tq = {1, 3, 5} indicates that the qth links performs the update in (5.31) in first,
third and fifth iterations. Furthermore, Let Θ(n)q = {θ(n)1,q , . . . , θ(n)Q,q} denote the set of most
recent times that the interference coming from each link is measured at Bobq in the nth
iteration. Hence, θ(n)r,q is the most recent iteration in which the interference from the rth
link, r 6= q is captured/updated, and θ(n)r,q ≤ n − 1. Therefore, in the nth iteration, the
qth link, q ∈ Q, performs the update in (5.31) based on Θ(n)q if n ∈ Tq. Using these def-
initions, we can now present an asynchronous algorithm that implements our proposed
game, which is shown in Algorithm 6. Other termination criteria can be used instead of
the maximum iteration number.
Algorithm 6 Asynchronous Iterative Secure Power Allocation (full E-CSI version)
1: Set p′q and δ according to (5.23) and Proposition 7 (see Section III).
2: for n=1 to maximum iteration do
3: Set φ(n)q =





, ∀(q) ∈ Q.
4: end for
Special cases of the asynchronous scheme include Jacobi (or simultaneous) and
Gauss-Seidel (or sequential) schemes [107]. The Jacobi scheme can be described as fol-
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lows (q ∈ Q):
Tq = {1, 2, ..., itmax}
Θ(n)q = {n− 1, ..., n− 1}
where itmax is the maximum iteration number. In other words, in the Jacobi scheme, all
links simultaneously update their actions at each iteration. The Gauss-Seidel scheme can
be described as follows:











{n− (q − 1), ..., n− 1} if j = 1, . . . , q − 1
{n, n− (Q− 1), ..., n− q} if j = q, . . . , Q
which means that in each iteration, only one link updates its action, while all other links
use their previously chosen actions. The following theorem guarantees the feasibility of
asynchronous implementation of our proposed game:
Theorem 9. Algorithm 6 converges asynchronously to the unique NE of the proposed
game if Theorem 8 holds.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that (5.3.2) was derived only to proceed with the game-theoretic analysis of the
problem. A detailed procedure to find the optimal value of φq in a node is as follows. At
a given iteration of our algorithm, say the nth iteration, after setting the optimal value of
RxFJ, in order to determine the optimal PA, Bobq needs to first measure the interference
at his receive chain, i.e., a(n−1)q + b
(n−1)
q p′q




indicate the values of aq and bq at the previous iteration. Assuming that full knowledge










q ; 2) He adds the result of subtraction to d(n−1)q p′q
∗. Denote the













It can be seen that setting the optimal PA involves simple addition, subtraction and divi-
sion of scalar values. Moreover, there is no need to know all interference terms at Bobq
and Eve because only the aggregate of these terms (i.e., aq and cq) need to be known.
5.4.3 Sufficient Conditions for NE Uniqueness
Although (5.33) is a tight condition, evaluating it requires knowledge of the whole matrix
A + B, which is not desirable for distributed implementation. We introduce a sufficient
condition which can be evaluated in distributed fashion. It is shown in [107, Proposition
A.20] that for any induced matrix norm17 ||•|| and any square matrix M we have ρ(M) ≤
||M||. Using this property, we consider the induced norm || • || to be || • ||∞, which is
the infinity norm. Hence, assuming that M is a Q-by-Q matrix, a sufficient condition for
ρ(M) < 1 is whether ||M||∞ < 1. Using this property in our game, a sufficient condition






q . However, the
values of aq and cq can vary across iterations.
17The induced norm of matrix M is defined as ||M|| , max||x||=1 ||Mx|| where x is a vector and both
norms in the RHS are vector norms.
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for our game to have a unique NE is whether






|Aq,r −Bq,r| < 1. (5.38)
The physical intuition drawn from the condition in (5.38) is not straightforward. One
way to interpret this condition is to decompose this condition as follows: The term Aq,r
in (5.38) is mostly related to the MUI at each Bob which should be low enough, i.e.,
|d†qHqq|, ∀q ∈ Q in Aq,r should be large enough to guarantee the uniqueness of NE (see
(5.30)). A sufficient separation between the links can satisfy this condition. The term
Bq,r in (5.38) is related to E-CSI components (see (5.30)). At first, it may seem that this
condition requires each link to be the dominant interferer at Eve w.r.t. other links (i.e.,
|r†qGjq|, ∀q ∈ Q inBq,r should be large enough). However, this is physically not possible.
It can be seen that the uniqueness condition depends on the location of Eve as well
because both Aq,r and Bq,r depend on Eve’s channels. Other studies such as [46, 55, 65]
have also confirmed the dependency of the unique NE (of non-cooperative secure power
control games) on Eve’s channels. Such a coupling is neither practical (because E-CSI
must be known) nor favorable (because Eve plays a role in the stability of the game). In
what follows, we aim to mitigate knowledge of E-CSI and set the NE uniqueness (derived
in Theorem 8) free of Eve’s role. None of the approaches in [43, 46, 55] were shown to
be extendable to the case of unknown E-CSI. However, we show that our approach can be
simply extended to cover the case of unknown E-CSI.
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5.5 Robust Power Allocation Game
In this section, we incorporate the assumption of unknown E-CSI in our game.
5.5.1 Best Response Under E-CSI Uncertainties
As knowledge of E-CSI becomes unknown, each legitimate link needs to ensure that
positive secrecy is still preserved. Recalling the inequalities in (5.29) and (5.3.2), positive
secrecy happens when cq > aq + (bq − dq)p′q or equivalently






{(Aq,r −Bq,r)φrPr + Cq,rPr +Dq,rp′r} .
Under unknown E-CSI, for a given probability of positive secrecy, denoted by ε, the qth
link needs to satisfy the following:
Pr{(1− φq)Pq > ψq + τqp′qEq} ≥ ε. (5.40)
Using (5.23) and the Bayes law of total probability, we have
Pr{(1− φq)Pq > ψq + τqp′qEq} =
Pr{bq < dq}(1− Pr{(1− φq)Pq ≤ ψq+
τqP
′
qEq}) + Pr{bq > dq}(1− Pr{(1− φq)Pq ≤ ψq}). (5.41)
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We assume that ψq + τqp′qEq is a non-negative number for both values of p
′
q, i.e., Pr{ψq +
τqp
′
qEq > 0} = 1, otherwise (5.40) is always satisfied when ψq + τqp′qEq < 0, and Aliceq
can spend all of the transmit power on information signal18. Using Markov inequality in
(5.41), the following holds
Pr{bq < dq}(1− Pr{(1− φq)Pq < ψq + τqP ′qEq})+
Pr{bq > dq}(1− Pr{(1− φq)Pq < ψq}) >
Pr{bq < dq}(1−
E[ψq + τqP ′qEq]
(1− φq)Pq ) + Pr{bq > dq}(1−
E[ψq]
(1− φq)Pq ). (5.42)
Hence, (5.40) remains true as long as we have
Pr{bq < dq}(1−
E[ψq + τqP ′qEq]
(1− φq)Pq ) + Pr{bq > dq}(1−
E[ψq]
(1− φq)Pq ) ≥ ε. (5.43)





1− Pr{bq < dq}
E[ψq + τqP ′qEq]
(1− ε)Pq − Pr{bq > dq}
E[ψq]






For the rest of this section, we explain how different terms in (5.5.1) can be computed.
We first focus on computing Pr{bq < dq}. Using (5.6) and (5.9), we simplify bq < dq,
which is as follows


















The small-scale fading components of r†qG
′
q and r†qGq are ZMCSCG-RVs with unit
variances. Hence |r†qGq|2 and |r†qG′q|2 both have chi-square distributions with 2 and 2Nq
degrees of freedom, respectively. The division of a (central) chi-square random variable
by another independent (central) chi-square random variable has F-distribution. To tackle
the issue of unknown large-scale fading components of r†qG
′
q and r†qGq we use stochastic
geometry [124]. One can model nodes’ positions according to a spatial distribution, e.g.,
a Poisson point process (PPP). For instance, stochastic geometry has been used in model-
ing eavesdroppers’ positions in several recent works [125]. We model the location(s) of
Eve(s) according to an independent homogenous PPP, namely Ω, with density λ. Such a
representation can be used to model single or multiple Eves depending on the choice of




where Γ and γ are RVs that represent large-scale and









Using stochastic geometry and F-distribution, we have the following theorem20:
Theorem 10. An analytical solution for (5.46) that is used in (5.5.1) is as follows:




















and Pr{§qγ > ν} = (1 + ν§q )
−Nq .
19For example, if Eve is known to be distributed inside a certain region, we can find a suitable λ (that
represents the density as λ Eves per unit of the surface area) such that the PPP matches our settings.
20
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Proof. See Appendix C.
We now turn our attention to E[ψq + τqP ′qEq] and E[ψq] in (5.5.1). We propagate the
expectation in E[ψq+τqP ′qEq] to each term inside ψq using (5.30). Because the expectation









Pr{Γγ > ν}dν (5.48)
where Pr{Γγ > ν} can be derived from Theorem 10. Hence, the terms involving expec-






While in the simulation section, we focus on the case where no knowledge on E-CSI
components is available to links (i.e., both large-scale and small-scale fading parts of E-
CSI components are not known), we can extract more insights from the derivations for
unknown E-CSI by considering the case where large-scale fading part of E-CSI is avail-
able. Hence, we can give a close-form representation to (5.5.1). Knowledge of large-scale
fading of Alice-Eve and Bob-Eve channel is not new and has been assumed to be known
for various scenarios. One example is when Eve is acting as a reactive jammer. That is
to say after some eavesdropping on the current transmissions, Eve injects her jamming
signal to disrupt the ongoing communications. In such a case when jamming happens,
assuming that the jamming power of Eve and the statistical features of the jamming signal
are previously known (e.g., PDF, mean), the legitimate links can measure the jamming
signal strength when it interferes with their transmissions. Hence, the approximate loca-
tion of Eve can be estimated. Moreover, in [97], it was shown that in a massive MIMO
scenario, a passive Eve might not be very dangerous and must therefore be active and
attack the training phase. This active attack can make Eve exposed, and hence the legiti-
mate links can acquire some knowledge about her location. Recently, the authors in [98]
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proposed a method with which the legitimate nodes can detect the passive eavesdropper
from the local oscillator power leaked from its RF front end. Hence, an approximation
on the location of Eve can be acquired. Furthermore, the knowledge of large-scale fading
was recently analyzed in [126] where the directional properties (i.e., small-scale fading)
of Eve(s) are unknown to Alice.




in (5.46) is equivalent to the SINR of a one-branch diversity combiner withNq interferers
[127, eq. (19)]. Thus,
FX(§) = 1− 1
1 + § . (5.49)
Using (5.49) in (5.46), we end up with 21









To compute E[ψq + τqP ′qEq] and E[ψq] in (5.5.1), we know that the small-scale fading part
of random variables |r†qGjq|2, |r†qGjr|2, |r†qGr|2, and |r†qG′r|2 have chi-square distributions
with 2(Nq − 1), 2(Nr − 1), 2, and Nr degrees of freedom, respectively [120, Lemma
2]. Note that all of the aforementioned RVs are independent from each other because
the precoding matrices V(1)q and V
(2)
q ,∀q are unitary and orthogonal to each other (see
Section II). The division of a (central) chi-square random variable by another independent
21Note that it is assumed that the knowledge of Alice-Bob channel, self-interference, and multi-user
interference still hold.
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(central) chi-square random variable has F-distribution [128]. Hence,
E[Aq,r] =
Nq − 1
(Nr − 1)(Nq − 3)
(Nr − 1)|d†qHrq|2 − |d†qHjrq|2
|d†qHqq|2
(5.51a)
E[Bq,r] = 0 (5.51b)
E[Cq,r] =
Nq − 1
(Nr − 1)(Nq − 3)
|d†qHjrq|2
|d†qHqq|2





























Nq − 3 . (5.51f)
The last issue is related to the on-off scheme proposed earlier for the RxFJ. As it was
shown in Section 5, whether the RxFJ is used or not depends on bq < dq or bq > dq (See
(5.23)). When bq < dq becomes a random variable in the case of unknown E-CSI, we
choose to use RxFJ whenever Pr{bq < dq} > 0.5.
Interestingly, in the scenario where knowledge of E-CSI is not available, it can be
shown that our robust scheme introduced in this section is in fact aimed at maximizing the
ergodic secrecy rate. The details of describing our robust scheme as an ergodic secrecy
rate maximization method can be found in Appendix C.4.2.
5.5.2 Distributed Power Control Under E-CSI Uncertainties
Using (5.5.1)-(5.48), we construct a game with the same structure as in Section 5 where
each link’s best response is computed from (5.5.1). Same as what we did in the proof of
Theorem 1, we concatenate the solution in (5.5.1) for all q to establish the following fixed
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point problem in its n−th iteration




E[A + B]Φ(n) + E[f ]
)
(5.52)
It can be seen that (5.52) is similar to (36) with the only difference that in (5.52) we
applied expectation w.r.t E-CSI to all terms. To analyze the uniqueness of NE, the fixed
point problem in (5.52) must be in closed form, i.e., the expectation terms in (5.52) must
be computable. The close-form representation of these terms was given in (45)–(48).
Hence, all the analysis that we did for the NE in the full-ECSI scenario is applicable in
the robust scheme as well.
Using the same logic behind Theorem 8, the following must hold to ensure a unique







where the expected value is element-wise. Note that E[Bq,r] = 0 (See (5.51b)), so one
can see that the analysis of E [A + B] is simplified to E [A]. Therefore, the E-CSI is no
longer present in NE uniqueness conditions. Moreover, for the qth link, q ∈ Q to perform
the PA scheme in (5.5.1), it requires the PA’s set by other links (i.e., φr, ∀r ∈ Q, r 6= q),
as well as the interfering channels between other legitimate links and Bobq (i.e., Hrq and
Hjrq, H ′rq, ∀r, q ∈ Q, r 6= q). Hence, no knowledge of MUI at Eve or E-CSI components
is needed. Same as the previous section, an alternative condition to (5.53) is to replace
the spectral radius with the infinity norm (see also (5.38)). Interestingly, the alternative
condition for the robust game has a nice interpretation. Specifically, (5.53) is deduced if
||E[A]




1− ε |E[Aq,r]| < 1. (5.54)
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Intuitively, if the interfering channels are small enough, a unique NE exists. Thus, the
uniqueness conditions in the robust schemes are not dependent on E-CSI. Algorithm 7
implements the robust version of our game:
Algorithm 7 Asynchronous Iterative Secure Power Allocation (robust version)
1: Given ε, calculate (5.46) and set p′q = P
′
q if Pr{bq < cq} ≥ 0.5, or p′q = 0 if
Pr{bq < cq} < 0.5.
2: for n=1 to maximum iteration do
3: Set φ(n)q =





, ∀(q) ∈ Q.
4: end for
5.6 Numerical Results
In this section, we verify our theoretical analyses. We show our results for a four-link
network22. Eve is located at (Xe, Ye) on a 2-D coordinate system. Alices are randomly
placed on the boundary of a circle, known as simulation region, with radius rcirc whose
center is at the origin of the coordinate system. Each Alice has a fixed distance (com-
munication range) with her corresponding Bob denoted as dlink23. Each Bob is placed
randomly around his corresponding Alice on the boundary of a circle whose center is the
location of Bob’s corresponding Alice with radius dlink. The noise level is set to 0 dBm.
Unless stated otherwise, the power constraint for each legitimate link is set to Pq = 20
dBm, ∀q, the maximum RxFJ power at each Bob is P ′q = 15 dBm, η = 2.5, τq = −100
dB24, dlink = 10 m, and finally Jacobi algorithm is used in all simulations. Regarding
22The results for this case can be generalized to larger number of links.
23Using a common communication range is a generic assumption in wireless ad hoc networks [125].
24Such SIS factors that reduce self-interference below the noise level were reported in recent practical
implementation of full-duplex radios [29].
188






















P  = 15 dBm
P  = 30 dBm
P  = 50 dBm
Figure 5.2: Probability of having both positive secrecy and the assignment in (5.15) being
the optimal solution for a single-link scenario (Xe= Ye= 0, Nq = 8,Mq = L = 5, Pq =
25 dBm,∀q,Q = 4)
the unknown location for Eve, Bobq assumes that Eve is distributed in a circle around him
with radius r0 = 5 m according to a PPP with λ = 125pi Eve/m
2, q ∈ Q.
For the first numerical result, we set up our system model in the presence of an eaves-
dropper where the PA between TxFJ and information signal for all links is set to φ = 0.5.
We aim to find out if the RxFJ PA scheme in (5.15) is sufficiently close to an optimal
scheme to solve (5.12). To do so, we perform the optimal assignment of RxFJ power
for (5.12) with a simple one-dimensional search method for several channel realizations
and count the times when the solution found from one-dimensional search reduces to the
solution in (5.15). In Figure 5.2, we plot the probability of having both positive secrecy
and the optimal value of RxFJ power for problem (5.12) (found from a one-dimensional
search) being either the maximum or zero according to the scheme in (5.15) for all links.
Such probability shows how frequent the scheme in (5.15) gives us the optimal value of
RxFJ power. It can be seen in Figure 5.2 that this probability is very high even for when
the power budget for RxFJ is high. Also, the size of simulation region has a negligible
effect.
Figure 5.3 (a)-(c) show the number of links that use RxFJ in the network for the two
RxFJ PA schemes derived in (5.15) and (5.23) where in (5.15), cq is set according to
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Figure 5.3: Number of links that use fixed-power RxFJ under full knowledge of E-CSI
(i.e., rule (5.15)) and no knowledge of E-CSI (i.e., rule (5.23)) vs. (a) transmit powers
(P ′q = 15 dBm) (b) RxFJ powers (Pq = 25 dBm) (c) number of links given that per-link
secrecy is guaranteed (Xe= Ye= 0, rcirc = 20 m, Nq = 8,Mq = L = 5,∀q,Q = 4).
(5.26). We assumed that all links use φq = 0.5 as the PA for information and TxFJ signals.
It can be seen from these figures that using the RxFJ PA in (5.23) has a close performance
to (5.15) whenever Alices’ power budgets are high enough (see Figure 5.3(a)) or when
Bobs’ RxFJ power budgets are low enough (see Figure 5.3(b)). Examining cq in (5.26),
one can easily see that low transmit powers would decrease aq and high RxFJ powers
would increase (bq − dq)P ′q. Both of these situations are detrimental to the scheme in
(5.23), as they violate the condition cq > 0 which is a requirement for sufficiency of the
scheme in (5.23) (See Proposition 7 and Remark 1). Using high enough power budgets
at Alices (i.e., Pq, ∀q ∈ Q) and low enough RxFJ powers at Bobs (P ′q, ∀q ∈ Q) for
all links can ensure that cq will remain positive. As it can be seen in Figure 5.3 (c), for
a suitable choice of transmit power and RxFJ power, both conditions stay close to each
other regardless of number of links in the network. Overall, under high enough transmit
power budget and low enough RxFJ power budget, the sufficient condition (5.23) yield a
performance equivalent to (5.15) and sets Aliceq free of having to track the MUI at Bobq
and Eve.
Next, we compare the performance of our proposed methods for PA between TxFJ and
information signals. Specifically, in one method, we use one-dimensional search to find
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the best value of δ in (5.27). In the other method, we use our proposed heuristic method
for finding δ, i.e., δ = 1
2
|dq − bq|P ′q. We compare the resulting secrecy sum-rate of these
two methods in Figure 5.525. It can be seen that the proposed heuristic method has a
very close performance to that of the one-dimensional search, suggesting that we can use
the heuristic method for assigning δ without imposing the relatively larger computational
complexity of the one-dimensional search method.
Figure 5.4 shows the probability of satisfying the uniqueness conditions derived in
(5.33) and (5.38) for a two-link scenario with full knowledge of E-CSI. The vertical axis at
the left of each subfigure indicates the probability of satisfying (5.33), i.e., ρ(A+B) < 1.
Specifically, each point on the curve related to (5.33) (indicated by n1) is the result of
averaging the number of times (5.33) holds over 100 network topologies where in each
topology 500 channel realizations are simulated and averaged. Thus, the probability of
convergence for (5.33) is n1/(100∗500) where n1 denotes the number of times that (5.33)
is satisfied over all network topologies and channel realizations. Let n2 denote the number
of times that condition (5.38) is satisfied given that (5.33) is already satisfied. Hence, the
vertical axis at the right of each subfigure indicates the ratio n2/n1 for which we have
n2/n1 < 1, since n2 counts the times (5.38) is true among the times (5.33) holds.
The horizontal axis in Figure 5.4 indicates the value of Xe. While the value of Ye is
fixed for a subfigure, it is different from one subfigure to another. For the two-link case,
condition (5.33) is highly probable in all scenarios. The practical condition in (5.38), how-
ever, is only good when Eve is relatively far from the network, but as Eve becomes closer
to the network this condition is less efficient. Interestingly, as Eve approaches the origin,
for Ye = 0 in Figure 5.4 (a), the probability of satisfying (5.38) increases. The reason for
such a result is because of the simulation model, which verifies the physical interpretation
































































































Figure 5.4: Probability of convergence vs. eavesdropper’s location for the full E-CSI case:























Figure 5.5: Comparison of secrecy sum-rate between the one-dimensional search method
and the heuristic method for setting δ in (5.27) (Xe= Ye= 0, Nq = 8,Mq = L = 5, Pq =
25 dBm, P ′q = 15 dBm,∀q,Q = 4)
given for (5.38). In fact, the origin is where the distance of all links to Eve is the same
because the simulation model puts all of Alices in the boundary of the simulation region
which is a circle. One can see that when the y-coordinate of Eve changes in Figure 5.4 (b)
and Figure 5.4 (c), the location Xe = 0 becomes more similar to other points inside the
simulation region. We did not however, see this phenomenon for higher number of links,
which is attributed to the fact that the second summation in (5.38) becomes too large with
high number of links, even though it is a constant for when (Xe,Ye) = (0, 0).
Figure 5.6 shows the variation of convergence (i.e., NE uniqueness) probabilities in
robust and full E-CSI methods w.r.t rcirc for the four-link case. The convergence prob-
ability is calculated as number of times the conditions in (5.33) and (5.38) (indicated by
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Robust, n1 (  = 0.9) Robust, n2 (  = 0.9)
Full-ECSI, n1 Full ECSI, n2
Robust, n1 (  = 0.1) Robust, n2 (  = 0.1)
Figure 5.6: Probability of convergence vs. rcirc (Xe= Ye= 5, Nq = 8,Mq = L =
5,∀q,Q = 4).
“full E-CSI, n1” and “full E-CSI, n2”, respectively), and their equivalents for the robust
game (i.e., (5.53) indicated by “Robust, n1” and (5.54) indicated by “Robust, n2”) hold
true divided by the number of channel realizations. It can be seen that for the case of full
E-CSI, probability of uniqueness of NE using (5.38) is very low. However, in the case of
unknown E-CSI, since the nodes are indifferent w.r.t. E-CSI, far less restrictive conditions
than that of full E-CSI scenario can be achieved. In fact, although the distances between
links and Eve become larger as rcirc grows, the uniqueness of NE in the full E-CSI case
still remains unpredictable. On the contrary, in the robust method, by increasing the ra-
dius of simulation region, interference at each Bob becomes weaker. So, as the physical
interpretation mentioned for (5.54) suggested, the NE uniqueness becomes more often.
Moreover, in robust version, as ε becomes larger, the uniqueness conditions become more
restrictive, which is in line with the derivation in (5.53).
Figure 5.7(a)-(c) show the achieved secrecy sum-rate of our proposed power control
(under known/unknown E-CSI) vs. the radius of our simulation region. We also plotted
the secrecy sum-rate of globally optimal solutions of the secrecy sum-rate maximization.
We used Algorithm 1 when the E-CSI is fully known to the legitimate links (indicated by
“Full E-CSI” in Figure 5.7(c)), and used Algorithm 2 when E-CSI is unknown (indicated
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z) Info. rate (MRC at Eve,  = 0.9)
Info. rate (MMSE at Eve,  = 0.9)
Leaked rate (MRC at Eve,  = 0.9)
Leaked rate (MMSE at Eve,  = 0.9)























z) Info. rate (MRC at Eve,  = 0.1)
Info. rate (MMSE at Eve,  = 0.1)
Leaked rate (MRC at Eve,  = 0.1)
Leaked rate (MMSE at Eve,  = 0.1)





















z) Info. rate (MRC at Eve, Full ECSI)
Info. rate (MMSE at Eve, Full ECSI)
Leaked rate (MRC at Eve, Full ECSI)
Leaked rate (MMSE at Eve, Full ECSI)
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z) Robust (MRC at Eve,  = 0.9)
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z) Robust (MRC at Eve,  = 0.1)
Robust (MMSE at Eve,  = 0.1)



















z) Full ECSI (MRC at Eve)
Full ECSI (MMSE at Eve)
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Figure 5.7: (a)-(c): Comparison of secrecy sum-rate, (d)-(e): Comparison of informa-
tion/leaked rate (Xe= Ye= 5, Nq = 8,Mq = L = 5,∀q,Q = 4), (g)-(i) Secrecy sum-rate
vs. transmit power (Xe= Ye= 0, rcirc = 10 m, Nq = 8,Mq = L = 5,∀q,Q = 4)
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by “Robust” in Figure 5.7(a)-(b)). Furthermore, Figure 5.7 (d)-(f) show the resulting
sum of information and leaked rates of our methods vs. the radius of our simulation
region. Figure 5.7(a) and (d) correspond to our robust approach where the probability
of positive secrecy is ε = 0.9, while Figure 5.7(b) and (e) correspond to ε = 0.1, and
Figure 5.7(c) and (f) correspond to the case of full E-CSI. We also have two baseline
schemes in Figure 5.7(a)-(c): the scheme where no RxFJ is used at Bob, and the scheme
where no TxFJ is used at Alices. The maximum amount of iterations for Algorithm 1 and
2 is 50. Each approach is examined under two scenarios: 1) when Eve uses MRC decoder,
and 2) when Eve uses MMSE decoder.
Although our analysis was limited to the case of using MRC decoder at Eve (see
Section II), we still observed the convergence of our algorithm for the case of MMSE
decoder. One reason that we did not analyze the case of MMSE receivers at legitimate
links or Eve is that MMSE receivers add to the complexity of links’ best responses. In
fact, in addition to the TxFJ and RxFJ powers being updated at each iteration of the
game, the MMSE receiver needs to be updated at each iteration of the game as well,
thus increasing the complexity of a link’s actions. In contrast, using the MRC decoder
employed at Eve/Bobs allows us to only focus on TxFJ and RxFJ PA26.
From Figure 5.7(a)-(c), it can be seen that our approaches have less secrecy compared
to globally optimal solutions because the NEs of our proposed game are not necessarily
guaranteed to be globally optimum for the secrecy sum-rate. Both cases of the robust
method have less secrecy sum-rates than that of the full E-CSI method, although the
gap is not large. Furthermore, it can be seen that both no RxFJ and no TxFJ schemes
have significantly less secrecy sum-rates compared to our approaches, which signifies
26Further discussion of the difference in computational complexity between MRC and MMSE receivers
is provided in Appendix C.
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Figure 5.8: Convergence of asynchronous algorithm for different update schemes: (a)
Jacobi, (b) Gauss-Seidel, (c) Random updates.
the importance of FJ. Lastly, in our particular simulation scenario, it seems that using no
TxFJ affects the secrecy sum-rate more than using no RxFJ. Both of these schemes exhibit
worse performance when Eve employs MMSE receiver, which is not shown here due to
space limitations.
According to Figure 5.7 (d)-(e), for a given ε in the robust method, regardless of the
decoder at Eve, the sum of information rates remains the same, which indicates that the
interference management between legitimate links in the robust method is completely
decoupled from Eve characteristics. In other words, in the robust method, the nodes are
indifferent to E-CSI. Moreover, for when ε = 0.9, the leaked rate is significantly reduced
compared to when ε = 0.1 because the probability of achieving positive secrecy is set
to be higher for when ε = 0.9. However, the penalty for achieving positive secrecy
with high probability (in the robust method) is that the nodes have less power remaining
for their information signals and thus cannot manage interference between themselves as
efficiently as in the full E-CSI case or the case where ε = 0.1. We can see that when
rcirc is large (i.e., low SINR at Eve) the performance of MRC and MMSE are very close
to each other. This is in fact expected, as the MMSE receiver at Eve theoretically reduces
to the MRC receiver for low SINR [129]. For smaller rcirc however, there is a gap between
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the performance of MMSE and MRC receivers used at Eve.
Figure 5.7(g)-(i) show that in all approaches secrecy sum-rate grows as Pq increases.
Hence, by using RxFJ and TxFJ, positive secrecy and arbitrary secrecy levels (by changing
the links’ transmit powers) are achievable, thus extending the same property that existed
in the single-user scenario [22]. We also verified such a scaling at the per-link level. Same
as what was discussed in previous figures, the secrecy sum-rate achieved for the full E-
CSI method (Figure 5.7(i)) is larger than that of the robust methods (Figure 5.7(g)-(h)).
Also, comparing Figure 5.7(g) and Figure 5.7(h), we conclude that when ε is chosen to be
too large, the nodes are not able to do an efficient interference management, thus lower
secrecy sum-rate is achieved compared to when ε is small.
Figure 5.8 shows the convergence of Algorithm 2 under different update schemes for
a settings where the NE is unique. All schemes converge to the same point, indicating the
uniqueness of NE. The Jacobi method converges faster due to simultaneous updates for
all users at each iteration. For the random updates in Figure 5.8(c), each link generates a
random integer between 2 and 6 that specifies the number of iterations when its action is
updated after the current one. As expected, asynchronous actions degrade the convergence
speed.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a framework for a wiretap interference network under
which every link can utilize both RxFJ and TxFJ to achieve a positive secrecy rate. Next,
we modeled the interaction between the players as a game and derived sufficient condi-
tions for the uniqueness of the resulting NE. We also proposed an asynchronous algorithm
that can implement the proposed game. Next, we proposed another version of our game
that is robust to when the eavesdropping channels are unknown. We showed in simu-
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lation that our proposed approach for achieving positive secrecy using TxFJ and RxFJ
are efficient enough to be considered as best responses for legitimate links. Moreover,
the performance of robust schemes are close to the one that assumes knowledge of E-
CSI. Lastly, the secrecy sum-rate scales with the power budget at legitimate transmitters,
regardless of the knowledge of E-CSI.
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CHAPTER 6
Linear Precoding in Overloaded Wiretap MU-MIMO
Networks
6.1 Overview
In this chapter, we focus on the application of TxFJ techniques in the downlink of a broad-
cast network1. Alice and Bobs, all have multiple antennas, resulting in a multiuser MIMO
(MU-MIMO) network. MU-MIMO networks have been the subject of numerous studies,
and several standards such as 802.11ac and LTE have been pushed to support this net-
work architecture at least for downlink communications. The use of multiple antennas
in MU-MIMO networks grants the best use of spectral resources by simultaneously ser-
vicing Bobs in downlink/uplink communications. Precoding approaches proposed over
the last two decades have come a long way to approach the capacity of MU-MIMO net-
works. The theoretical precoding method of dirty-paper coding guarantees to achieve the
capacity of these networks [130]. However, complicated and non-linear design procedure
of this method declines the feasibility of implementing it in real-world systems. Instead,
linear precoding schemes, such as the ones based on zero forcing (ZF) andminimum mean
square error (MMSE) [131] criteria, have been extensively used in practical realizations
of MU-MIMO networks. The PHY-layer secrecy of MU-MIMO networks has also been
studied in the literature, and several precoders have been designed to create TxFJ in such
1A broadcast network refers to a network of one Alice and many Bobs, where each Bob receives his
own separate message from Alice.
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networks [9, 132]. We narrow down our focus to an MU-MIMO network where Bobs
are not malicious nodes, i.e., Bobs are not interested in transmissions of their neighbors.
Instead, an external Eve exists in the network. The lower and upper bounds on the secrecy
capacity of such networks were derived in [133]. The authors in [132] introduced TxFJ
techniques for MU-MIMO networks. The study of MU-MIMO networks when massive
number of antennas exist in Alice side was done in [134]. Other interesting problems
related to the secrecy performance of FJ, such as the case where spatial correlation exists
between Alice’s antennas and power allocation between FJ and information signals were
considered in [121,135], respectively.
We are primarily interested in linear precoding design approaches, as non-linear de-
signs are not suitable for practical implementation. In conventional ZF-based methods
for MU-MIMO networks, the number of antennas at Alice must be greater than or equal
to the total number of antennas at Bobs so as to generate interference-free signals on all
Bobs [72]. We refer to this condition as information rate rank constraint (IRRC). The case
where IRRC is met is referred to as the underloaded scenario. If IRRC is violated, the
network is overloaded, and hence the ZF-based and MMSE-based precoder designs are
infeasible. To satisfy IRRC in overloaded networks, scheduling algorithms have been used
to select a subset of Bobs, thus creating an underloaded network. When no information on
Eve’s location is known (hence FJ techniques are typically used), the ZF method requires
the MU-MIMO network to be underloaded to allow for creation of FJ signals [132]. We
refer to this condition as the secrecy rank constraint (SRC).
Antenna selection and scheduling are two different approaches to satisfy either IRRC
or SRC in MU-MIMO networks. In fact, antenna selection decreases the number of data
streams that Bobs can receive by selecting a subset of their antennas, while scheduling
aims to reduce the total number of serviced Bobs without removing any of their anten-
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nas/streams. In an extensive recent study done by Bjo¨rnson et.al [136], it was shown that
in MU-MIMO networks where several multi-antenna Bobs exist, it is more beneficial (in
terms of lowering the bit-error-rate) to decrease the number of streams for each Bob and
service many Bobs than to decrease the number of Bobs (by scheduling). Henceforth, we
focus on schemes where the number of streams are kept low to serve more Bobs.
While antenna selection can force the network to satisfy IRRC and SRC, selecting a
subset of antennas is a difficult integer programming problem [72]. Antenna selection
also requires RF switchers. These components can impose delay on receivers’ operations
if the wireless channels are sufficiently far from being slowly fading channels [137]. RF
switchers also increases the cost of production [138]. Lastly, antenna selection may reduce
the combining capabilities of Bobs. Specifically, when Bobs switch on a few number of
antennas (or RF chains), they cannot increase the diversity as much as when all their
antennas are functioning.
Motivated by these challenges, we propose a new linear precoding scheme for the
downlink of a MU-MIMO network which uses FJ for achieving secrecy but relies on
using a few streams per Bob to function in overloaded settings. To do this, we relax
IRRC conditions, allowing for multi-user interference (MUI) between downlink users.
However, we aim to minimize MUI at each downlink user via a specific precoder design.
Our scheme offers the same complexity as the combination of a ZF-based (or MMSE-
based) precoding with a suboptimal antenna selection algorithm. However, the sum-rate
of our algorithm is the same as that of ZF-based precoding schemes merged with the
optimal antenna selection algorithm.
It turns out that allowing MUI between downlink users not only enables our scheme to
operate in overloaded settings, but also imposes the most stringent condition on the num-
ber of antennas that Eve requires to cancel out the FJ signals. Overall, the contributions
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of this chapter are as follows:
• We propose a linear precoding scheme for the downlink of MU-MIMO networks
that relies on minimizing the interference leakage caused from downlink signals.
Our precoders are different from ZF-based precoders, as we relax the zero interfer-
ence leakage condition to improve on the feasibility conditions of traditional pre-
coders in over/fully loaded MU-MIMO networks.
• We also create FJ signals using the linear precoders that we designed for minimiz-
ing MUI. Compared to traditional methods of FJ, our approach demands the same
complexity but imposes the most stringent condition on the number of antennas
that Eve requires to cancel out FJ signals. Using simulations, we show that the free-
dom in choosing rank of our precoding matrices enables us to establish a trade-off
between secrecy, reliability and sum rate of the network.
Notation
Boldface uppercase/lowercase letters denote matrices/vectors. A(:,a:b) and A(a:b,:), respec-
tively denote matrices comprised of columns a to b of A and rows a to b of A. I and 0
denote the identity matrix and the zero matrix (i.e., matrix with zero entries) of appro-
priate sizes. E[•], •†, Tr(•) are respectively, the expected value, conjugate transpose, and
trace operators. Lastly, C is the set of complex numbers.
General System Model
Consider a network where Alice hasM antennas and communicates withQ Bobs,Q ≥ 2.
Let Q = {1, 2, . . . , Q}. Bobq has Nq < M antennas, q ∈ Q. Without loss of generality,
assume that all Bobs have the same number of antennas, i.e., Nq = N < M, ∀q ∈ Q.
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An external Eve with L antennas also exists in the range of communications2. The setting
whereM = NQ is referred to as the fully-loaded scenario. WhenM < NQ, the network
is overloaded, and when M > NQ the network is underloaded. Bobq, q ∈ Q, receives
Kq independent streams from Alice, where Kq ≤ N . Without loss of generality, assume
that Kq = K, ∀q ∈ Q. The number of streams determines how the antennas at Alice
and Bobs are exploited. For example, K = N indicates that the signals intended for
Bobs have the maximum number of streams, thus the antennas are used to provide spatial
multiplexing. In contrast, K = 1 signifies that the combining features of Bobs are used
to increase the diversity (thus reliability) of transmissions.
6.2 Conventional Precoder Design
To better understand our method, we first explain the ZF method used in designing the
precoding matrices. The received signal at Bobq, q ∈ Q, can be expressed as
yq = Hq(u + f) + n (6.1)
where yq ∈ CN ,Hq ∈ CN×M is the complex channel between Alice and Bobq, u ∈ CM is
the signal containing information from Alice, f ∈ CM is the FJ signal, and n ∈ CN is the
AWGNwhich has i.i.d. zero-mean-circularly-symmetric-complex Gaussian- (ZMCSCG-)








2A single Eve with L antennas can also represent several multi-antenna colluding Eves.
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where uq ∈ CM is the signal intended for Bobq. Tq is the precoder that is responsible for
cancelling the MUI generated from uq. sq ∈ CK is theK-dimensional information signal
(K streams of data) intended for Bobq.
Assume that E[sqs†q] = φPq/KI, where Pq is the power of Alice allocated to Bobq’s
signal and φ is the portion of Alice’s total power allocated to all information signals. Let
P ,
∑Q
q=1 Pq, where P is the Alice’s total power. Alice allocates φP of her total power
to all information signals. The rest of the power (i.e., (1− φ)P ) goes to the FJ signal.
We assume that Alice knows allHi, ∀i ∈ Q, and Bobq only knowsHq. In the channel
estimation phase, Alice sends pilot signals to Bobs, so that Bobq can estimate Hq and
feed it back to Alice. Substituting (6.2) in (6.1), the effective channel that Bobq sees from
Alice would be HqTq. Hence, Alice can apply another precoder for each Bob to optimize
her transmissions. Specifically, assume that Tq ∈ CM×τ , K < τ ≤ N . Then, Alice can







Bobq also applies a linear combiner to estimate the transmitted information signal. In
particular, Bobq applies Dq ∈ CK×N to have the following estimate of sq:










Let HqTq = UqΣqV†q be the singular-value decomposition (SVD) of HqTq, where Uq
and Vq are the unitary matrices of left and right singular vectors, and Σq is the matrix of





optimal precoder/combiner duo to estimate sq at Bobq can be established [132].
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We now focus on the design of Tq and f. The ZF method is based on nullifying both
the FJ signal and MUI on unintended Bobs. Formally, the following conditions must be
satisfied:
HrTq = 0, r 6= q, ∀r, q ∈ Q (6.5a)
Hqf = 0, ∀q ∈ Q (6.5b)
The precoder Tq can be determined as follows. Define H¯q ,




q+1, . . . ,H
†
Q]
† ∈ CN(Q−1)×M , and let H¯q = LqJqRq be the SVD
of H¯q, where Lq and Rq denote the matrices of left and right singular vectors, and
Jq denotes the matrix of singular values. Provided that M > N(Q − 1), H¯q has a
non-trivial null-space, which can be exploited to meet condition (6.5a). Specifically, if
M > N(Q − 1), Alice sets Tq = R(:,B:B+τ)q ∈ CM×τ , where B = N(Q − 1) + 1, to
satisfy (6.5a) for all q ∈ Q. The condition
M ≥ N(Q− 1) + τ (6.6)
constitutes the IRRC in the downlink of the ZF method. The FJ signal mentioned in (6.1)
has the following structure in the ZF method. Define H˜ , [H†1, . . . ,H†Q]† ∈ CNQ×M . Let
H˜ = LJR be the SVD of H˜, where L and R denote the matrices of left and right singular
vectors, and J denotes the matrix of singular values. To satisfy (6.5b), H˜ must have a
non-trivial null-space, which requiresM > NQ. Hence, the inequalityM > NQ is the
SRC for the ZF method. We choose τ = N , as IRRC in (6.6) is dominated by SRC. The
FJ signal is expressed as f = Zv, where Z is the associated precoder for FJ, which spans
the null space of H˜, and v is the vector of artificial noise that has the same characteristics
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of AWGN except that Tr[vv†] = (1 − φ)P . If SRC is violated, the creation of FJ signal
becomes infeasible.
6.3 Proposed Signaling Scheme
In this section, we introduce our proposed signaling scheme. Although the precoding
design in this section is not much different from previous section, the signaling scheme
that we propose here will play an important role in the design of our precoders in the
next section. We first modify the signal model at Bobs and Eve in (6.3) and (6.12).
Specifically, the received signal at Bobq, q ∈ Q can be expressed as
yq = Hqu
′ + n (6.7)










where u′q is the signal intended for Bobq, q ∈ Q, and f′q is the FJ signal designed to
protect Alice’s transmissions that are intended for Bobq. In fact, compared to (6.1), the
main change in the signal model is the decomposition of the FJ signal (i.e., convert f to
f′q, q ∈ Q) in a way that each FJ signal exclusively protects the transmissions intended for
one Bob.






















qv′q. The precoder T
′
q is responsible for cancelling MUI
and FJ on unintended Bobs,W′q is the precoder to boost signal strength on Bobq (same as
Wq in previous section), Z′q is the precoder for the FJ signal that protects Bobq, and v′q is
the vector of artificial noise. As before, sq is theK-stream information signal intended for
Bobq. Because precoder T′q is applied to both information and FJ signals (compare (6.9)
and (6.2)), we are ensured that FJ will have no effect on unintended Bobs. As in (6.4),
a linear receiver D′q is applied at Bobq to recover sq. Using (6.7) and (6.9), Bobq has the
following estimate of sq
















The conditions for completely nullifying the MUI and FJ signals for the signal model in
this section are as follows:












q would be the same as those ofTq,Wq andDq in the previous
section. Therefore, the IRRC of our method is the same as that of conventional ZF. All
FJ signals are removed by a combination of (6.11a) and (6.11b). Notice that (6.11b) is
different from (6.5b) in that Z′q in (6.11b) is designed so that only v′q is nullified at Bobq
with the help ofD′q. The rest of FJ signals (i.e., v′r, r 6= q) are removed by T′q that satisfies
(6.11a). Therefore, the SRC of our method is determined by the condition that is the most
dominant in (6.9). Due to keeping the same design of the conventional ZF method for T′q,
the SRC is the same as IRRC in our method, i.e.,M ≥ NQ given that τ = N (see (6.6)).
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Because we use a different procedure to nullify the FJ signal, the design of Z′q is










q are the unitary matrices of left and




(:,1:K), D′q = U
′
q
(:,1:K)† (same as previous section), and Z′q = V
(:,K+1:τ)
q , then
(6.11b) is also satisfied (compare with the design of Z).
6.3.1 Security Analysis of Proposed Method
The received signal at Eve can be expressed as









where G ∈ CL×M is the channel between Alice and Eve, and e has the same charac-
teristics as n in (6.1). Eve has to first combat the MUI to be able to wiretap ongoing
communications. Eve does so by applying a linear combiner. For example, to eavesdrop
on signals intended for Bobq, Eve first applies A′q on the signal she receives. Define
zq , A′qz. Upon cancelling MUI with A′q, Eve applies B′q on zq to estimate sq. In other
words, Eve’s estimation from sq is s˜q = B′qzq. We assume the worst-case scenario where
Eve knows G. For instance, Eve can use the pilot signals sent from Alice in the channel
estimation phase to estimate G. Moreover, because Bobs have to explicitly feed back the
channel estimates to Alice, Eve can snoop on the channel estimation feedback from Bobs
to gain knowledge of all Hq, ∀q ∈ Q. Note, however, that neither Alice nor Bobs have
any knowledge of G, i.e., Eve is a passive eavesdropper.
We now describe how Eve chooses her combiners to decode Alice’s transmissions.
We also show how many antennas Eve requires to decode all messages. Using (6.12),
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zq = A′qz, and the linear estimate s˜q = B
′





















r) = 0, r 6= q, ∀r, q ∈ Q (6.14a)
A′qG f
′
q = 0, ∀q ∈ Q (6.14b)
Using (6.8), (6.9) and (6.13), Eve first constructs the following blocked matrix
G′q = [Ω
′









where Ω′q = GT
′
q ∈ CL×τ and Γ′q = GT′qZ′q ∈ CL×τ−K . Eve sets A′q to be the last K
columns of the matrix of left singular values of G′q. For such a choice of A
′
q that allows
Eve to cancel MUI and FJ, the minimum value of L is derived by counting the column of
G′q, i.e.,
Ψ′ = τ(Q− 1) + (τ −K) +K = τQ (6.16)
Setting τ = N , we have Ψ′ = NQ. The first term in the right hand side (RHS) of (6.16) is
the number of antennas that Ωr, r 6= q, r ∈ Q occupies in establishing G′q in (6.15). The
second term in (6.16) is the number of antennas that Γ′q occupies in (6.15). Finally, the
third term is the number of antennas that are required to recover sq after nullifying MUI
and FJ. The same security analysis can be done for the ZF method, and it can be shown
that if Alice uses the conventional ZF method, Eve requires at least Ψ = M − (N −K)Q
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antennas.
6.3.2 Comparison Between Conventional ZF Method and Proposed Method
We now compare required the number of Eve’s antennas for both the ZF and the proposed
method to decode all messages in an underloaded scenario, i.e., we compare Ψ and Ψ′
whenM > NQ. Consider the conditions when Ψ > Ψ′, i.e.,M − (N −K)Q > NQ. In
other words, we examine when the ZF method is better than our approach. Clearly such a
comparison depends on K, which is analyzed as follows:
• ForK = N , we end up withM > NQ, which is always true in the underloaded sce-
nario, so in the case of using all streams (i.e., spatial multiplexing), the ZF method
imposes a more stringent condition than our method.
• ForK < N , the simplified inequality is 2N −K < M
Q
. By lowering the number of
streams (K), it can be deduced that the ZF method imposes more antennas on Eve
than our method only when the network is sufficiently underloaded. To clarify, take
the extreme example of K = 1; In this case, M − (N − K)Q > NQ is reduced
to M > (2N − 1)Q which is more demanding than an underloaded network (i.e.,
M > NQ) with N > 1.
Overall, when a few streams are selected for each Bob, the ZF method does not impose
more antennas on Eve than our proposed method unless the network is sufficiently under-
loaded. Normally, a sufficiently underloaded is not preferred, as the MU-MIMO network
would not be fully utilized.
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6.3.3 Antenna Selection for Zero-Forcing Precoding
To compensate for the absence of FJ in over/fully loaded scenarios, antenna selection
algorithms can be used to decrease the number of functioning receive antennas at Bobs
fromN toN ′, so that SRC can be satisfied, i.e.,M > N ′Q. We mainly focus on capacity-
based antenna selection algorithms, but our analysis can be simply extended to other types
of antenna selection algorithms. We introduce antenna selection for when the the network
is over/fully loaded, i.e., the number of Bobs is large enough thatM ≤ NQ.
The capacity of the channel between Alice and Bobq, q ∈ Q can be expressed as3
Cq = log det(I + φPqHqH†q) (6.17)
Using antenna selection, we are interested in switching on only K ≤ N ′ < N antennas
of Bobq such that M > N ′Q. Denote H¯q as a matrix comprised of N ′ columns of Hq.
Denote S(Hq) as the the set of matrices that are formed using N ′ rows of Hq. Therefore,
the problem of antenna selection can be formulated as
H¯∗q = arg max
S(Hq)
(





where H¯∗q ∈ CN ′×M . The optimal antenna selection is a difficult integer programming
problem, thus suboptimal algorithms such as [139] can be used which are based on max-
imizing the upper bounds of the capacity. After performing the antenna selection at each
Bob, the SRC is expected to be met (i.e., M > N ′Q), which allows for creation of FJ.
Hence, by replacing N with N ′, we can deduce that the number of antennas required
3Note that such a capacity can be achieved with dirty-paper coding scheme, which is a non-linear pre-
coding method [130].
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at Eve to cancel out FJ and MUI in the ZF method with antenna selection would be
M − (N ′ −K)4.
6.4 Proposed Precoding Method
The current precoder design for T′q in our proposed signaling scheme has two issues.
First, the IRRC condition is still the same as that of the conventional ZF method, which
prohibits our signaling scheme from operating in overloaded scenarios. Second, after
implementation of these precoders, although forK < N our signaling scheme can impose
more antennas on Eve to decode the ongoing messages –by adding more columns to
matrix G′q in (6.13), see Section 6.3.2–, it turns out that the rank of G
′
q does not increase
with the added columns. Therefore, Eve can still decode the signals with fewer antennas
than what our proposed signaling scheme claims. In this section, we modify the design of
T′q to resolve these issues.
To do so, we relax condition (6.11a) in a way that MUI created from sq inflicts the
least amount of damage on the reception of other Bobs. Formally, we design the precoder
T′q, q ∈ Q using an optimization problem that is detailed later on. Before presenting this
optimization problem, we formulate the ZFmethod as a variant of a family of optimization








†T′q = I (6.19)
where || • ||F is the Frobenius norm. In problem (6.19) the precoder for Bobq must be de-
4Clearly, antenna selection can also be performed in situations where IRRC is also violated. However,
for the sake of brevity, we only apply antenna selection to satisfy SRC.
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signed in a way that the interference generated from sq (i.e., denominator of the objective
in (6.19)) is minimized while the strength of sq at Bobq (i.e., the numerator of the objec-
tive) is maximized. The constraint on T′q causes the productHqT
′
q to have the same statis-
tical properties of Hq. Problem (6.19) is identified as a Rayleigh quotient problem [140].
It is easy to see that when N0 << φPq (i.e., high SNR scenario), the solution to (6.19)
reduces to the ZF method from the previous section because the maximum objective value
would be achieved if the denominator goes to zero, which is in line with condition (6.5a)
or (6.11a). In moderate SNRs, the solution to (6.19) reduces to MMSE-based precoding
methods [141]. Also notice that problem (6.19) does not impose any rank constraint on
its solution. We now examine (6.11a) again. This condition imposes the result ofHqT′q to
have entries with the minimum possible value. We decompose (6.11a) as follows:
HrT′q
(:,n)
= 0, r 6= q, ∀r, q ∈ Q & ∀n (6.20)
where T′q
(:,n) is the nth column of T′q. In fact (6.20) suggests the same condition in
(6.11a) but is represented on a column-by-column basis. Also notice that since we have
not explicitly designed T′q yet, we do not impose any constraints on its rank, thus no
information is yet available on the values that n in (6.20) can take. For now, assume that
n ∈ {1, . . . , τ} where K ≤ τ ≤ N . Instead of (6.19), we propose our precoding method













, n ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. (6.21)
Problem (6.21) is still a Rayleigh quotient problem, but the difference with (6.19) is that
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in (6.21) we find the solution on a column-by-column basis. The constraint in (6.21)
ensures that the resulting precoder does not violate the power constraint. In fact, because















where ∆ is the matrix of generalized eigenvectors corresponding to τ non-zero general-












where eigmax,τ is the operator for extracting τ generalized eigenvector that correspond
to τ non-zero generalized eigenvalues. From the properties of generalized eigenvalue
problems, it can be deduced that there are N eigenvectors that correspond to non-zero
generalized eigenvalues in (6.23) [142]. Hence, ∆ ∈ CM×τ .
Solving problem (6.21) allows us to relax the condition in (6.11a). Interestingly, there
is no guarantee on the solution of (6.21) to satisfy the constraint of (6.19), which makes
(6.19) and (6.21) to be essentially not equivalent to each other. Even in high SNR scenario,
there is no guarantee on the equivalence of the solutions of (6.19) and (6.21). In fact, that
the resulting precoders of (6.21) are do not necessarily have diagonal covariance matrices
to satisfy the constraint in (6.19). However, the constraint in (6.21) ensures that T′q
∗ does
not violate the power constraint at Alice. Specifically, in T′q
∗†T′q


















∗||F ≤ 1 is guaranteed, ensuring that our proposed precoding





] ≤ φPq/KI5. In
summary, our proposed method in (6.21) relaxes the general shape of the ZF-based and
MMSE-based precoders that are known from problem (6.19), such that the MUI is still
minimized as much as possible.
In case of an underloaded network (i.e., M > NQ), we set τ = N (i.e., same as
Section 6 and 6). In case of over/fully loaded networks (i.e.,M ≤ NQ), we set τ = dM
Q
e,
where d•e is the ceiling function to handle the case of non-integer values of τ . Notice
that in an overloaded scenario, we do not decrease Q via scheduling. Instead, we have the
freedom in choosing τ and still keeping all users in the network. Using the fact that K <
τ ≤ N , we can also determine the value of K. After designing T′q and determining K,




q) can be designed as
in Section 6. Hence, all terms in (6.9) and (6.10) are defined, and our proposed precoding
method is complete.
The security analysis of our method in underloaded scenarios was already done in
Section 6.3.2, where we showed Eve requires Ψ′ = τQ antennas to decode all mes-
sages. In the case of overloaded network as mentioned before, we choose τ = dM
Q
e.
Hence, Ψ′ = max{τQ,M} which is the most stringent condition on Eve’s number of
antennas. The conventional ZF method is not able to generate the FJ signal in an over-
loaded network because condition (6.5b) cannot be satisfied. Hence, it can be shown
that Eve only requires Ψ = KQ antennas to decode all messages in ZF method. As
KQ < max{τQ,M}, then our method always performs better than the conventional ZF
scheme in overloaded networks.









































































Figure 6.1: Comparison of (a) SER (Underloaded) (b) SER (Overloaded) (c) achieved
SINR (Underloaded) (d) achievable rate (Underloaded) (e) achieved SINR (Overloaded)
(f) Eve’s SER (Overloaded)
Notice that our proposed precoder design for T′q in this section can also be used in the
conventional ZF method to design Tq for overloaded scenarios and relax condition (6.5a).
However, there will be no increase in the number of Eve’s antennas required to decode
Alice’s messages because the design of FJ in the conventional ZF method is decoupled
from the design of Tq.
Overall, the combination of our signaling scheme in Section 6 and the precoder design
in Section 6.3.3 not only handles the overloaded scenarios (without scheduling), but also
increases the rank of G′q in (6.13), which leads to increase in the number of antennas that
Eve requires to decode all messages.
Although our method and the optimal antenna selection perform equally, we already
mentioned that antenna selection methods are prone to many issues which are mainly
to do with requiring RF switchers. However, our approach does not require these con-
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siderations. In terms of computational complexity of our method and antenna selection,
our method is dominated by the computation of generalized eigenvalues and several SVD
calculations. The complexity of antenna selection methods are also dominated by the
calculation of SVD and solving the optimization in (6.18). Our derivations –which are
skipped here for the sake of brevity– show that both methods demand the same amount of
computational complexity.
6.5 Numerical Results
We verify our theoretical analyses via simulations. All simulations are done for a
network of Q = 2 Bobs. Similar conclusions can be drawn for networks with more Bobs
and more antennas at Alice. Our proposed method in these simulations is the combination
of the methods in Section 6 and Section 6.3.3, while the simulated ZF method is the
scheme that we discussed in Section 6. In our proposed method, the power allocated to
Bob’s message is divided equally between its associated information and FJ signals. Same
is done for the ZF method. We use uncoded QPSK modulation for all simulations. For
simulation that show SINR and achievable rate, we use Gaussian codebooks. The triplet
(M,N,K) in all simulations denote number of Alice/Bob antennas and number of data
streams.
Figure 6.1 (a) shows the symbol error rate (SER) of the Alice-Bob channels, averaged
across all Bobs for an underloaded scenario. It can be seen that our proposed method
outperforms the ZF method for both settings because our precoders are more flexible. In
fact, although the precoders designed by the ZF method completely suppress MUI, they
also do not contribute to the strength of the signal to the intended user.
Figure 6.1 (b) shows the SER for an overloaded scenario. It can be seen that our
method’s performance is close to that of antenna selection (AS) schemes. However, as
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mentioned earlier, our method does not have the problems of AS schemes (see Section 6
for our thorough explanation about AS schemes).
Figure 6.1 (c) shows the CDF of the achieved SINR in an underloaded scenario. Our
method achieves higher SINR compared to the ZF method. This in fact decreases the SER
of our scheme as shown in Figure 6.1 (a).
Figure 6.1 (d) shows the CDF of achievable information rate. As can be seen, our
method also achieves a higher rate. Therefore, our method achieves a better tradeoff
between diversity (i.e., SINR in Figure 6.1 (b) and multiplexing (i.e., achievable rate in
Figure 6.1 (c). Moreover, in both Figs 2 and 3, it can be seen that using a higher number
of streams results in a lower SINR but higher achievable rate, and vice versa, signifying
that a lower number of streams exploits the diversity of multiple antennas.
Figure 6.1 (e) shows the SINR of our method in an overloaded scenario. It can be seen
that our method performs better than AS schemes because in AS, by switching off dM
Q
e
antennas, the combining capabilities of Bobs decreases, but our method does not require
to turn off RF chains at Bobs. However, this achieved SINR does not result in a better
BER as seen in Figure 6.1 (b). Similar results can be established for the achievable rate
of our method and AS in overloaded networks.
Figure 6.1 (f) shows the SER of Eve in an overloaded scenario when L = 6. Both
(7, 4, 3) and (7, 4, 2) settings represent overloaded scenarios. In both settings, we set
τ = 4. Clearly, no FJ can be created in these settings using the ZF method. It can be
seen that our method performs significantly better than the ZF scheme in both overloaded
settings because our method forces Eve to have at least Ψ′ = max{τQ,M} antennas
to decode all messages. However, the ZF method only imposes Ψ = KQ antennas in
overloaded scenarios. In both of these settings, L = 6 antennas would be enough to
decode all messages in the ZF design. It can be seen that the setting (7, 4, 3) experiences
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more SER because more data streams are used per user, which decrease the diversity gain.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a novel precoding scheme that not only manages the
interference in MU-MIMO networks better than the zero-forcing method, but also enables
the nodes to operate in overloaded settings. Compared to the ZF method, our scheme
is able to impose more stringent conditions on Eve’s number of antennas in overloaded
scenarios. Our method also did not require the hardware modifications that some other
methods, such as antenna selection schemes, demand in overloaded networks. Analysis of
this scheme in massive MIMO networks, or with limited feedback from downlink users,
or with in-band full-duplex capability in nodes are the subject of future research.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we proposed to advance the state-of-art in PHY-layer wireless security
in multi-user, multi-link scenarios, including MU-MIMO and P2P networks. We consid-
ered that external eavesdropper(s) snoop on ongoing communications in such networks.
Our security techniques were all based on creation of an intentional artificial interference
known as friendly jamming (FJ) at each legitimate node to accompany its secret message,
such that eavesdroppers’ reception quality are degraded but the intended legitimate re-
ceiver’s signal quality is intact. In designing such techniques, a significant challenge was
how to prevent friendly jamming signals from interfering with multiple unintended but le-
gitimate ongoing receptions. Overall, we showed that careful management of multi-user
interference between legitimate inks can improve secrecy in the network, as interference
can be used to jam potential eavesdroppers once it is avoided from being captured on
legitimate nodes.
First, we designed a game theoretic secure precoder optimization for a MIMO interfer-
ence network with several MIMO-enabled eavesdroppers. We proposed three algorithms
to increase secrecy sum-rate. In the first algorithm, the links myopically optimize their
transmission until a quasi-Nash equilibrium (QNE) is reached. Because of the inferior per-
formance of first algorithm in case of multiple QNEs, we designed the second algorithm
based on the concept of variational inequality. The second algorithm enables us to analyt-
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ically derive convergence conditions, but achieves the same secrecy sum-rate as the first
algorithm. To increase the secrecy sum-rate, we proposed the third algorithm in which the
links can select the best QNE according to a certain design criterion. Simulations showed
that not every criterion is good for the performance improvement. Specifically, reducing
co-channel interference is a better criterion compared to explicitly increasing interference
at the eavesdroppers to improve secrecy sum-rate.
Second, we studied distributed design of FJ control in a MIMO wiretap interference
network using practical precoders. Our study was conducted under various eavesdropping
capabilities, e.g., size of antenna array at Eve, as well as her receive-based beamforming
capabilities. Compared to the precoder optimization in our first contribution, our methods
in the second contribution enjoyed a variety of improvements, such as more robustness to
Eve’s capabilities (i.e., disabling powerful decoders at Eve), low control signaling over-
head, etc. We then showed that greedy FJ is not an optimal approach in terms of total
network secrecy rate. Accordingly, we designed a price-based FJ control that guarantees
a local optimum point in maximizing the secrecy sum-rate. Through simulations, we ob-
served a noticeable improvement in the secrecy sum-rate when pricing is leveraged for
FJ control. We then introduced uncertainty in the eavesdropping channel and designed
a robust method. We showed via simulations that the robust method achieves a higher
secrecy sum-rate than the greedy FJ approach. Some of the proposed designs were also
implemented on software-defined radios to assess their performances in real-world sce-
narios.
Third, we proposed a game-theoretic approach for power control in an interference
network tapped by an external eavesdropper. In addition to transmit-based FJ (TxFJ), in
this design every link can utilize receiver-based FJ (RxFJ) as well. We then modeled the
interaction between the players as a game and derived sufficient conditions for the unique-
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ness of the resulting Nash equilibrium (NE). Compared to previous designs, our design
allowed us to implement an asynchronous algorithm, hence making our design robust to
transmission delays in the network. Next, we proposed another version of our game that
is robust to when the eavesdropping channels are unknown. Compared to the second con-
tribution, in here we were able to conduct the analysis for more than two links. We also
analytically derived each link’s optimal strategy using only knowledge of distribution of
eavesdropping channel components, while in the previous contribution, we only showed
the performance of our method using simulations. Lastly, the secrecy sum-rate scales with
the power budget at legitimate transmitters, regardless of the knowledge of eavesdropping
channels, thus extending the same property from single-link scenarios.
Fourth, we considered the downlink of a MU-MIMO network in the presence of an
external eavesdropper. No knowledge of eavesdropper’s location was assumed at the ac-
cess point. The information signals for downlink users were accompanied by TxFJ. The
network was studied in underloaded and overloaded conditions. We proposed a novel
precoding scheme fro the downlink of MU-MIMO networks that not only manages the
interference in MU-MIMO networks better than conventional precoding methods (e.g.,
zero-forcing), but also enables the nodes to operate in overloaded settings. Apart from bet-
ter utilization of resources, in terms of PHY-layer secrecy Compared to the zero-forcing
(ZF) method, our scheme was shown to be able to impose more stringent conditions on
eavesdropper’s number of antennas in overloaded scenarios. All of these improvements
were made possible by allowing interference in the system. In fact, conditioned on the fact
that interference for legitimate downlink users are minimized, the secrecy of the system
was shown to be increased when facing an eavesdropper with high number of antennas.
In contrast, the ZF method explicitly removes interference on legitimate links. Such a
constraint leads to precoders that cannot neither operate in overloaded settings nor deal
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with an eavesdropper with large number of antenna arrays.
7.2 Future Work
There exist multiple directions for future research. In the following, we list several of
them.
• Analysis under finite block length coding and/or finite alphabet inputs:
Throughout this dissertation, we used secrecy rate equations that are achievable
via Gaussian codebooks. Such a choice enabled us to have tractable mathematical
optimization problems for complete analysis of interference networks. Hence, we
were able to take the first steps in developing methods for interference exploitation.
However, the next step would be to extend these analyses to both finite block length
coding schemes and finite alphabet inputs. The analysis under finite block length
regime can be beneficial for links with bursty transmissions. In such cases, even
the M-QAM approximation of Gaussian codebook’s rate (see Chapter 1) may not
be justifiable.
Regarding the analysis under finite alphabet input, most works so far considered
codebooks with fixed rates (see [12] and references therein). In such a situation,
the analysis of secrecy must be conducted over many codebooks to ensure a good
tradeoff point between leakage and information rate. Even if this issue can be han-
dled, the achievable secrecy rates do not have close-form expressions, which can
complicate the analysis under multi-link scenarios. Therefore, more research is
needed on developing methods for tackling such secrecy rates and integrating them
into the schemes developed in this dissertation.
• Achieving asynchronous and distributed precoder design: In our first contri-
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bution for precoder optimization, it was assumed that at each round of the game,
“all”of the players are maximizing the utilities. The feasibility of implementing the
algorithms using asynchronous update fashions can be a subject of future research.
• Assessment of vulnerability zone: A critical hypothesis in this dissertation was
the dependence between the Alice-Bob CSI and Alice-Eve CSI when Eve is in
the proximity of Bob. Such dependence gives rise to a vulnerability zone, within
which the nullified FJ at Bob will also extend to Eve. As shown in our preliminary
experiments, such dependence was not observed in a Rayleigh fading environment
but observed over a Rician channel (with line-of-sight component). This is yet to
be verified experimentally.
• RxFJ and dynamic range issues: We assumed that FD receivers are not experi-
encing dynamic range issues that cause the additive noise at the receive chain to be
dependent on the transmit power of the FD device. Relaxing this assumption is a
subject for future research to show the trade off in terms of achieved secrecy with
RxFJ while approaching dynamic range limits of the receiving device.
• Implement a highly capable eavesdropping attack: Theoretically, it is known
that such a capable Eve can combat FJ by nullifying its effect. It would be interest-
ing experimentally implement such scenario to verify the extent of this theoretical
result.
• MU-MIMO with large number of antennas and FD-capable downlink users:
Analysis of the secure linear precoding in MU-MIMO settings can be extended to
massive MIMO networks as well. In addition, considering limited feedback from
downlink users, or in-band full-duplex capability in nodes are also interesting sub-
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ject of future research.
• PHY-layer security in multi-cell networks: An interesting extension to the current
designs in this dissertation would be to design precoders or perform power control
for cell-edge users that are being eavesdropped in a multi-cell network. In a sense,
such a scenario includes both MU-MIMO and interference networks discussed in




Proofs of Chapter 3
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let (Σ∗q,W
∗
q, {S∗q,k}Kk=0) denote the limit point of AO iterations found in Line 10 of Al-
gorithm 1 for the qth link, q ∈ Q. As mentioned earlier, problem (3.15) is convex w.r.t






T ]T , Zq = [Σq
T ,WqT ]T , (A.1a)
∇Zq f¯q(Σ∗q ,W∗q , {S∗q,k}Kk=0) =
[−(∇Σq f¯q)T ,−(∇Wq f¯q)T ]T , (A.1b)〈
Zq −Xq,∇Zq f¯q(Σ∗q ,W∗q , {S∗q,k}Kk=0)
〉 ≥ 0, ∀(Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq, (A.1c)〈
Sq,k − S∗q,k,∇Sq,k f¯q(Σ∗q ,W∗q , {S∗q,k}Kk=0)
〉 ≥ 0, ∀Sq,k  0, ∀k ∈ K. (A.1d)
It should be noted that for a given (Σ∗q,W
∗
q), the value of {S∗q,k}Kk=0 are uniquely de-






) is differentiable w.r.t (Σq,Wq), and inequality (A.1c) holds2.
Moreover, it can be verified that





) = ∇ΣqR¯s,q(Σ∗q ,Wq∗), (A.2)





) = ∇WqR¯s,q(Σ∗q ,Wq∗) (A.3)
1AO iterations converge to a stationary point of (3.15) [26, Section IV-B], [102, Corollary 2].
2Similar reasoning for f¯q(Σ∗q ,W
∗
q ,Sq,k) can be used to justify the inequality in (A.1d).
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s.t. Zq ∈ Fq. (A.5)
Hence, (Σ∗q,W
∗
q) must satisfy the K.K.T conditions of (A.5), which can be written as
∇ΣqR¯s,q(Σ∗q ,W∗q)− ζqI + Ξq,1 = 0 (A.6a)
∇WqR¯s,q(Σ∗q ,W∗q)− ζqI + Ξq,2 = 0 (A.6b)
ζq(Tr(Σ∗q + W
∗
q)− Pq) = 0,Σ∗qΞq,1 = 0,W∗qΞq,2 = 0 (A.6c)
ζq ≥ 0,Ξq,1  0,Ξq,2  0. (A.6d)
where ζq, Ξq,1, and Ξq,2 are Lagrange multipliers. Therefore, the stationary point of AO
iterations satisfies the K.K.T conditions of (3.13).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4
To prove the existence of the QNE, we use the following theorem:
Theorem 11. [84, Corollary 2.2.5] For a mapping F : Q → RN that is continuous on
the compact and convex set Q ⊆ RN , the solution set for V I(F,Q) is non-empty and
compact.
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The objective in (3.15) is continuously differentiable on its domain, making FR con-
tinuous. Furthermore, the setK is a compact convex set because it is the Cartesian product
of compact convex sets (i.e., players’ strategy sets). Hence, KR, the real-vector version of
K, is a convex set. Due to the presence of power constraints, the strategy set of each player
is compact, then the set KR is also compact. Thus, according to Theorem 11, the solution
set to the VI in (3.40) is non-empty, meaning that the QNE in the proposed smooth game
exists.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5
We first introduce following definition:
Definition 4. [91, Definition 26] Considering the complex VI in (3.25), with FC(Z) :
K → CN ′×N , K ⊆ CN ′×N being a continuously R−differentiable function and K being
a convex set that has a non-empty interior. The augmented Jacobian matrix for FC(Z),









∂ vec(Z)T is a N








Using this definition, the following proposition holds for V I(FC,K).
Proposition 8. [91, Proposition 27] For the V I(FC,K) defined in Definition 1, it holds
that:
3For the case of K having a possibly empty interior, the equivalent condition in [91, Proposition 28] can
be used.
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• FC is monotone on K if and only if JFC(Z) is Augmented Positive Semi-Definite
(APSD) on K. That is, for all Y ∈ CN ′×N and Z ∈ K,
[vec(Y ∗)T , vec(Y )T ]JFC(Z)[vec(Y )T , vec(Y ∗)T ]T ≥ 0 (A.8)
Therefore, V I(FC,K) is called a monotone VI and has a (possibly empty) convex
solution set.
• If JFC(Z) is Augmented Positive Definite (APD) onK, then FC is strictly monotone
on K. JFC(Z) is APD if the inequality in (A.8) is strict. Hence, V I(F,Q) is a
strictly monotone VI and has at most one solution (if there exists any).
• FC is strongly monotone on K with constant cs > 0 if and only if JFC(Z) is
uniformly APD on K with constant cs/2. That is, for all Y ∈ CN ′×N and Z ∈ K,
there exists a constant cs such that
[vec(Y ∗)T , vec(Y )T ]JFC(Z)[vec(Y )T , vec(Y ∗)T ]T ≥ cs||Y ||2F (A.9)
where ||.||F is the Frobenius norm. Hence, V I(F,Q) is a strongly monotone VI and
has a unique solution.
We write the augmented Jacobian matrix for FC(Σ,W) according to (A.7). Let
DZF

























 DΣl(−∇Σq f¯q) DWl(−∇Σq f¯q)
DΣl(−∇Wq f¯q) DWl(−∇Wq f¯q)
 , (A.11)
and DZ∗FC(Z) = DZ(FC(Z)∗ = 0 (cf. (3.34)). Thus the matrix JFC becomes a block
diagonal matrix. For a QNE to be unique, the matrix JFC has to satisfy inequality (A.8)
with strict inequality. Since the game is proved to have at least one QNE (using Theorem
2), and since a strictly monotone VI has at most one solution (if there exists any), then the
strict monotonicity of the resulting VI from the game is sufficient to prove the uniqueness
of QNE. The strict monotonicity property requires JFC to be APD. In order to satisfy
this condition, we only need DZFC(Z) to be Positive Definite (PD). Given FC in (3.34),













































, l = q,
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and the operator ⊗ represents the Kronecker product. Furthermore,

























and the first inequality in (A.14) holds because both of the derivativesDWl(−∇Σq f¯q) and
DΣl(−∇Wq f¯q) are continuous which implies the symmetry of the Hessian matrix (i.e.,





Ωq,l,k ⊗GHqkSq,kGqk − Ωq,l,k ⊗GHqkM−1e,q,kGqk + piq,l,k ⊗ piq,l,k
)
−Ψ∗ql ⊗Ψqlwhere
piq,l,k , GHqkM−1e,q,kGlk. (A.16)
Recalling equations (A.10) and (A.11) again, to prove DZFC(Z) is PD, we rely on the
generalized Gerschgorin circle theorem [95]. Specifically, for a block matrix A in which
the blocks Aij, (i, j) = 1, . . . ,M are N × N matrices with complex entries, define the
matrix norm ||| • ||| in CN×Nas follows:




where || • || is a vector norm on CN . Using the Gerschgorin circle theorem, every eigen-
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value λ of A satisfies





for at least one 1 ≤ i ≤ M , where |||A−1|||−1 , infx∈CN ||Ax||||x|| , and I is the identity
matrix.






|||Ai,k|||, i = 1, . . . ,M (A.19)
for norm ||| • ||| in CN×N (where |||A−1i,i |||−1 = inf
x∈CN
||Aijx||
||x|| ), then A is a diagonally
dominant matrix. Also if the diagonal blocks are PSD, the condition in (A.19) is sufficient
for the matrix A to be PSD.
We can use the aforementioned Gerschgorin circle theorem, Proposition 8, and Propo-
sition 9 on DZFC(Z) defined in (A.10) to obtain the set of conditions with which the
augmented Jacobian matrix JFC is APSD. We also set the norm ||| • ||| to be the spec-
tral norm. (i.e., |||A|||2 =
√
λmax (AHA) where λmax(•) denotes the spectral radius of a






|||DZlFCq (Zq)|||2, q = 1, . . . , Q (A.20)
where λq,min is the smallest eigenvalue of DZqFCq (Zq). Using the strict inequality to
(A.20) –as required by the strict monotonicity– and since the diagonal blocks ofDZFC(Z)
are already PSD (i.e., λq,min ≥ 0 due to concavity of qth player’s utility to (Σq,Wq)), then
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|||DZlFCq (Zq)|||2, q = 1, . . . , Q (A.21)
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APPENDIX B
Proofs of Chapter 4
B.1 Proof of Theorem 7
Let the Lagrangian of (4.22) w.r.t σ be denoted as L(σ). Also, let the Lagrangian of
(4.24) w.r.t σq be denoted as Lq(σq), ∀q. For σ∗ = [σ∗q ]Qq=1, with σ∗q defined in (4.4.2),
to be a locally optimal solution of (4.22), the K.K.T. conditions of both (4.22) and (4.24)

















 = 0. (B.1)






which is the same as (4.25). Thus, as-
suming that iterative application of (4.4.2) converges to a NE, that NE is a locally optimal
solution to (4.22)
The local optimality of the NE requires proving that (4.4.2) converges to the NE .
Convergence to NE can be proved following the same approach used in [143, Appendix
A]. Basically, once positive secrecy of link q is achieved for all q, then the secrecy rate of
the qth link becomes a convex function of σr, r 6= q, r ∈ Q. Then, the convergence can
be proved using monotonic convergence theorem, i.e., the secrecy sum-rate becomes an
upper-bounded and non-decreasing function of the TxFJ powers at each iteration.
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Before proving this property, we present a useful lemma. We then leverage the result
of this lemma to the game in (4.24) and prove the uniqueness of its NE1. The following
lemma sets the conditions that allow us to approximate the secrecy sum-rate as a concave
function:
Lemma 2. For all links that satisfy the bound in (4.18), in the case of low interference,
the secrecy sum-rate Csec becomes a concave function of the vector lnσ = [lnσq]
Q
q=1.
Proof. Note that satisfying the bound in (4.18), or σq ∈ Dq, ∀q, withDq defined in (4.22),
is directly interpreted as either having an eavesdropper that is far enough from the links or
having not too demanding rate constraints at the qth link which leaves enough power for
TxFJ to satisfy the positive secrecy constraint in (4.18) (i.e., not ending up to the case in
(4.20a)). Hence, considering σq ∈ Dq, ∀q, one can set σq as σq = AqBq + δq where δq > 0
is upper-bounded until σq meets its maximum value defined in (4.22)2. Note that contrary
to (4.21) where δq is a small positive value, here, δq can take any positive value as long
as σq ∈ Dq. For example in the case of Aq < 0, we can set δq = −AqBq , so that σq = 0 as
in (4.21d). Replacing σq =
Aq
Bq
+ δq in the secrecy rate given in (4.13), wherein Gq is as
in (4.12a), we can have a simplified equation for secrecy rate given in (B.2)3. It can be
easily seen in (B.2) that with σq =
Aq
Bq
+ δq (or equivalently σq ∈ Dq), positive secrecy is
achievable because the second term in (B.2) is always less than the first term as long as
1Note that the existence of NE is already known, as the strategy set of each player is a closed and convex
set, and the utility of each player is a concave function of his action [106].
2Note that we do not simply subtract AqBq from P
jam =
Pq−γq
Nq−1 to find an upper bound for δq , as it is
possible that Aq < 0.
3The details of this simplification is skipped for the sake of brevity. Nevertheless, one can input the
secrecy rate in (4.13) with σq =
Aq
Bq
+ δq to a mathematical symbolic computation software such as Math-
ematica to obtain the simplified equation in (B.2).
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Csecq = log
1 + ∣∣d†qHqq∣∣2 γq∑Q
r=1
r 6=




∣∣d†qHqq∣∣2 γq∣∣d†qHqq∣∣2 |r†qG′q|2|r†qGq|2 δq +∑Qr=1r 6= (∣∣d†qHrq∣∣2 γr + ∣∣d†qH′rq∣∣2 σr)+N0

(B.2)
δq > 0. Assume that
∣∣d†qHqq∣∣2  ∑Qr=1
r 6=
(∣∣d†qHrq∣∣2 γr + ∣∣d†qH′rq∣∣2 σr) + N0, ∀q, indicat-
ing low interference at each legitimate receiver. Also, assume that
∣∣d†qHqq∣∣2 |r†qG′q|2|r†qGq|2 δq ∑Q
r=1
r 6=
(∣∣d†qHrq∣∣2 γr + ∣∣d†qH′rq∣∣2 σr)+N0, ∀q, which mainly suggests low interference to-
gether with δq > 0, ∀q such that |r
†
qG′q|2
|r†qGq|2 δq ≥ 1. Note that
|r†qG′q|2
|r†qGq|2 > 1 because the term
r†qG
′
q is a vector of i.i.d ZMCSCG random variables and the term r†qGq is a scalar ZM-
CSCG [120], the norm of these two terms is expected to be larger than one4. Hence,






(∣∣d†qHrq∣∣2 γr + ∣∣d†qH′rq∣∣2 σr)+N0
−
log
1 + ∣∣r†qGq∣∣2 γq∣∣∣r†qG′q∣∣∣2 δq
 . (B.3)
4One can use the law of large numbers as in [41] to prove this for large number of transmit/receive
antennas. However, we saw the same trend even for a moderate number of transmit/receive antennas.
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Let ρ = [ρq]
Q
q=1 where ρq , lnσq. Hence, (B.3) can be rewritten as








∣∣∣r†qGq∣∣∣2 γq∣∣∣r†qG′q∣∣∣2 (eρq − AqBq )
 . (B.4)







is convex in RQ [89, Chap. 3.1.5]. Hence, the first




. Also, the second term is a concave








|r†qG′q|2 )). Because we already have the
assumption of σq >
Aq
Bq
, then the second term in (B.4) is a concave function of ρq =
ln(σq). Therefore, the approximation of Csecq is a concave function of ρ = lnσ.
Now, let us turn our attention to the game in (4.24). In order to show that there is
a unique NE to this game (under the conditions of Proposition 3), we use contradiction.
Assume that there are two NEs for the game in (4.24), namely σ¯ = [σ¯q]
Q
q=1 and σ˜ =
[σ˜q]
Q
q=1. Hence, they both satisfy the K.K.T. conditions of (4.24) for all q, i.e.,
∂
∂σq
Csecq (σ¯)− λq + νTq1
∂
∂σq
fq(σ¯) = 0 (B.5a)
∂
∂σq
Csecq (σ˜)− λq + νTq2
∂
∂σq
fq(σ˜) = 0 (B.5b)











vectors of Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the TxFJ power constraints of Aliceq.
237
The result of Theorem 7 suggests that equations in (B.5) can be equivalently written as
∇σCsec(σ¯) + Υ1∇σf(σ¯) = 0 (B.6a)
∇σCsec(σ˜) + Υ2∇σf(σ˜) = 0 (B.6b)
where ∇σCsec is the gradient of Csec w.r.t. σ, f = [fT1 , . . . ,fTQ ]T , ∇σf(σ) =
[ ∂
∂σ1




T , Υ1 and Υ2 are block diagonal matrices with [Υ1]qq = ν
T
q1
and [Υ2]qq = ν
T
q2, q ∈ Qwhere [•]qq denotes the block on the qth row and the qth column,
and finally 0 is a vector of zeros (of appropriate size). Multiplying both sides of equations
in (B.6) by (σ˜ − σ¯)T and subtracting (B.6b) from (B.6a) we have
(σ˜ − σ¯)T∇σCsec(σ¯) + (σ¯ − σ˜)T∇σCsec(σ˜)+
(σ˜ − σ¯)TΥ1∇σf(σ¯) + (σ¯ − σ˜)TΥ2∇σf(σ˜) = 0. (B.7)
Recalling Theorem 7, at the NE of the price-based method, a locally optimum point of
Csec would be found. Thus, both σ¯ and σ˜ satisfy the following unilateral optimality for
every player q:
Csec(σ¯q, σ¯−q) ≥ Csec(σq, σ¯−q), ∀σq ∈ Dq, ∀q (B.8a)
Csec(σ˜q, σ˜−q) ≥ Csec(σq, σ˜−q), ∀σq ∈ Dq, ∀q (B.8b)
where σ¯−q = (σ¯1, . . . , σ¯q−1, σ¯q+1, . . . , σ¯Q) is the set of all TxFJ powers except that of the
qth link (equivalent notation also holds for σ˜−q). Convexity of each player’s strategy set
(i.e., concavity of fq) suggests that the terms in (B.7) that are related to the constraints can
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be lower-bounded as
(σ˜ − σ¯)TΥ1∇σf(σ¯) + (σ¯ − σ˜)TΥ2∇σf(σ˜) ≥
Υ1(f(σ˜)− f(σ¯)) + Υ2(f(σ¯)− f(σ˜)) =
Υ1(f(σ˜)) + Υ2(f(σ¯)) ≥ 0 (B.9)
where we used the complementary slackness conditions, i.e., νq1 ◦ fq(σ¯) = 0 and
νq2 ◦ fq(σ˜) = 0 with ◦ and 0 denoting the Hadamard product and a vector of zeros
(of appropriate size), respectively. Under the conditions of Proposition 3, we can approx-
imate Csec as a concave function of ln σ¯ or ln σ˜ where ln(•) is applied to each element
of a vector (cf. Lemma 2). The second term in (B.4) shows that for all q, the utility of
the qth player is a concave function of lnσq. Moreover, the approximation in (B.4) is a
strictly increasing function of σq. Next, the function lnσq is concave w.r.t. σq. Hence, we
can conclude that (B.4) is a strictly concave function of σq5. Lastly, the first two terms of
(B.7) can be simplified to
Q∑
q=1
(σ˜q − σ¯q) ∂
∂σq






(σ˜q − σ¯q) ∂
∂σq





(Csec(σ˜q, σ¯−q)− Csec(σ¯)) + (Csec(σ¯q, σ˜−q)− Csec(σ˜)). (B.11)
5Specifically, we use the fact that for a convex function g(x) and a non-decreasing convex function f(x),
the composite function f (g(x)) is convex w.r.t. x [89].
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Due to strictly increasing property of Csec w.r.t. σq and the inequality in (B.8), one can
consider that if Csec(σ˜q, σ¯−q) < Csec(σ¯), then σ˜q < σ¯q. On the other hand, as the second
term in the right hand side (RHS) of (B.11) suggests, Csec(σ¯q, σ˜−q) < Csec(σ˜) means
that σ¯q < σ˜q. This contradiction together with the result obtained in (B.9) suggests that
(B.7) does not hold except only for the case where σ¯q = σ˜q, ∀q ∈ Q, which contradicts
the assumption of existence of two different NEs. Hence, the NE of this game must be
unique. Also, the approximation of Csecq is a concave function of ρ = lnσ, ∀q ∈ Q.
Furthermore, Theorem 7 suggests that every NE of the price-based FJ control is a local
optimum of the secrecy sum-rate maximization. Thus, the unique NE of the price-based
game is the global maximum of the secrecy sum-rate maximization problem in (4.22).
The convergence of iterative optimization in (4.24), wherein Csecq is written according





, can be established by finding a Lyapunov-
type function of the TxFJ powers for the qth player, ∀q ∈ Q, and show that it is non-
decreasing w.r.t. σq and upper-bounded. We do not go through the details of this proof for
the sake of brevity (see [144], [145, Section 2.2], and [146, Appendix IV]).
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4
In order to prove this property, we leverage the concept of Fast Lipschitz optimization
introduced in [81], defined in the following:




s.t. xi ≤ gi(x) ∀i ∈ A
xi = gi(x) ∀i ∈ B (B.12)
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where
• x = [xi]ni=1 is the vector of decision variables (not to be confused with the informa-
tion signals defined in Section II).
• g0 : Rn → Rm is a differentiable scalar (m = 1) or vector-valued (m ≥ 2)
function.
• A and B are complementary subsets of {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• gi : Rn → R are differentiable functions.
For the case of g0 being a vector valued function, the problem in (B.12) is sometimes
called vector optimization, where the aim is to maximize all the elements of g0 with
respect to the non-negative orthant Rm+ (i.e., a proper cone [89, Section 4.7]), indicating
that all the elements of g0 must remain positive. A feasible decision vetor x∗ is said to
be Pareto-optimal if there is no other feasible vector x˜ such that g0(x∗) ≥ g0(x˜) where
the inequality is element-wise. If such Pareto-optimal point is unique, then x∗ is the best
achievable decision vector. The authors in [81] proved that if some sufficient conditions
(derived in [81, Theorem 7]) hold for the problem in (B.12), then a unique Pareto-optimal
point for the problem in (B.12) exists and can be found via the iterative computation
x∗ = g(x∗) where g = [gi]mi=1.
If the set of feasible vectors is a convex set, then one can convert the objective in




where ν is a vector of positive weights. It can be shown that any Pareto-optimal point
of (B.12) can be found by a proper choice of weights in (B.13) [105]. Looking back at
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the problem where the aim was to solve (4.17), it turns out that the same scalarization
technique used in (B.13) is actually used in (4.17) as well where the elements of g0 where
set to individual secrecy rates, the decision vector x was set to the vector of TxFJ powers,
and the weight vector ν’s elements were set to 1. Moreover, the uniqueness of the Pareto-
optimal point of (4.17) (i.e., uniqueness of NE of price-based FJ control defined by (4.24))
was shown in Proposition 3 for the case where the optimal TxFJ power is not necessarily
the maximum TxFJ power, i.e., σq = P jamq .
Here, we would like to show where using maximum TxFJ power is a unique Pareto-
optimal operating point, which can be proved by leveraging Fast-Lipschitz optimization
problems. In order to write the Fast Lipschitz form of (4.17), one can observe that because
the problem in (4.17) has no equality constraints, we can assume that its Fast Lipschitz
form does not have equality constraints, i.e., B = ∅. Furthermore, because in this proof we
are trying to prove the optimality of greedy method (i.e., using maximum TxFJ power),
we can set the functions gq = P jamq , q ∈ Q.
Now that we have converted the greedy method into a Fast-Lipschitz optimization
problem, we can use the properties of this class of optimization problems, specifically [81,
Theorem 7] to comment on the conditions that guarantee the greedy method is the unique
Pareto-optimal point. Because [81, Theorem 7] provides sufficient conditions (for the
uniqueness of the Pareto-optimal optimal point) when the functions gq(x) are assumed to
be of general types, we simplify these conditions to the case where gq = P jamq are constant
values. The general qualifying conditions in [81, Theorem 7] requires the following for
the uniqueness of the Pareto-optimal point:
• ∇g0(x) must have non-negative elements with non-zero rows where ∇g0(x) is the
Jacobian matrix of g0(x) w.r.t. x, i.e., the elements in the qth column of∇g0(x) are
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denoted as [∇g0(x)]:,q = ∂g0(x)∂xq 6, q ∈ Q.
• ||∇g|| < 1 where∇g is the Jacobian matrix of g = [gq]Qq=1 w.r.t x, i.e., the elements
in the qth column of ∇g are denoted as [∇g]:,q = ∂g∂xq ; and || • || is an arbitrary
matrix norm.
There exists a k <∞ such that
• The kth power of∇g, i.e., (∇g)k has non-negative elements.
• When k > 1, then ||∑k−1l=1 (∇g)l|| < z(x) = minq minr[∇g0(x)]rqmaxr[∇g0(x)]rq where [∇g0(x)]rq
refers to the element in the rth row and qth column of ∇g0(x).
Considering that in our case the elements of g0(x) are assumed to represent the individual
secrecy rates for all q ∈ Q, x is the vector of all links’ TxFJ powers, and g = [P jamq ]Qq=1,
then the last three items of general qualifying conditions are automatically satisfied (as-
suming that z(x) = 1 in case of having zeros at both its nominator and denominator).
Hence, we only need to satisfy the first item of general qualifying conditions, indicating




> 0, r, q ∈ Q, is the only requirement to guarantee that the
greedy FJ control is of Fast-Lipschitz form. Hence, the property is proved.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 5
In order to prove this property, we need to make use of the reformulation of the se-
crecy rate in (B.2) that we previously utilized in the proof of Proposition 3. According
to the proof of Proposition 4, in order for the greedy FJ –which results in using the
maximum TxFJ power at each link– to be the unique Pareto-optimal operating point,
6Note that g0(x) is in general a vector. Thus the derivative
∂g0(x)
∂xq
is a vector whose elements are denoted
by individual derivative of each element of g0(x) w.r.t. x.
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we only require every element of ∇g0(x) to be non-negative with non-zero row where
[∇g(x)]rq = ∂Csecr∂σq , r, q ∈ Q. Given that the secrecy rate of the qth user is a strictly in-




> 0, r = q. For the case of r 6= q, the term
∂Csecr
∂σq





















δr + ar + γr
) (B.14)
where δr = σr − ArBr with Ar and Br defined in (4.19); and δ′r = ∂δr∂σq . Note that Ar and










> 0, indicating that the
nominator of the second term in the RHS of (B.14) is always positive. Set the nominator
of the second term to Z > 0. Given that the first term in the RHS of (B.14) is always










: In this case the second term in the RHS of (B.14), namely
h(σr) which is a function of σr, can be written as
h(σr) =
Z
(σr +W )(σr + E)
(B.15)
where both Z > 0, W > 0, E > 0 and E > W 7. The plot of h(σr) is shown in
Figure 14.
It can be seen that if σr is reasonably low (which refers to a low power constraint
7We do not show the process of simplifying the second term in RHS of (B.14) to end up with (B.15) for
the sake of brevity. One can use δr = σr − ArBr in (B.14) to end up with the same result in (B.15) for the
second term in RHS of (B.14)
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+ h(σr) > 0. Note that it could be
the case that ifW is too large as is shown in Figure 15, indicating large interference
at the rth legitimate receiver or close proximity of Alicer to Eve, then even a low
value for σr cannot be enough to guarantee
∂Csecr
∂σq
> 0. Note also that for the case of
Ar
Br
< 0, although we can set σr = 0 by following the procedure in (4.21), we can
still use the above analysis to show that lower values of σr (in this case the lowest












Figure 15: Plot of h(σr) whenW is large.
2. If Ar
Br










: In this case the second term
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in the RHS of (B.14), namely h(σr) which is a function of σr, can be written as
h(σr) =
Z
(σr +W )(σr + E)
(B.16)
where W < 0, but E > 0. The plot of h(σr) is the same as Figure 14 with the
rightmost root shifted to the right side of σr = 0 axis because nowW is considered
a negative value. It can be easily deduced that for a large value of |W | a moder-
ate/high value of σr can make
∂Csecr
∂σq
























> 0, ∀r, q ∈ Q, and thus according to Proposition 4, the greedy FJ control
approach becomes the unique Pareto-optimal operating point in the network.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Without loss of generality, assume that σ∗q is a decreasing function of σr and χq defined
in (4.4.2) satisfies ∆σq < χq <
Pq−γq
Nq−1 , q = 1, 2. Furthermore, assume that the iterative
use of (4.4.2) is done sequentially, i.e., Gauss-Seidel algorithm in the sense of [107, Chap-
ter 3] is used, meaning that only one player is updating his TxFJ power at each iteration.
More specifically, let the initial TxFJ power for the qth player be σ∗(1)q , where the su-
perscript (1) represents the iteration index. In the second iteration σr gets updated using
(4.4.2) and σ∗(2)q = σ
∗(1)




r , and σq gets updated, and





rth player will select a smaller TxFJ power in the fourth iteration compared to the second
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iteration (i.e., σ∗(2)r > σ
∗(4)
r ). Consequently, in the fifth iteration, the qth player selects
a higher TxFJ power comparing to the third iteration. This trend continues until either
the qth player reaches P jamq or the rth player reaches to χr. Depending on which player
reaches to either of the extreme points faster than the other, the first four forms in the RHS




2 ), we first
derive the price above which we always have σ∗q = χq. Let this price be λq,1. Reducing
the inequality σ∗q ≤ χq, we end up with an inequality in the form of λq ≥ λq,1. Next,
we find a price below which we have σ∗q = P
jam
q . Let this price be λq,2. Reducing the
inequality σ∗q ≥ P jamq , we end up with an inequality in the form of λq,2 ≥ λq8. Because
σq is a decreasing function of λq, if P jamq > χq then λq,1 > λq,2. Thus, the tuples (χ1, χ2)
and (P jam1 , P
jam
2 ) happen when λq > λq,1, ∀q ∈ {1, 2} and λq < λq,2, ∀q ∈ {1, 2}, re-
spectively. An equivalent proof for when σ∗q is an increasing function of σr can be given,
which is skipped for the sake of brevity.
8Note that when 0 < λq ≤ λq,2, greedy FJ is optimal in terms of secrecy sum-rate, but it may not always
be beneficial for both of the links unless λq ≤ 0. The condition λq ≤ 0, ∀q found in Proposition 4 can also
guarantee the optimality of greedy FJ in terms of individual secrecy rates.
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APPENDIX C
Proofs of Chapter 5
C.1 Proof of Theorem 7
Using [107, Proposition 6.1], the fixed point iteration in (5.36) converges to a point φ∗
from any initial point iff ρ(A + B) < 1. We now introduce the following theorem
Theorem 12. [107, Ch. 2, Proposition 6.6] For any square matrix M and any  > 0,
there exists an induced norm, || • || such that ρ(M) ≤ ||M|| ≤ ρ(M) + 1.
Using the above theorem, since ρ(A + B) < 1, we can choose  > 0 arbitrarily close
to zero such that ρ(A + B) +  < 1. Hence, we can find a an induced norm ||A + B||
such that ||A + B|| ≤ ρ(A + B) + . Therefore, we are able to convert the condition
ρ(A + B) to an equivalent condition based on an induced norm, i.e., ||A + B||. We use
this result later during this proof. To proceed with further analysis, we need the following
definition:
Definition 6. [107] Consider the following iteration:
Φ(t+1) = T (Φ(t)) , t = 1, 2, ..., (C.1)
where T is a mapping from A (a subset of RQ) to itself, and t indicates the index of
1For the sake easy presentation, we omitted introducing the weighted norm, while this is the type of
norm used in [107, Ch. 2, Proposition 6.6]. Nevertheless, all of our analyses can be extended to the case of
weighted norms as well.
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iterations. If T is continuous and
||T (Φ(1))− T (Φ(2))|| ≤ Ω||Φ(1) − Φ(2)|| , ∀{Φ(1),Φ(2)} ∈ A2, (C.2)
where ||.|| is a norm in A and Ω ∈ [0, 1), then the mapping T is a contraction mapping




generated by iterations in (C.1)
converges to the fixed point φ∗.
Using this definition and the result of Theorem 12, we can show the iteration in (5.36)
as a contraction mapping, i.e.,
||T (Φ(1))− T (Φ(2))|| ≤ ||(A + B)(Φ(1) − Φ(2))|| (C.3)
≤ ||A + B|| ||Φ(1) − Φ(2)|| (C.4)
where ||A + B|| < 1, (C.4) is due to Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, and the induced norm
|| • || is chosen such that for some  > 0 we have ||A + B|| ≤ ρ(A + B) +  < 1 (cf.
Theorem 12). This result will be used later in this proof.
We now focus on min{•} and max{•} functions. The operator max{min{φ0, 1}, 0},
for some φ0 > 0, can be equivalently shown as a Euclidean projection. Specifically, the
Euclidean projection of a scalar φ0, denoted as [φ0]





s.t. 0 ≤ φ¯ ≤ 1. (C.5)
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The KKT conditions of this problem are written as follows:
φ¯− φ0 − ν + λ = 0, (C.6)
ν ≥ 0, φ¯ ≥ 0, νφ = 0 (C.7)
λ ≥ 0, φ¯ ≤ 1, λ(φ− 1) = 0; (C.8)
If ν > 0, then φ¯ = 0. Hence, λ = 0 and we have ν = −φ0, or equivalently φ0 ≤ 0. If
λ > 0, then φ¯ = 1. Hence, ν = 0, and we have 1 + λ = φ0, or equivalently φ0 ≥ 1. If






0, if φ0 ≤ 0,
1, if φ0 ≥ 1,
φ0, if 0 ≤ φ0 ≤ 1.
(C.9)
The right hand side of (C.9) is exactly the definition of the operator max{min{•, 1}, 0}.
Converting max{min{•, 1}, 0} to Euclidean projection, we use the non-expansive
property of Euclidean projection which is as follows [107, Ch. 3, Proposition 3.2]:
∣∣∣∣∣∣[T (Φ(1))]+ − [T (Φ(2))]+∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣T (Φ(1))− T (Φ(2))∣∣∣∣ (C.10)
The non-expansive property of Euclidean projectors can be generalized to all vector norms
because all vector norms (i.e., norms inRn) are equivalent, i.e., for any two different norm
|| • ||1 and || • ||2 ∃ α1 ∈ R and α2 ∈ R such that α1||x||1 ≤ ||x||2 ≤ α2||x||1, ∀x ∈ Rn
250
[95]. Hence, we have the following chain of inequalities
∣∣∣∣∣∣[T (Φ(1))]+ − [T (Φ(2))]+∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣T (Φ(1))− T (Φ(2))∣∣∣∣ (C.11)
≤ ||(A + B)(Φ(1) − Φ(2))|| ≤ ||A + B|| ||Φ(1) − Φ(2)|| (C.12)
Hence, ∣∣∣∣∣∣[T (Φ(1))]+ − [T (Φ(2))]+∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ||A + B|| ∣∣∣∣Φ(1) − Φ(2)∣∣∣∣ . (C.13)
Setting the norm in (C.13) as the same norm in (C.4), the best response of each player is
a contraction map, and thus has a unique fixed point (NE).
C.2 Proof of Theorem 9
Similar to the proof of Theorem 7, consider the following iteration:
Φ(t+1) = T (Φ(t)) , t = 1, 2, ..., . (C.14)
We use the asynchronous convergence theorem [107], which is as follows:
Theorem 13. The iteration in (C.14) converges asynchronously if the following conditions
are satisfied:
1. There exists a sequence of non-empty sets X (t) such that
· · · ⊂ X (t+ 1) ⊂ X (t) ⊂ · · · ⊂ X . (C.15)
2. The iteration T (•) must satisfy T (Φ(t)) ∈ (t + 1). Furthermore, every limit point
of Φ(t) must be a fixed point of T (•).
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3. For every t, we must have X (t) = X1(t)× · · · × XQ(t) where Xq(t) ⊂ Xq, q ∈ Q.




fixed point of the iteration in (C.14). Consider the following set
Xq(t) = {Φ ∈ A : ||Φ− Φ∗||2,block ≤ αt||Φ(0) − Φ∗||2,block} ⊂ A (C.16)
whereA = {Φ ∈ RQ : 0 ≤ Φ ≤ 1}, ||a||2,block = max
q∈Q
||aq||2 is the vector block-maximum
norm for a = [a1, . . . , aQ]T with || • ||2 defined as the Euclidean norm, and α = ||A+B||
with A and B defined in (5.34) and (5.35). It can be easily seen that iff α < 1 we have
αt+1||Φ(0) − Φ∗||2,block < αt||Φ(0) − Φ∗||2,block, ∀n = 0, 1, . . . . (C.17)
Hence, we can conclude that
X (t+ 1) ⊂ X (t) ⊂ A, t = 1, 2, . . . . (C.18)
The second item of Theorem 13 can be concluded from Theorem 7. As for the third item
of Theorem 13, consider the following. The set X (t) = X1(t) × · · · × XQ(t) can be
decomposed as follows for all t:
Xq(t) = {0 ≤ Φq ≤ 1 : ||Φq − Φ∗q|| ≤ αt||Φ(0) − Φ∗||2,block}. (C.19)
Hence, all three conditions required for asynchronous convergence of Algorithm 1 can be
satisfied provided that Theorem 7 holds.
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C.3 Proof of Theorem 10
Without loss of generality assume that Ω represents a set of multiple independent
(fictitious) Eves, whose locations (inside a given area) follows the PPP distribution with
density λ. Obviously, these multiple Eves can be simplified to one Eve provided that a
certain density and a certain area are given. Denote e ∈ Ω as an arbitrary Eve. Using
expectation by conditioning, the probability in (5.46) can be written as


















In our scenario, each Bob assumes Eves are distributed according to the PPP Ω in a





2 − 2dqqd′qecosϕ, where ϕ is the angle between d′qe and dqq that is




2 + β2 − 2dqqβcosϕ
)η
. (C.21)
Let d′qe = β. The expectation in (C.20b) is equivalent to Laplace functional of a point
process, so (C.20a) can be reduced to [124, Ch. 7]

























, q ∈ Q. The quantity γ in (C.22) is the SINR of a
one-branch diversity combiner with Nq interferers whose CDF is [127]
FX(γ) = 1− 1
1 + γ
. (C.23)
Using (C.23) in (C.22), we end up with






C.4 Comparison of Complexity and Signaling Overhead Between MRC and
MMSE Receivers
We first would like to mention that our work may not be applicable to devices with
low computing capabilities like sensors or IoT devices. Note that these devices likely do
not have multiple antennas anyway. However, our solution is in fact meant/designed for
multiple antenna systems, e.g., smart phone, laptops, BSs whose computing powers are
reasonably strong. We also avoided imposing additional computations on nodes in our
proposed algorithms. For example, in the linear receiver stage, we chose MRC receivers
instead of the MMSE receivers, as the MMSE method poses negligible performance im-
provement at the cost of additional complexity. In the following, a brief comparison
between MMSE and MRC receivers in terms of number of operations is given2
The first step to compute an MMSE receiver at each Bob is to calculate the covariance
matrix of the interference at the receive chain of each Bob, which is basically a vector mul-
2We skipped the detailed description of an MMSE method of reception for the sake of brevity. The
fundamentals of MMSE receivers can be found at [72, chapter 6].
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tiplication operation. Then, each Bob needs to measure the channel between himself and
his corresponding Alice and multiply it to the inverse of the interference’s covariance ma-
trix to establish the MMSE receiver. Compared to the MRC receiver, which only requires
the channel between Bob and his corresponding Alice, the MMSE receiver requires three
more operations (two matrix multiplications and one inverse) to be established, which can
be significant depending on the number of Alice’s/Bob’s antennas.
Regarding the calculation of TxFJ and RxFJ powers, we first need to reintroduce the
following definitions. The secrecy rate of Aliceq is denoted as Csecq , and can be defined
as
Csecq , max{Cq − Ceq, 0} (C.25)
where Cq and Ceq are the information rate at Bobq and the leaked rate at Eve from Aliceq,
respectively. Cq is defined as




where φq is the power assignment (PA) for the information signal at Aliceq, Pq is Aliceq’s
transmit power, aq is the normalized multi-user interference received at Bobq, bq is the
normalized self-interference channel at Bobq and p′q is the power of RxFJ. Ceq is defined
as




where cq is the normalized interference received at Eve (except the interference received
from the RxFJ of Bobq), dq is the normalized interference received from RxFJ of Bobq.
To analyze the complexity of our power allocation algorithm, we first focus on the case
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where full knowledge of E-CSI is available3.
C.4.1 Computing the Optimal RxFJ Power





P ′q, if bq < dq
0, if bq > dq.
(C.28)
where P ′q is the total power available at Bobq for RxFJ. It can be sen from (C.28) that
setting the optimal amount of RxFJ only involves a comparator to judge on the values
of bq and dq. Again, we assume that in the full-ECSI scenario Aliceq knows the channel
between herself and Eve; Moreover, MUI at Eve (i.e., cq + dqp′q
∗) is also known at Aliceq,
q ∈ Q.
C.4.2 Computing the Optimal Power Allocation between Information and TxFJ Signals
The optimal PA (i.e., φq, ∀q) can be found from optimization (5.27). The optimal solution
for PA (i.e., φq) can be found by simplifying the following equality:
cq = aq + (bq − dq)p′q∗ + δ∗. (C.29)
Notice that the term cq includes φq, i.e.,
cq ,
∣∣r†qGjq∣∣σq∣∣∣r†qGq∣∣∣2 +O (C.30)
3We need to emphasize that we use the full-ECSI scenario to build foundation for our scheme to handle
the case where knowledge of E-CSI is not available. The procedure for designing the scheme that is robust
to E-CSI uncertainties is given in Section V.
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where
∣∣r†qGjq∣∣ and ∣∣r†qGq∣∣2 are the E-CSI components, σq = (1 − φq)Pq is the power
allocated to TxFJ and O covers other interference terms at Eve. Hence, the simplification
of the above equality w.r.t. φq can be easily done. Note that (5.3.2) was derived only to
proceed with the game-theoretic analysis of the problem. A detailed procedure to find the
optimal value of φq in a node is as follows.
At a given iteration of our algorithm, say the nth iteration, after setting the optimal
value of RxFJ, in order to determine the optimal PA, Bobq needs to first measure the in-
terference at his receive chain, i.e., a(n−1)q +b
(n−1)
q p′q
∗ must be measured, where a(n−1)q and
b
(n−1)
q indicate the values of aq and bq at the previous iteration. Assuming that full knowl-
edge of E-CSI is available, Bobq also knows the MUI at Eve in the previous iteration,
i.e., c(n−1)q + d
(n−1)
q p′q






q ; 2) He adds the result of subtraction to d(n−1)q p′q
∗. Denote
the result of this addition as gq; 3) He finds the optimal PA in the nth iteration, which can
be described as (5.4.2) It can be seen that setting the optimal PA involves simple addition,
subtraction and division of scalar values. Moreover, there is no need to know all interfer-
ence terms at Bobq and Eve, only the aggregate of these terms (i.e., aq and cq) needs to
be known. Knowing the noise floor at Bobq can be helpful to measure the interference
level. For example, in 802.11 systems, the noise level usually stays at−90 dBm [29]. The
computation of PA when E-CSI and MUI at Eve are not known still involves simple scalar
operations, but is different in terms of the signaling it needs, i.e., the channels that Bobq
needs to know for his computations are different from the full-ECSI scenario.
Thus, to the best of our knowledge, users with reasonably high computational capa-
bility can still perform the operations required by our algorithms with modest complexity.






q . However, the
values of aq and cq can vary across iterations.
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C.5 Detailed Analysis of the Robust Scheme
Note that we focus on no E-CSI knowledge in only Section V. However, for the purpose
of laying a theoretical foundation, until Section V, we assume that E-CSI is available.
In the scenario where knowledge of E-CSI is not available, we are in fact focused on
optimizing the ergodic secrecy rate. In what follows, we give the details of our robust
scheme. We first present a detailed formulation of our robust scheme to show that our
robust scheme focuses on optimizing ergodic secrecy rate. Then, we provide the proofs
of existence of NE as well as conditions that guarantee it uniqueness.
C.5.1 Detailed Formulation of the Robust Scheme
We first need to revisit the main optimization problem in (26). We have
max
φq , δ
Uq(, φq, δ, ξ) = C
sec
q
s.t. cq(ξ) = aq + (bq − dq(ξ))p′q∗ + δ
cq(ξ) > 0
0 < δ < (dq(ξ)− bq)P ′q + J(1− tq(ξ))
0 ≤ φq ≤ 1. (C.31)
where ξ is a parameter that indicates all E-CSI components. Note that the terms cq, dq and
tq are shown as functions of ξ, as they depend on E-CSI components. When knowledge
of E-CSI is not available, the parameter ξ can be treated as a random variable, i.e., ξ
represents a random variable that maps the elements of a (continuous) set of random
events Ω to a real-valued vector which is referred to as E-CSI components. Now, we











the expected value of the objective in (C.31) is not enough to convert problem (C.31) into
a stochastic programming problem because the constraints of (C.31) also depend on E-
CSI components. Without loss of generality, let Ω be a set of infinitely many discrete
events ωi, i = 1, 2, . . . , which are mapped to random variables ξi, i = 1, 2, . . . . Thus, the
stochastic programming formulation of (C.31) can be written as [124]
max
φq , δ
Eξ[Uq(, φq, δ, ξ)] =
∑
i=1
Pr(ξi)Uq(, φq, δ, ξi)
s.t. 0 ≤ φq ≤ 1.
cq(ξi) = aq + (bq − dq(ξi))p′q∗ + δ
cq(ξi) > 0
0 < δ < (dq(ξi)− bq)P ′q + J(1− tq(ξi))
 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . . (C.32)






s.t. 0 ≤ φq ≤ 1.
cq(ξi) ≥ aq + (bq − dq(ξi))p′q∗
cq(ξi) > 0
 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . . (C.33)
Notice that in (C.32), the constraints need to hold for all ξi (i.e., all realization of E-CSI).
In the jargon of stochastic programming, the first constraint in (C.33) is known as first-
stage constraints, and the set of constraints that depend on ξi are referred to as second-
stage constraints. In the case of finite set of random events (i.e., finite realizations of ξi)
or some special types of objective functions, one can use two-stage stochastic program-
259
ming approaches to efficiently solve (C.33) [124]. However, the set of random events is
not finite in our case because the variations of the wireless environment are usually mod-
eled as continuous distributions. Thus, the formulation in (C.33) becomes prohibitively
difficult to solve with two-stage stochastic programming approaches. Therefore, we need
to settle with a sub-optimal solution that is easier to achieve. To do this, we look at (C.33)
again.
Recall that we already explained that the first second-stage constraint is mainly to
do with allocating enough power to TxFJ to achieve positive secrecy. Ensuring that this
constraint is satisfied across all ξi (i.e., all realizations of E-CSI) can be limiting. For
example, for some (less probable) realizations of E-CSI, the channel between Aliceq and
Eve can be a lot stronger than that between Aliceq and Bobq. Thus, ensuring positive
secrecy for this realization can force Aliceq to allocate most of her power to TxFJ, which
may be too conservative. We aim to avoid this issue by ensuring positive secrecy with a
certain probability, i.e., positive secrecy is ensured across a subset of E-CSI realizations.
In other words, the qth link needs to satisfy the following:
Pr
(
(cq(ξi) ≥ aq + (bq(ξi)− dq(ξi))p′q∗
)
≥ ε (C.34)
where ε is a given probability for ensuring positive secrecy.
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